

HRVATSKO POLITOLOŠKO DRUŠTVO  
Croatian Political Science Association



SVEUČILIŠTE U DUBROVNIKU  
UNIVERSITY OF DUBROVNIK


# 27<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of Central European Political Science Association

## **WAR AND DEMOCRACY: CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES UNDER PRESSURE**

*Dubrovnik, September 28-29, 2023*

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*Financially supported by the Faculty of Political Science University of Zagreb, Ministry of Science and Education and the Student Center of Dubrovnik*



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# WAR AND DEMOCRACY: CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES UNDER PRESSURE

*Dormitory  
Student Center of University of Dubrovnik  
Marka Marojice 2b, 20000 Dubrovnik*

*The Department of Economy and Business Economy,  
University of Dubrovnik  
Lapadska obala 7, 20000 Dubrovnik*

## PROGRAM SCHEDULE

### **Organizational Committee:**

**Goran Čular**, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, president of the CPSA

**Miro Haček**, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, president of the CEPSA

**Ana Matan**, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, vice-president of the CPSA

**Višeslav Raos**, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, vice-president of the CPSA


**Anka Kekez-Koštro**, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**Pero Maldini**, University of Dubrovnik

**Ivan Miković**, the CPSA Secretary

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Education and the Student Center of Dubrovnik*



## PROGRAM SCHEDULE GUIDE

PANEL NUMBER	TERM	DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMY - CLASSROOM (number of seats)					DORMITORY
		B2 (50+)	B3 (50+)	B4 (40+)	E2 (60+)	E3 (80+)	
	WED	<b>Participant registration (18:00-19:30)</b>					X
	WED, 18:30-19:30	CEPSA EC Meeting					X
		Dinner for CEPSA EC members, senior presidents and organizers (at 19:30)					X
	THU	<b>Participant registration (7:30-8:45)</b>					X
	THU, 9:00-9:45	<b>Conference opening session</b>					„Salocha“
		Coffee-break					X
	THU	<b>Participant registration at Department of Economy (10:00-10:30)</b>					
1	THU, 10:30-12:00	PT	IRSS	PP	PCP		
		Lunch break					
2	THU, 14:00-15:30	PT	IRSS			CP	
		Coffee-break					
3	THU, 16:00-17:30	PCP (a)		PP	PCP (b)	CP	
4	THU, 18:00-19:30	PCP (a)	CP (a)		PCP (b)	CP (b)	
		Common dinner (at 20:00)					„Salocha“
5	FRI, 9:00-10:30	PT	CP (a)	PC	PCP	CP (b)	
		Coffee-break					
6	FRI, 11:00-12:30	PT	IRSS	PC	PCP	CP	
		Lunch break					
7	FRI, 14:30-16:00	PT	IRSS	PC	PCP	CP	
	FRI, 17:00-18:00	Key-note Speaker Lecture					„Salocha“

PT – political theory


PC – political communication

CP – comparative politics

PP – public policy

IRSS - international relations and security studies

PCP – proposed closed panel



## KEY-NOTE SPEAKER LECTURE

**FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29**

**17:00 – 18:00**


### *Salocha, Dormitory*

## Nenad Zakošek

### **State-building, democracy and war: Comparing the consequences of the breakup of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia**

In 1991 two communist federations, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, nearly simultaneously fell apart. While the dissolution of Yugoslavia caused first major war in Europe after WW II, Soviet Union dissolved for the most part peacefully (apart from armed conflicts at the periphery). The Russo-Ukrainian war that broke out thirty years after the collapse of Soviet Union comes as a belated consequence of this process.

In the lecture the causes of different transformation dynamics of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are explored from the perspective of the closely intertwined processes of state-building, democratization and war. The focus is in each case (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia) on the two main republics, not only in terms of population, economic and political strength, but also because of the fact that their state-building processes have been historically closely interrelated: Russian Federation and Ukraine in the case of Soviet Union and Serbia and Croatia in the case of Yugoslavia. In both cases democratization in 1989/1990 caused the disintegration of the federal state and opened up the space for the completion of state-building processes of the constituent republics. In Croatia this immediately triggered off the war which lasted three and half years and in which Serbia was heavily involved. Russia and Ukraine peacefully transitioned into independence. Thirty years later Russian president has initiated a large scale aggression against Ukraine in the attempt to undo the consequences of the collapse of Soviet Union. The war has transformed Russia into full-fledged autocracy, while it threatens state-building and democracy in Ukraine. Simultaneously, Croatia has completed its state-building process, which is the main precondition for a possible consolidation of democracy. Serbia's state-building remains in limbo with the unresolved Kosovo issue and separatist tendencies among Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This has blocked democratization in Serbia and caused development towards a regime of electoral authoritarianism.



## Curriculum vitae – Nenad Zakošek


Nenad Zakošek completed his studies in political science at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, and then obtained his doctorate in political science at the Free University in Berlin. As a scholarship recipient of the Humboldt Foundation, he stayed in Berlin on two occasions, in 1998/99 at the Humboldt University with Professor Claus Offe and in 2007 at the Social Sciences Research Center with Professor Wolfgang Merkel.

Since 1986, he has been employed at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb, since 2008 as a full tenured professor. He held the position of the dean of the Faculty in two mandate periods from 2010 to 2014.

The focus of his research is on elections and parties, the political system of Croatia, comparative analysis of the transformation processes in Central and Southeastern Europe and theories of political development. From 2007 to 2013, he was the head of the research project "Elections, parties and parliament in Croatia", financed by the Ministry of Science and Education of Croatia. From 2015 to 2018 he was the head of the research project "Voters' preferences and voting behaviour in parliamentary elections in Croatia", financed by the University of Zagreb. He participated in numerous scientific meetings and conferences in Croatia and in a number of European countries. He published in scientific publications in Croatia, Germany, Serbia, Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Great Britain.

He was Editor-in-chief of the Croatian Political Science Journal *Politička misao* (2000-2005) and of the book series *Biblioteka Politička misao* (2008-2010). He participated in a number of civil society organizations. Since 2009 he is a member of citizens' advocacy and watch dog organization Gong (2016-2018 as president of its Council, since 2022 as member of the Council). From 1996 to 2021 he was expert adviser to the Zagreb office of the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation. From 2011 to 2015 he was external member of the Committee for Constitution, standing orders and political system of the Croatian Parliament.






## PROGRAM SCHEDULE

**THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28**


**10:30 – 12:00**

<b>PANEL PT-1: War, peace and justice</b>		<b>10:30 – 12:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Ana Matan</b>		<b>B2</b>
<b>Cirila Toplak</b> University of Ljubljana Faculty of Social Sciences	<a href="#">Peace in historical European cooperation designs: patterns to consider</a>	
<b>Matevž Tomšič</b> School of Advanced Social Studies	<a href="#">Human Dignity and Transitional Justice in War-Torn Countries</a>	
<b>Petra Kleindienst</b> School of Advanced Social Studies		
<b>Dániel Gyuris</b> Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Centre of Political Science	<a href="#">Revolutionary and wartime political iconoclasm and Monument-building in Ukraine during the 21st Century</a>	


<b>PANEL IRSS-1: Invasion of Ukraine and security issues</b>		<b>10:30 – 12:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Davor Boban</b>		<b>B3</b>
<b>Andriy Tyushka</b> European Neighbourhood Policy Chair, College of Europe in Natolin	<a href="#">Failing fast and forward? The EU's institutional and member states' response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the advent of protean power</a>	
<b>Barbara Bieniek</b> University of Silesia in Katowice	<a href="#">Russian Invasion of Ukraine– a New Chapter in Europe's Militarization. Nordic Countries case study</a>	
<b>Matěj Prášil</b> Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague	<a href="#">The Three Seas Initiative as a contemporary <u>cordón sanitaire</u></a>	
<b>Ondřej Filipec</b> Palacký University in Olomouc	<a href="#">Security Role of the EU Agencies in Responding to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine</a>	
<b>Katka Vavřínová</b> Palacký University in Olomouc		
<b>Monika Szynol</b> Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Silesia	<a href="#">The evolution of Central and Eastern European Countries' development and humanitarian aid for Ukraine. Supporting security?</a>	



<b>PANEL PP-1: Policy and politics</b>	
<b>Panel Chair: Marjeta Šinko</b>	
<b>10:30 – 12:00</b>	
<b>B4</b>	
<b>Boda Zsolt</b> Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest	<a href="#"><u>Discursive governance and populist policy making in Hungary: the case of EU sanctions against Russia</u></a>
<b>Łukasz Zamecki</b> University of Warsaw	<a href="#"><u>The full-scale Russian aggression on Ukraine and the changes in Polish educational policy: case of Matura Exam</u></a>
<b>Piotr Załęski</b> University of Warsaw	
<b>Petra Đurman</b> Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb	<a href="#"><u>Public participation in Croatian e-consultations: Who participates, how and with what outcome?</u></a>
<b>Peter Spáč</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University	<a href="#"><u>Mayors, Grant Requests and Strategies from a Gender Perspective</u></a>
<b>Krešimir Petković</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#"><u>Policy Goals as an Indicator of Policy Style: Contribution from Central Europe</u></a>
<b>Ana Petek</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	
<b>Nikola Baketa</b> Institute for Social Research	
<b>Anka Kekez</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	
<b>Marko Kovačić</b> Institute for Social Research	
<b>Mario Munta</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	
<b>Marjeta Šinko</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	
<b>Borna Zgurić</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	



<b>PANEL PCP-1: Authoritarianism in East-Central Europe and the Russian-Ukrainian war</b>		<b>10:30 – 12:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Jerzy J. Wiatr</b>		<b>E2</b>
<b>Hans-Georg Heinrich</b> University of Vienna	<a href="#"><u>Hungary’s roller coaster politics in face of the war in Ukraine</u></a>	
<b>Karin Liebhart</b> University of Vienna	<a href="#"><u>The Austrian Freedom Party’s Exploitation of the War in Ukraine</u></a>	
<b>Krzysztof Palecki</b> Jagiellonian University of Krakow	<a href="#"><u>The Russian aggression and its impact on the political situation in Poland</u></a>	
<b>Tomasz Rawski</b> University of Warsaw	<a href="#"><u>Post-Yugoslav nationalism and the war in Ukraine. The cases of Serbia and Croatia</u></a>	
<b>Jerzy J. Wiatr</b> European School of Law & Administration, Warsaw –Brussels	<a href="#"><u>Right-wing nationalism and the impact of war on authoritarian regimes: a comparative analysis</u></a>	




**THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28**

**14:00 – 15:30**

<b>PANEL PT-2: Sovereignty, EU and democracy</b>		<b>14:00 – 15:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Andreas Pribersky</b>		<b>B2</b>
<b>Aistė Deimantaitė</b> Vytautas Magnus University	<a href="#">Rethinking the concept of sovereignty in the EU and Central European countries in the light of the war between Ukraine and Russia: fragmentation or integration? National sovereignty or/and EU sovereignty?</a>	
<b>Gerda Jakštaitė-Confortola</b> General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania	<a href="#">Democracy as part of the U.S. Security Policy Agenda during the Presidency of Joe Biden: Implications for Central European countries</a>	
<b>Attila Antal</b> Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University	<a href="#">The Extraordinary Governance and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe</a>	

<b>PANEL IRSS-2: Politics of the Visegrad group</b>		<b>14:00 – 15:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Laura Gheorghiu</b>		<b>B3</b>
<b>Zoltán Gál</b> Faculty of Economics, University of Pécs	<a href="#">“Is the V4 the growth engine of Europe?” Geopolitical &amp; geoeconomic challenges in Central &amp; Eastern Europe</a>	
<b>Andrea Schmidt</b> Faculty of Humanities and Social Science, University of Pécs		
<b>Adam Kirpsza</b> Jagiellonian University in Krakow	<a href="#">Coalition building and bargaining success of the Visegrad Group countries in European Union lawmaking</a>	
<b>Janik Szabolcs</b> Centre for Political Science, Mathias Corvinus Collegium	<a href="#">Visegrad ‘À la carte’ – An alternative policy-based approach to the platform</a>	
<b>Vadym Zheltovskyy</b> Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw	<a href="#">Political discourse of the Visegrad Group leaders on the prospects of EU-Russia relations</a>	
<b>Andrea Schmidt</b> Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Pécs	<a href="#">Trojan horse or strategic alliance? Hungary and the V4 relations in the shadow of multiple crises</a>	



PANEL CP-2: Elections	
Panel Chair: Višeslav Raos	
<b>14:00 – 15:30</b>	
<b>E3</b>	
<p><b>Ingrida Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė</b> Department of Political Science, Vytautas Magnus University</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Analysis of the 2023 Lithuanian local elections: How much the war in Ukraine was important for electoral behavior of Lithuanian voters?</u></a></p>
<p><b>Daria Boratyn</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University</p> <p><b>Jarosław Flis</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University</p> <p><b>Wojciech Słomczyński</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p> <p><b>Dariusz Stolicki</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Beyond Duverger's Law: Formally Modeling the Number of Parliamentary Parties under the Jefferson-D'Hondt System</u></a></p>
<p><b>Liutauras Gudžinskas</b> Vilnius University</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Electoral resilience of mainstream political parties in Lithuania: securitization vs. endogenous evolution</u></a></p>
<p><b>Jakub Čapek</b> Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague,</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Incumbency advantage in the case of Czech mayors: Analysis of election results in 128 largest Czech cities</u></a></p>
<p><b>Michael Škvrňák</b> Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences</p> <p><b>Lukáš Linek</b> Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>There's Something Special 'bout People like us: Voter-Candidate Similarity and Preferential Voting</u></a></p>




**THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28**

**16:00 – 17:30**

<b>PANEL PCP-3a: The EU's neighbourhood after the Russian aggression against Ukraine</b>		<b>16:00 – 17:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Tomasz Stępniewski</b>		<b>B2</b>
<b>Tomasz Stępniewski</b> Catholic University of Lublin	<a href="#">Surviving a geopolitical earthquake? How will the Eastern Partnership change since February 2022?</a>	
<b>Marko Babić</b> Associate Professor, University of Warsaw	<a href="#">Between European Union and US/British policy in the Western Balkans: Integration or new spheres of influence?</a>	
<b>Andrzej Szabaciuk</b> Catholic University of Lublin	<a href="#">Migration from Eastern Europe to Poland (Central Europe)</a>	
<b>Artur Adamczyk</b> Centre for Europe University of Warsaw	<a href="#">The impact of Russian aggression against Ukraine on the enlargement policy of the European Union in the Balkans – Polish perspective</a>	
<b>Goran Ilik</b> Faculty of Law University "St. Kliment Ohridski"		
<b>Jacek Wojnicki</b> Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies, Warsaw University	<a href="#">Public administration in the face of the conflict in Ukraine, challenges and determinants</a>	


<b>PANEL PP-3: Energy and environmental policies</b>		<b>16:00 – 17:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Dario Nikić Čakar</b>		<b>B4</b>
<b>Sima Rakutienė</b> Faculty of Political science and diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University	<a href="#">Implementation of EU climate change policy in Lithuania: in search of political consensus</a>	
<b>Anka Kekez</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#">At the frontline of energy transition: how cooperatives empower citizens to produce and consume energy</a>	
<b>Andrija Henjak</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb		
<b>Ivan Miković</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb		
<b>Davor Boban</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#">The Russian Energy Power in Southeast Europe and the EU's Countermeasures</a>	




<p><b>Miriam Matejova</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University</p> <p><b>Peter Spáč</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University</p> <p><b>Vlastimil Havlík</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University</p> <p><b>Bartha Ildikó</b> Department for European Law and International Law, University of Debrecen</p>	<p><a href="#">Populism and environmental attitudes in the land of coal: results from a Czech opinion survey</a></p> <p><a href="#">What's Behind Market Intervention? The Example of State Aid in CEE Countries in Times of Crisis</a></p>
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<p><b>PANEL PCP-3b: Foreign policy perspectives in Central Europe</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Jaroslav Ušiak</b> <b>Panel Co-Chair: Péter Rada</b></p>		<p><b>16:00 – 17:30</b></p> <p><b>E2</b></p>
<p><b>Jaroslav Ušiak</b> Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica</p>	<p><a href="#">Visegrad Foreign and Security Cooperation after start of Ukraine War</a></p>	
<p><b>Péter Rada</b> Budapest Metropolitan University</p>	<p><a href="#">SurRealism of the liberal internationalism: the Rubik's cube of our world order</a></p>	
<p><b>Laura Nyilas</b> University of Public Service</p>	<p><a href="#">Visegrad Security and Strategy: a comparative analysis of national security strategies in the Visegrad countries</a></p>	
<p><b>Ewelina Kancik-Kołatun</b> Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University</p>	<p><a href="#">Problems of the Visegrad Group countries after the outbreak of war in Ukraine</a></p>	
<p><b>Petr Just</b> Department of Political Science and Anglophone Studies, Metropolitan University Prague</p>	<p><a href="#">Reviving Traumas and Grievances: Geopolitical Codes and Political Culture in Central Europe</a></p>	
<p><b>Nuno Morgado</b> Department of Geography and Planning, Corvinus University of Budapest</p>		

<p><b>PANEL CP-3: Populism and polarization</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Ingrida Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė</b></p>		<p><b>16:00 – 17:30</b></p> <p><b>E3</b></p>
<p><b>Lukáš Linek</b> Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences</p> <p><b>Lenka Hrbková</b></p>	<p><a href="#">Affective polarization during the election campaign</a></p>	



Department of Political Science, Masaryk University	
<b>Éva Ványi</b> Corvinus University of Budapest	<a href="#"><u>Politics or expertise? The impact of populism on the composition of Orban governments (2010-2022)</u></a>
<b>Natalia Stręk</b> Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian University in Cracow	<a href="#"><u>The populist strategy of Polish political parties in peacetime and wartime - a comparative case study</u></a>
<b>Jakub Krupa</b> Doctoral School in the Social Sciences - Jagiellonian University	<a href="#"><u>Us and Them. Populism of Polish political parties</u></a>
<b>Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka</b> Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce	<a href="#"><u>There ain't no cure for populism</u></a>
<b>Rafał Dudala</b> Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce	




**THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28**

**18:00 – 19:30**

<b>PANEL PCP-4a: The challenges to EU regional policies: Inclusion and development</b>		<b>18:00 – 19:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Simona Kukovič</b>		<b>B2</b>
<b>Petr Bláha</b> Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem	<a href="#">“Do we even have a chance?”: Local referenda in the Czech Republic and the structure of political opportunities</a>	
<b>Pavel Maškarinec</b> Faculty of Arts, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem	<a href="#">Women’s political representation at regional level and its determinants: the V4 countries in comparative perspective</a>	
<b>Lili Karácsony</b> Eötvös Loránd University Budapest	<a href="#">Changes in the regional development policy with the appearance of EU sources in Hungary</a>	
<b>Márton Maróth</b> Eötvös Loránd University Budapest		
<b>István Hoffman</b> Eötvös Loránd University Budapest	<a href="#">EU Cohesion Policy and the New Member States: Soft Power of EU Policies?</a>	
<b>Simona Kukovič</b> School of Advanced Social Studies and Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana	<a href="#">Enhancing Local Development through Cross-Border Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges</a>	


<b>PANEL CP-4a: War and change</b>		<b>18:00 – 19:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Hrvoje Cvijanović</b>		<b>B3</b>
<b>Vlastimil Havlík</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University	<a href="#">No more Ukraine, they say! The populist radical right framing of Russia-Ukraine War in the Czech Republic</a>	
<b>Alena Kluknavská</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University		
<b>Johannes Böhnlein</b> Institute for Political Science, University of Würzburg,	<a href="#">How Does the Russia-Ukraine War Affect the Formal Democratic Institutions of Neighboring Central Eastern European EU States? A Comparison of Two Different Developments in Hungary and Estonia</a>	
<b>Jan Holzer</b> Department of Political Science and International Institute for Political Science, Masaryk University	<a href="#">Putinism? Changes in the Identity of Contemporary Russian Political Regime</a>	
<b>Marta Żerkowska-Balas</b> SWPS University, Warsaw	<a href="#">Freedom or Fortress? Prioritization of Freedom vs. Security Among Poles in Times of Crisis</a>	
<b>Juraj Marušiak</b>	<a href="#">War in Ukraine and its impact on the attitudes of Slovak citizens to the migrations</a>	



Institute of Political Science, Slovak Academy of Sciences	
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<b>PANEL PCP-4b: Conspiracy theories and their impact on CEE politics</b>		<b>18:00 – 19:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Miro Haček</b>		<b>E2</b>
<b>Agnieszka Turska-Kawa</b> Institute of Political Science, Silesia University in Katowice	<a href="#"><u>Between Sacrum and Profanum. Dimensions of motivations of Conspiracy Theorists</u></a>	
<b>Tine Šteger</b> Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana	<a href="#"><u>The analysis of prevailing conspiracy theories in Central and Eastern Europe</u></a>	
<b>Pawel Matuszewski</b> Institute of Political Science, Silesia University in Katowice	<a href="#"><u>Conspiracy Theorists' communication patterns</u></a>	
<b>Miro Haček</b> Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana	<a href="#"><u>(Dis)trust into political institutions and conspiracy theories: case of Slovenia</u></a>	

<b>PANEL CP-4b: Political participation</b>		<b>18:00 – 19:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Bartul Vuksan-Ćusa</b>		<b>E3</b>
<b>Armin Mühlböck</b> University of Salzburg, Department of Political Science	<a href="#"><u>What Drives Political Participation in small to medium size Municipalities? Explaining the Effects of Population Polarization on Turnout at the Local Level</u></a>	
<b>Birgit Mitter</b> Salzburg Center of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg		
<b>Katarzyna Domagała</b> Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław	<a href="#"><u>All hands on board! Civil society 'tolerant' strategies opposing populist illiberal policies in Poland</u></a>	
<b>Aleksandra Moroska-Bonkiewicz</b> Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław		
<b>Michal Klíma</b> Metropolitan University Prague	<a href="#"><u>Rethinking the concept of extremism in relation to the new protest movements. The case of the Czech Republic in 2015-2023</u></a>	




**FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29**

**09:00 – 10:30**

PANEL PT-5: (I)liberalism, wokism and autocracy		09:00 – 10:30
Panel Chair: Berto Šalaj		B2
<b>Enes Kulenović</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#">The Spectre of Wokism: Social Justice and the Decline of Liberal Democracy</a>	
<b>Tonči Kursar</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#">Liberalism after liberalism</a>	
<b>Ana Matan</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb		
<b>Adam Szymański</b> Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw	<a href="#">Democratization and Autocratization in Multi-level Democracies. Case Study of Poland</a>	
<b>Chris Welzel</b> Leuphana University	<a href="#">Turning Quantity into Quality: Humanity's Amazing Births-to-Brains Transition</a>	


PANEL CP-5a: European Union politics		09:00 – 10:30
Panel Chair: Josip Lučev		B3
<b>Robert Sata</b> Central European University	<a href="#">War in Ukraine: Breaking the illiberal alliance against the EU</a>	
<b>Marta Żerkowska-Balas</b> SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw		
<b>Adrienne Komanovics</b> Corvinus University of Budapest Corvinus Egyetem	<a href="#">What has the European Union ever done for Hungary? Expectations v. reality</a>	
<b>Dario Čepo</b> Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb	<a href="#">Fundamental Values between Democracy and Autocracy: Analysis of European Values' Discourse in European Council Conclusions</a>	
<b>Goran Čular</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb		
<b>Sebastian Kubas</b> University of Silesia in Katowice	<a href="#">The understanding the Europeanization process by the EU and Hungary in the context of the implementation of the 2022 Conditionality Regulation</a>	
<b>Michal Garaj</b>	<a href="#">Slovak members of European Political Parties, Facebook &amp; War in Ukraine</a>	




Faculty of Social Science, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava	
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<b>PANEL PC-5: Communication science, democracy and social media</b>		<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Karin Liebhart</b>		<b>B4</b>
<b>Pero Maldini</b> University of Dubrovnik, Department of Mass Communication	<a href="#">Freedom of expression or its misuse: Is social media undermining democracy?</a>	
<b>Karina Czepiec-Veltzé</b> Jagiellonian University, Doctoral School of Social Sciences	<a href="#">How to conduct research on contemporary political communication in social media? An ethnographic approach oriented towards creative multimodal discourse</a>	
<b>Rudolf Metz</b> Centre for Social Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest	<a href="#">Prove your leadership (if you can)! Identity-based impression management and formation in online space</a>	
<b>Márton Bene</b> Centre for Social Sciences; Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law		

<b>PANEL PCP-5: New hybrid threats: Old risks redefined after Russian aggression in Ukraine</b>		<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Robert Mikac</b>		<b>E2</b>
<b>Robert Mikac</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#">Russian hybrid influence on the Baltic countries and the Western Balkans countries</a>	
<b>Vladimir Sazonov</b> University of Tartu and Estonian Military Academy		
<b>Věra Stojarová</b> Masaryk University Faculty of Political Science	<a href="#">The Night Wolves in CEE and the Western Balkans – Putin's Angels or Devil's Advocates?</a>	
<b>Josef Kraus</b> Masaryk University Faculty of Political Science	<a href="#">Comparison of hybrid interference against police forces and military forces</a>	
<b>Miroslav Mareš</b> Masaryk University Faculty of Political Science	<a href="#">Impact of Russian aggression against Ukraine on hybrid threats in the Czech Republic</a>	



PANEL CP-5b: Political parties		09:00 – 10:30
Panel Chair: Goran Čular		E3
<p><b>Beata Kosowska-Gąstol</b> Jagiellonian University in Kraków</p> <p><b>Dariusz Stolicki</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Why Do Some New Parties Survive and Most Die? Party Genesis Impact on Their Chances to Survive Measured by the Index of Candidate Continuity and Change</u></a></p>	
<p><b>Marko Kuček</b> Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg</p> <p><b>Dario Nikić Čakar</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Staying Loyal to the Roots? Party Origin, Voter Linkages and Deliberation in Croatian Political Parties</u></a></p>	
<p><b>József Dúró</b> Institute of Social and Political Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Changes in an Unchanged Situation. The consequences of the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections in the party system</u></a></p>	
<p><b>Dariusz Stolicki</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p> <p><b>Daria Boratyn</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p> <p><b>Damian Brzyski</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p> <p><b>Beata Kosowska-Gąstol</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p> <p><b>Jan Rybicki</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p> <p><b>Wojciech Słomczyński</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>Measuring Party Similarity: A Comparative Evaluation of Metrics</u></a></p>	
<p><b>Małgorzata Kaczorowska</b> Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw</p>	<p><a href="#"><u>For Peace You Have to Take Risks Just as Much as in War? The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Activism of the Political Parties in the CEE Countries</u></a></p>	




**FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29**

**11:00 – 12:30**

<b>PANEL PT-6: Moralism and realism in war and peace</b>		<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Luka Ribarević</b>		<b>B2</b>
<p><b>Szilárd János Tóth</b> Institute of Political Science, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest</p> <p><b>Attila Gyulai</b> Institute of Political Science, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest</p>	<a href="#"><u>Does the method make a difference? Realists in search of political normativity</u></a>	
<p><b>Domagoj Vujeva</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p>	<a href="#"><u>Morality and prudence in Kant's political theory</u></a>	
<p><b>Ádám Darabos</b> Research Institute for Religion and Society, Eötvös József Research Centre</p>	<a href="#"><u>Christian Realism – a corrective perspective for Hungary on the Russian-Ukrainian War</u></a>	
<p><b>Rastislav Kazanský</b> Faculty of Political Sciences and international relations Matej Bel University Banská Bystrica</p> <p><b>Lucia Rýsova</b> Faculty of Political Sciences and international relations Matej Bel University Banská Bystrica</p> <p><b>Radoslav Ivančík</b> Academy of the Police Force, Bratislava</p>	<a href="#"><u>Remarks to the debate between Realists and Liberals in the level of Alliance theory and its impacts to the security policy of small state</u></a>	


<b>PANEL IRSS-6: Multipolarity, EU and Russia</b>		<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Dario Čepo</b>		<b>B3</b>
<p><b>Josip Lučev</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p>	<a href="#"><u>Hegemonic capacity in an era of multipolarity</u></a>	
<p><b>Petar Popović</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p>	<a href="#"><u>Europe's 'Strategic Sovereignty': A reaction to conditions of non-polarity</u></a>	
<p><b>Anna Molnár</b> University of Public Service – Ludovika, Budapest</p> <p><b>Éva Jakusné Harnos</b> University of Public Service – Ludovika, Budapest</p>	<a href="#"><u>Issue of European sovereignty and European autonomy after the Russian aggression in Ukraine</u></a>	



<p><b>Stipe Buzar</b> Libertas International University</p>	<p><a href="#">Theory of a Multipolar Russian World. A „Coulda-Shoulda-Woulda“ Approach to Peace and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe</a></p>
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
<p><b>PANEL PC-6: Political communication in wartime</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Marko Roško</b></p>		<p><b>11:00 – 12:30</b></p> <p><b>B4</b></p>
<p><b>Gabriella Ilonszki</b> Corvinus University of Budapest</p> <p><b>György Lengyel</b> Corvinus University of Budapest</p>	<p><a href="#">Political and media polarisation in communicating war and peace</a></p>	
<p><b>Tanja Gradečak</b> Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University J.J. Strossmayer of Osijek</p> <p><b>Sara Erdeljić</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p>	<p><a href="#">How to (not) declare a war – the performative and euphemistic character of Putin's public discourse</a></p>	
<p><b>Anzhelika Savchuk-Konarska</b> Doctoral College of Political Science and Administration, Wrocław University</p>	<p><a href="#">Political communication in wartime. The comparative analysis of the war narrative on the official Instagram's of Volodymyr Zelensky and Petro Poroshenko</a></p>	
<p><b>István Hegedűs</b> Hungarian Europe Society</p>	<p><a href="#">War and Peace: Populist and Radical Political Communication Spread by Fidesz and Its Loyal Media in Hungary</a></p>	

<p><b>PANEL PCP-6: Reshaping transnational dependencies in the European Union's periphery: changing policies and perceptions</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Gergő Medve-Bálint</b></p>		<p><b>11:00 – 12:30</b></p> <p><b>E2</b></p>
<p><b>Imre Szabó</b> Central European University, Vienna</p> <p><b>Vera Scepanovic</b> Universiteit Leiden</p>	<p><a href="#">Manufacturing forever – What can the EU learn from the Visegrad Four about rebuilding industrial capacity in the 21st century</a></p>	
<p><b>Gergő Medve-Bálint</b> Corvinus University of Budapest and Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest</p>	<p><a href="#">Out of control: energy dependence and the green (non)transition in the Visegrad countries</a></p>	
<p><b>Sándor Kozák</b> Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest</p> <p><b>Miklós Sebők</b> Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest</p>	<p><a href="#">The German Enablers of Illiberalism: The Case of Orbán's Hungary with Merkel and the industrial lobby</a></p>	



<b>Anna Ürmössy</b> Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest	
<b>Visnja Vukov</b> University of Vienna	<a href="#"><u>Reshaping dependency through multiple crises: Spain in European context</u></a>

<b>PANEL CP-6: Voter behaviour</b>		<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Andrija Henjak</b>		<b>E3</b>
<b>Bartul Vuksan-Ćusa</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#"><u>The Wheel of Time: An Age, Period, and Cohort Analysis of Voter Behavior in a Post-Communist Context</u></a>	
<b>Višeslav Raos</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb		
<b>Olivera Komar</b> Faculty of political science, University of Montenegro	<a href="#"><u>Same old, same old: Attitudes of Montenegrin citizens about Russia's aggression on Ukraine</u></a>	
<b>Slaven Živković</b> University of Mainz		
<b>Boglárka Koller</b> Department of European Studies, University of Public Service, Budapest	<a href="#"><u>Comparative analysis of citizens' view on democracy in CEE member states of the EU</u></a>	
<b>Filip Kostelka</b> EUI	<a href="#"><u>Voter Turnout and Satisfaction with Democracy in the Post-Communist Context</u></a>	
<b>Lukáš Linek</b> Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences		
<b>Jan Rovný</b> Sciences Po Paris		
<b>Michael Škvrňák</b> Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences		




**FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29**

**14:30 – 16:00**

<b>PANEL PT-7: Violence, conflict and political identity</b>		<b>14:30 – 16:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Domagoj Vujeva</b>		<b>B2</b>
<b>Luka Ribarević</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#"><u>In the Beginning, Was There Violence? Thomas Hobbes's Kingdom of God</u></a>	
<b>Szilvia Horváth</b> Institute of Political Science, Eötvös Loránd University	<a href="#"><u>From stasis to agon: Political theory, the Other, and the post-stasis condition</u></a>	
<b>Laura Gheorghiu</b> Karl Franzens University Graz	<a href="#"><u>The Anatomy of Two Meta-Political Identities</u></a>	
<b>Hrvoje Cvijanović</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb	<a href="#"><u>World War Z: Ruscism and Russian Decolonization</u></a>	

<b>PANEL IRSS-7: Foreign policies and bilateral international relations</b>		<b>14:30 – 16:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Petar Popović</b>		<b>B3</b>
<b>Jan Niemiec</b> Jagiellonian University in Kraków	<a href="#"><u>Continuity and change in post-pandemic Turkish foreign policy towards the Western Balkans</u></a>	
<b>Miklós Teszary</b> Eötvös Loránd University	<a href="#"><u>From Orthodox brothers to stepbrothers? Montenegro-Russia relations in the shadow of the Ukrainian-Russian war 2014 - 2022</u></a>	
<b>Brucker Balázs</b> CERS, Institute of Regional Studies	<a href="#"><u>The End of Polish-Hungarian friendship? The effect of the War in Ukraine on sister city relationships between Hungary and Poland</u></a>	
<b>Péter Kacziba</b> Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Pécs	<a href="#"><u>The Nexus Between Populism and Public Diplomacy: The case of Hungary</u></a>	


<b>PANEL PC-7: War, disinformation and propaganda</b>		<b>14:30 – 16:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Pero Maldini</b>		<b>B4</b>
<b>Viktor Denisenko</b> General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania	<a href="#"><u>The discourse of "peace" in Kremlin propaganda in the context of Russia's aggression against Ukraine: the case of Baltnews</u></a>	




<b>Marko Roško</b> University of Dubrovnik	<a href="#">War in Ukraine: Content analysis of Faktograf's fact checks</a>
<b>Sandra Buratović Maštrapa</b> University of Dubrovnik	
<b>Monika Cverlin</b> University of Dubrovnik	<a href="#">EU defensive democracy versus sharp power. The responses of the EU to disinformation</a>
<b>Krisztina Juhász</b> Department of Political Science, University of Szeged	
<b>Romualdas Povilaitis</b> Vytautas Magnus University	
	<a href="#">Contradictions of foreign policy assessment in new media (the case of Lithuania)</a>

<b>PANEL PCP-7: The politics of numbers and rhetoric of indices</b>		<b>14:30 – 16:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Heino Nyssönen</b> <b>Panel Co-Chair: Jussi Metsälä</b>		<b>E2</b>
<b>Heino Nyssönen</b> Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku	<a href="#">Politics of Referendums in Nations in Transit</a>	
<b>Jussi Metsälä</b> Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku	<a href="#">Rhetoric of Numbers: Eight Indices in Comparison</a>	
<b>Heino Nyssönen</b> Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku		
<b>Jarosław Jańczak</b> Adam Mickiewicz University and European University Viadrina	<a href="#">Borders, migrants and refugees. Rhetoric of numbers in the context of west–east EUropean integration debate(s)</a>	

<b>PANEL CP-7: Political institutions</b>		<b>14:30 – 16:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Petr Just</b>		<b>E3</b>
<b>Krisztián Máté Lukács</b> Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem – ELTE	<a href="#">Bound to follow? Comparison of regimes with the theory of plebiscitarian leader democracy in the Central European region</a>	
<b>Jan Hruška</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University	<a href="#">Same Job, Different Approaches: Alternative Roles of Upper Chambers from the Perspective of the Czech Senators</a>	
<b>Stanislav Balík</b>		



Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University	
<b>Michael Drašar</b> Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University	<a href="#"><u>Who hold the presidential offices? Comparison of two European regions</u></a>
<b>Przemysław Żukiewicz</b> University of Wrocław	<a href="#"><u>Legislative party switching as a threat to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: myth or fact?</u></a>



HRVATSKO POLITOLOŠKO DRUŠTVO  
Croatian Political Science Association



SVEUČILIŠTE U DUBROVNIKU  
UNIVERSITY OF DUBROVNIK

## 27<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of Central European Political Science Association


# WAR AND DEMOCRACY: CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES UNDER PRESSURE

**- Book of Summaries -**


*Dubrovnik, September 28-29, 2023*

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*Financially supported by the Faculty of Political Science University of Zagreb, Ministry of Science and  
Education and the Student Center of Dubrovnik*



<p><b>PANEL PT-1: War, Peace and Justice</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Ana Matan</b></p>	<p><b>10:30 – 12:00</b></p> <p><b>B2</b></p>
<p><b>Cirila Toplak</b> University of Ljubljana Faculty of Social Sciences</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>PEACE IN HISTORICAL EUROPEAN COOPERATION DESIGNS: PATTERNS TO CONSIDER</b></p> <p>European cooperation and unification designs precede modern integration processes that have led to the present European Union of 27 by centuries. The earliest such idea is included in Dante Alighieri's 1314 De Monarchia. Almost simultaneously, Pierre Dubois composed a treaty entitled On the Recuperation of the Holy Land that tied perpetual peace to a reversal of the failure of Christian Crusades. At the time of the fall of Byzantium in mid-15<sup>th</sup> century, the idea of perpetual peace was revived by the direct Ottoman threat to Europe in writings of Pope Pius II and in in the extraordinary European confederation proposed by the Bohemian king Yuri Podiebrad. In early 17<sup>th</sup> century the politically biased but influential Great Design by the French Duke of Sully followed, the last to suggest war as the means of peace. In 1693, William Penn's enlightened proposals partly inspired Charles de Saint-Pierre's Project for Making Peace Perpetual in Europe at the time of the Utrecht Peace Treaty. Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay Toward Perpetual Peace thus did not come out of nowhere. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the list of theoretical peacemakers and unifiers of Europe goes on. In the aftermath of the Great War, the Paneuropean movement launched by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi claimed inspiration by de Sully's and Kant's designs and resulted in the initiative on the United Nations of Europe that came too late to prevent the Second World War. The post-War creation of European Communities, albeit dictated by the United States, was founded on genuine pacifism. Yet, the lasting European peace again only lasted until the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.</p> <p>Besides unification against common enemy and economic prosperity, lasting peace was a recurring motive in almost all historical European unification designs. Since the Enlightenment, it has been recognized as a precondition to any prosperity. However, its elusiveness has been owed to the historical inability of European rulers and politicians to prioritize common European interests before partial national interests.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> Peace, War, History, Europeanization, Cooperation</p>	
<p><b>Matevž Tomšič</b> School of Advanced Social Studies</p> <p><b>Petra Kleindienst</b> School of Advanced Social Studies</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>HUMAN DIGNITY AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN WAR-TORN COUNTRIES</b></p> <p>Achieving transitional justice in societies that have been severely traumatised by events in recent history, particularly by malfunctions and injustices of undemocratic regimes, is</p>	



important for stabilisation of political systems in the new democracies like those from Central and Eastern Europe. The mechanisms and processes of transitional justice contribute to the establishment of conditions for the realisation of human dignity. The latter is particularly under attack in countries, devastated by the horrors of war, such as Ukraine, which has been affected by Russian aggression.

The goals of the paper are 1.) thematisation importance of transitional justice as raising the level of (realised) human dignity in society, particularly of the side of victims of different types of abuse 2.) determining nation reconciliation which is a result of the processes of transitional justice as a factor of democratic consolidation; 3.) discussing the situation in war-torn countries – particularly in Ukraine after the end of hostilities. The authors claim that for the realisation of human dignity, the establishment of understanding and respect among different social groups through mutual acknowledgment of past iniquities (truth-seeking, i.e. finding data on events, their causes, and consequences) is of utmost importance. The process of establishment of transitional justice in the predominant part rest on the shoulders of political elites. Namely, the failed process of establishment of transitional justice is in predominant part caused by their (mis)conduct.

**Keywords:** human dignity, transitional justice, national reconciliation, consolidation of democracy, war


**Dániel Gyuriss**

Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Centre of Political Science


### **REVOLUTIONARY AND WARTIME POLITICAL ICONOCLASM AND MONUMENT-BUILDING IN UKRAINE DURING THE 21ST CENTURY**

This study will research political iconoclasm in Ukraine and its effects in connection to the Revolution and armed conflict of 2014 and the Russo-Ukrainian War. It will reveal that the struggle for occupying the symbolic and physical public spaces of Ukraine began well before the Revolution and only intensified during the subsequent conflict. The focus of this study is the observation and research of iconoclasm and the process of altering public symbols which occurred in less than 10 years in a definite geographical area. This process follows the patterns of other Central and Eastern European anti-communist iconoclasm which occurred after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the 1990s. In addition, this research will follow the pattern of wartime destruction of public symbols during the Yugoslav Wars. Radical changes in the symbolical space can be the precursors of political violence and the research on such changes in symbolic spaces help answer how the symbolical occupation of space turns into an actual occupation of physical space. That process is the expression and manifestation of the will of political domination. As a consequence of the symbolical occupation, the given political power signifies the act of actual occupation of space. When multiple political actors contest in the same and well-confined geographical and physical space then the intensity of iconoclasm and the replacements of symbols and monuments are significantly increasing.

**Keywords:** Political iconoclasm, Russo-Ukrainian War, Revolution, Ukraine, Symbolic space



<p><b>PANEL IRSS-1: Invasion of Ukraine and security issues</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Davor Boban</b></p>	<p><b>10:30 – 12:00</b></p> <p><b>B3</b></p>
<p><b>Andriy Tyushka</b> European Neighbourhood Policy Chair, College of Europe in Natolin</p> <p><b>FAILING FAST AND FORWARD? THE EU’S INSTITUTIONAL AND MEMBER STATES’ RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE AND THE ADVENT OF PROTEAN POWER</b></p> <p>The post-2022 moment of hard truth and bitter tragedy saw an incredible boost in the EU’s engagement in Ukraine and Eastern Europe more broadly. The EU and its member states helped cover Ukraine’s back with unprecedented (though, still, delayed, piecemeal and reactionary) military assistance, including the unhesitant deployment European Peace Facility, unwavering political support, humanitarian protection and over EUR 67 billion overall assistance mobilized by the EU and its member states, as well as, finally (and after unnecessary procrastinations since 2014 onwards) launching of a two-year EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM). In many regards, the EU is deemed to have rediscovered its unity, purpose and power. The views among the scholars and policymaking communities vary, though, as to whether this has been yet another moment of EU’s ‘failing forward’ (and thus learning from its past – failed – attempts to curb Russian covert aggression against Ukraine since 2014) or, potentially, a feature of the EU’s inherent ability to adapt to the risk and uncertainty, embrace complexity and mobilize the hitherto untapped (hard, sharp and other) power potential, that is its ‘protean power’. This paper aims to look into both the EU and its (Central and Eastern European) member states’ performance in providing Ukraine with diplomatic, political, military, economic and humanitarian assistance as well as into the changes that the nature and the scope of such a joined-up response have thus far triggered (and may condition further on) with regard to the development of the EU’s hard and protean power, including its defence and deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis belligerent Russia.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> Russian war against Ukraine; EU military assistance; hard power; protean power; defence and deterrence capabilities</p>	
<p><b>Barbara Bieniek</b> University of Silesia in Katowice</p> <p><b>RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE– A NEW CHAPTER IN EUROPE’S MILITARIZATION. NORDIC COUNTRIES CASE STUDY</b></p> <p>Russian aggression in Ukraine opened a debate on Europe's remilitarization. European states increased their defence budget and started investing more in army equipment as well as training to confront the presumptive enemy. The same happened to the Nordic countries (<i>Norden</i>) – Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.</p>	



I would like to bring up the topic of the Nordic region, which is perceived to not be endangered by the Russian military game. Those peaceful states with high democratic ranks and war-avoiding attitudes seem far from any military invasion. However, the three aforesaid states play a crucial role in stabilizing global order. The strategic meaning of the Gotland and Aland Islands determines whether Russia is able to threaten NATO and spread fear to the Baltic republics. Those states are responsible for the Baltic Sea and Arctic zone, especially Greenland. Soon, the whole region will be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which means that Russia will lose its uncontrolled power to trespass on *Norden's* territory. Furthermore, after February 2022, Nordic states started investing more in the army, weapons, and military preparation. Is it the end of peaceful Northern Europe? Are those states going to become new players in the global rivalry? Is it the beginning of time when the best-skilled soldiers and the most developed war technology will determine a state's position? Answers to these questions I will deliver during the conference.

Under preparation, I am oriented to include academic articles and books about Nordic militarization and defence concepts. The main methods I use in research are critical literature analysis, the institutional-legal method and document analysis.


**Keywords:** Nordic countries; Norden; militarization; Russian invasion; NATO

**Matěj Prášil**

Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague

### **THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE AS A CONTEMPORARY CORDON SANITAIRE**

A recent project of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) started in 2016 with an ambition to connect the Three Seas – Baltic, Black and Adriatic. The founder states Poland and Croatia founded 3SI intending to unite smaller eastern countries, which on the one hand, historically experienced communist regimes on their territory but, on the other hand, are currently members of both EU and NATO. The list of members also includes Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In the last year, also Ukraine received the status of a partner participant. Nevertheless, this is not the first time a similar idea has occurred. We can trace the 3SI roots back to the post-World War I. period when a Polish geopolitical plan, Intermarium, was proposed. Intermarium logically connected newly birthed countries in Eastern Europe, stretching between the Weimer Republic and the Soviet Union. Although France backed this proposal as a natural cordon sanitaire between the two mentioned states, the idea was opposed by most of the other Western powers and the prospective members themselves. The logical consequence of the described situation was the failure of the Intermarium, which idea was first destroyed by World War II. and ultimately, the subsequent Cold War. Is the current situation similar? Of course not. The direct threat from the East is indisputable. But in the West, the situation is entirely different. Still, we can observe a different historical experience of the Western and Eastern states during the Cold War. This practically divides West and East members of the NATO/EU regarding the level of support for Ukraine in the current conflict and in the long term, different foreign policy approaches towards the Russian Federation as such. This paper aims to examine through the geopolitical analysis conditions under which would be the use of the 3SI platform as cordon sanitaire (if you wish containment) of growing Russian aggression possible.



**Keywords:** Three Seas Initiative, geopolitics, containment, Russian Federation, Central and Eastern Europe

**Ondřej Filipec**

Palacký University in Olomouc

**Katka Vavřinová**

Palacký University in Olomouc

**SECURITY ROLE OF THE EU AGENCIES IN RESPONDING TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE**

The new institutionalism offers a unique theory aimed at analyzing the behavior of institutions, which are treated as independent actors having their own interests. This is also the case of various EU agencies which grew up in the former second and third pillars and which share significant security dimensions. This dimension has been significantly changed in February 2022 by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine which shaped the security environment and provided a new impetus for institutional activities. The main aim of the contribution is to analyze the response of selected EU agencies (European Defence Agency, European Institute for Security Studies, ENISA, and Europol) to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the context of new institutionalism theory with a focus on its individual streams (e. g. rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, social institutionalism, or discursive approaches). The contribution shall provide a comparative perspective on EU agencies in providing security and contribute to a critical assessment of the theory.

**Keywords:** EU agencies, Security, Ukraine, Institutionalism


**Monika Szynol**

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Silesia

**THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID FOR UKRAINE. SUPPORTING SECURITY?**

The main aim of this paper is to track the evolution of development and humanitarian aid transferred by selected Central and Eastern European countries for Ukraine concerning the changing conditions of its delivery. Ukraine has been a beneficiary of ODA (according to its OECD DAC definition) by those countries since 2005. By 2021, Poland provided aid worth USD 571.54 million, Hungary – USD 100.54 million, Slovakia – USD 19.42 million and the Czech Republic – USD 11.19 million. These amounts already indicate the diversified interests of donors in assisting this country. While Ukraine is a key recipient of Poland's aid (receiving 22.61% of total bilateral ODA spent in this period), for other countries of the region is marginal (the share of aid for Ukraine in bilateral ODA from Hungary was 7.42%, Slovakia – 3.98% and the Czech Republic – only 0.71%).

Therefore, it is crucial to answer the following questions: 1) What impact had the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, which began in 2014, on the transferred aid?; 2)



Have the assistance activities undertaken since then focused on strengthening the resilience of the beneficiary?; 3) What are the consequences of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine for development and humanitarian aid to this country?; 4) Do the four donors consider assisting Ukraine as an effort to strengthen their security?; 5) Is the aid of selected CEEC for Ukraine coherent with the trend of securitising development cooperation, i.e. subordinating aid to donor’s security interests?

The research is conducted as a part of the project “The Securitization of Development Cooperation. The Case of Selected Central and Eastern European Countries” financed by the National Science Centre (Poland) under the agreement 2021/41/HS5/01281.

**Keywords:** Securitisation, development aid, humanitarian aid, Ukraine, Central and Eastern Europe

**PANEL PP-1: Policy and politics**

**Panel Chair: Marjeta Šinko**

**10:30 – 12:00**


**B4**

**Boda Zsolt**

Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest

**DISCURSIVE GOVERNANCE AND POPULIST POLICY MAKING IN HUNGARY: THE CASE OF EU SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA**

The paper analyses how the Hungarian government framed and communicated its position on the EU sanctions against Russia. The analytical framework of the analysis is provided by the model of populist policy making (developed by the author with his colleagues, see Bartha, A., Boda, Zs. and Szikra, D.: When populist leaders govern. Conceptualising populism in policy making. *Politics and Governance*, 2020 8 (3), 71-81), and more specifically, the dimension of discursive governance of the model. Following the model, the paper argues that discursive governance is a typical feature of populist policy making and illustrates the point through examining the case of governmental politics concerning the EU sanctions against Russia, following Moscow’s aggression on Ukraine. From the Spring of 2022 on the European Union implemented a new series of economic sanctions against Russia, Russian companies and individuals, including freezing economic assets, restricting travel and transportation, prohibiting financial transactions as well as trade on a growing set of products. The Hungarian government, while successfully negotiating for some exceptions, ultimately voted for each measure. However, in December 2022 the government started a so-called “national consultation”, asking people’s opinion on the European sanctions and from January 2023 the result of the consultation, that “97% of Hungarians says ‘No’ to the sanctions” has been communicated in a nation-wide campaign. There is an especially stark contrast between what the government has said and what it has done concerning the sanctions, which is difficult to understand in light of the model of rational decision making.



However, the concepts of discursive governance and populist policy making offer a useful analytical perspective for the interpretation of this phenomenon.

**Keywords:** discursive governance, populism, policy making, sanctions, Hungary

**Lukasz Zamecki**  
University of Warsaw

**Piotr Załęski**  
University of Warsaw

### **THE FULL-SCALE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION ON UKRAINE AND THE CHANGES IN POLISH EDUCATIONAL POLICY: CASE OF MATURA EXAM**

Due to Russia's full-scale invasion on Ukraine, since 24 of February 2022 more than 10 millions of Ukrainians passed the Polish border. It is estimated that ca. 1.8 millions of Ukrainians stayed in Poland. According to data from the Educational Information System (data as February 2023) 187.900 Ukrainian children started to attend Polish schools and kindergartens. Approx. 144.000 of them attend primary and secondary schools. In the case of the latter group, Ukrainian youth have the right to take Polish state exams (Matura) enabling further education (including free studies at Universities). Therefore, we analyze the legal solutions related to the Matura exam and verify to what extent it really serves a kind of affirmative action for young people who are citizens of Ukraine.


The second and more important goal is a comparative analysis of the Matura exam sheets from 2021 and 2023 (Matura sheets from 2022 – the year of full scale invasion – are purposely omitted) in the field of:

- social sciences,
- humanities (history and history of art),
- the Russian language (one of six foreign languages to be choose from),
- and the Ukrainian language (can be taken as one of the six languages of minority groups).

We have verified how much the presence and content of elements related to Ukraine and Russia have changed in the Matura sheets. The sources used in analysis are – apart from the Matura exam sheets – semi-structured and unstructured interviews with the coordinators of the Matura exams in Central Examination Board. The results of the preliminary research lead us to conclusions about qualitative changes in the presentation of Ukraine and Russia in the Matura exams in Poland.

**Keywords:** Educational Policy, Citizenship Education, Ukrainian refugees

**Petra Đurman**  
Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb



## PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CROATIAN E-CONSULTATIONS: WHO PARTICIPATES, HOW AND WITH WHAT OUTCOME?

Public participation has traditionally been one of the central issues in both theoretical and empirical research in political science and public administration. Contemporary processes of globalization, Europeanization and digitization, together with decreasing citizens' trust in politico-administrative institutions, have made the phenomenon of participation even more prominent. Some recent events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have further emphasized the role of ICT in public administration. This paper deals with e-consultations as the main participatory instrument in involving general public in the process of issuing regulation in Croatia. The main research question is preoccupied with the characteristics of participants in the e-consultations (i.e., the public involved in the process of policy formulation) and its relation to the administrative responsiveness to public input. In other words, the paper explores what is the level and the type of public interest in various policy areas, and what type of public input is most commonly accepted. Research methodology consists of quantitative and qualitative content analysis of e-consultation reports. The analysis encompasses public consultations conducted via central *E-consultations* portal in Croatia in six-year period, from 2016 to 2021.

**Keywords:** public participation, e-consultations, public interest, quantitative and qualitative content analysis, Croatia


**Peter Spáč**

Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University

## MAYORS, GRANT REQUESTS AND STRATEGIES FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

One of main activities of incumbents includes collecting public resources for their constituencies. Previous research indicates that women outperform men in this regard, but this evidence mainly concerns national politics. Better performance of women is explained by higher barriers they face when entering politics and by negative voter bias. Providing women in politics anticipate these uneven conditions, they are motivated to deliver better performance than men even after being elected to public offices to increase their likelihood of re-election. This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the field by focusing on the performance of incumbents at the local level. To do so, I analyse more than 22 thousand grant requests from all 2,926 municipalities in Slovakia between 2006 and 2018.

I find three main results. First, women incumbents outperform their male counterparts by being more active in requesting grants for their municipalities. Second, this gender gap increases in favour of women with the increasing number of terms the mayors serve in office. Third, within the electoral term, mayors show the same pattern of grant requesting regardless their gender. More specifically, both men and women mayors ask for grants more often at the beginning of the term, and afterwards, their activities drop. However, this decline is reverted in the election year when mayors become substantially more active in grant requesting, probably adopting strategic approach to impress their voters. Hence, my findings



contribute to our knowledge of local politics by showing how women and men perform as incumbents at this territorial level.

**Keywords:** local politics, mayors, public resources, gender, grants

**Krešimir Petković**

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**Ana Petek**

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**Nikola Baketa**

Institute for Social Research

**Anka Kekez**

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**Marko Kovačić**

Institute for Social Research

**Mario Munta**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**Marjeta Šinko**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb


**Borna Zgurić**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

### **POLICY GOALS AS AN INDICATOR OF POLICY STYLE: CONTRIBUTION FROM CENTRAL EUROPE**

Important global circumstances, as wars, influence national policy-making. States are forced to transform their public policies and to modify their style of policy-making due to new international pressures and contexts. Still, similar occasions are often differently approached by national governments and their governance solutions diverge. The concept of policy style was developed in the 1980s to capture these varieties of policy-making across countries.

Even though the discipline of comparative public policies is quite utilized in the last decades and the concept of policy style is pretty popular, precise indicators of policy phenomenon for cross-national comparison are still underdeveloped. The concept of policy style lacks meticulous operationalisation, as there is no clear guidance on what data to collect and how, to conduct exact comparison based on systematic empirical analysis. Therefore, we propose a new indicator of policy style grounded in policy goals. Policy goals are central element of policy design, key structural part of any sector in any country. Additionally, policy goals, as the official statements on desired future, are the normative element in policy design that is strongly under the influence of politics. Also, goals are the design element first to change




during policy transformations. All of this makes them suitable foundation of cross-national policy-making comparison in unstable times.

Central European countries are not often included in comparative policy research in general. Policy style research in its beginning was formed on Western European examples. Newest edited volumes on policy style (Howlett, Tosun, eds, 2019, 2021), even though directly stress how the aim is to spread the application of the concept across the globe, still completely exclude Central Europe. Therefore, as our research is based on Croatian public policies, our regional perspective adds to the originality, novelty, and the contribution of our analysis. We explore governmental strategic documents by the rules of qualitative content analysis and inductively develop goals indicator of policy style.

**Keywords:** comparative public policy, policy design, policy goals, policy style, qualitative content analysis

<p><b>PANEL PCP-1: Authoritarianism in East-Central Europe and the Russian-Ukrainian war</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Jerzy J. Wiatr</b></p>	<p><b>10:30 – 12:00</b></p> <p><b>E2</b></p>
<p><b>Hans-Georg Heinrich</b> University of Vienna</p> <p><b>HUNGARY’S ROLLER COSTER POLITICS IN FACE OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE</b></p> <p>The war has produced some interesting configurations in the CEE area. While insisting on the absolute neutrality, the Orbán government has supported EU sanctions and has recently pulled out of the Russia-led International Investment Bank. High inflation rates and Ukrainian grain exports are a cause for concern, while the political alliance with the hawkish Poles appears unfazed. Unsurprisingly, Hungary’s U-turns and zigzags are mainly dictated by energy dependence on Russia hydrocarbons and the nuclear plant in Paks which is based on Russian technology.</p> <p><b>Karin Liebhart</b> University of Vienna</p> <p><b>THE AUSTRIAN FREEDOM PARTY’S EXPLOITATION OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE</b></p> <p>The paper discusses how the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) uses the current war in Ukraine in order to promote far right ideology and corresponding policy. The FPÖ has established close contacts with the Russian government, advocates ending EU sanctions, and recently started a new discussion on Austria’s neutrality status in order to politically</p>	



capitalize on corresponding identity constructions. The example sheds light on how the right wing parties use foreign policy issues for domestic political purposes.

**Krzysztof Palecki**

Jagiellonian University of Krakow

**THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND**

The Polish parliamentary election of October 2023 will be strongly affected by the war. Polish public opinion and political parties are uniquely united in the support offered to Ukraine. The open question remains, to what extent this will help the neo-authoritarian government of the Law and Justice party to renew its mandate.

**Tomasz Rawski**

University of Warsaw

**POST-YUGOSLAV NATIONALISM AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE. THE CASES OF SERBIA AND CROATIA**


The paper discusses the position of contemporary Serbian and Croat governments to the war in Ukraine from the perspective of the nation-building processes that took place in both countries after the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Special emphasis is placed on how the differences between the Serbian and Croatian experiences of the wars of the 1980s affect their political choices regarding Ukraine today.

**Jerzy J. Wiatr**


European School of Law & Administration, Warsaw –Brussels

**RIGHT-WING NATIONALISM AND THE IMPACT OF WAR ON AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

The Russian aggression against Ukraine resulted in the uneven polarization in East-Central Europe. In the majority of countries of the region, pro-Russian position correlates with the neo-authoritarian ideology and policy, but Poland is an exception, with both the ruling party and the democratic opposition taking a strongly pro-Ukrainian stand. Such exception results from the importance of nationalism as an important component of authoritarian ideology. Polish nationalism, as different from the Hungarian or Serbian ones, is – because of historical experiences – strongly anti-Russian, unlike the Hungarian and particularly Serbian nationalisms.



<p><b>PANEL PT-2: Sovereignty, EU and democracy</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Andreas Pribersky</b></p>	<p><b>14:00 – 15:30</b></p> <p><b>B2</b></p>
<p><b>Aistė Deimantaitė</b> Vytautas Magnus University</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>RETHINKING THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EU AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE LIGHT OF THE WAR BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: FRAGMENTATION OR INTEGRATION? NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OR/AND EU SOVEREIGNTY?</b></p> <p>The world is rocked by one crisis after another, and even before the heat of the COVID-19 pandemic has died down, Russia begins a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Most Central European countries, especially those bordering the aggressor country and Belarus, recognized the threat to their sovereignty and focused on all kinds of support for Ukraine. At the same time, the EU is reflecting on its dependence and actualizing the issue of EU sovereignty, which Macron and other actors already brought into EU public policy in 2017. EU leaders are aware that European integration must go hand in hand with European sovereignty. Despite these goals, however, the dilemma arises as to whether EU sovereignty really does not duplicate and confront the national sovereignty of the state, which has worried Central European countries and which Ukraine is now fighting for. Thus, the aim of this paper is to show the actualization of the concept of strategic sovereignty of the EU and its main directions in the community, and at the same time to examine the main arguments and considerations of the proponents of state sovereignty in Central Europe against deeper integration through both practical and theoretical research. The paper highlights the four components of the concept of sovereignty on the basis of which it is possible: community, unity and purpose, decision-making, and the subject of sovereignty. The point is to determine what EU sovereignty means in relation to state sovereignty, what EU sovereignty can be, where its functional boundaries lie, what communities it encompasses, what its purpose is, and whether there is a sovereign entity. And finally, what are the possible consequences and confrontations if it is (not) implemented?</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> sovereignty, European Union, war, Ukraine, national sovereignty, strategic sovereignty</p>	
<p><b>Gerda Jakštaitė-Confortola</b> General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>DEMOCRACY AS PART OF THE U.S. SECURITY POLICY AGENDA DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF JOE BIDEN: IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES</b></p> <p>In times of a disseminated sense of uncertainty, divisions amongst nations, challenges of foreign disinformation, and democratic model being under stress, the current president of the United States made the defence of the democratic model as a centrepiece of his security</p>	



policy agenda. Joe Biden, who defined democracy as “something more than a form of government, as a way of seeing the world and the rule of the people,” warned that democracy was “in peril” in the United States and around the world “in the face of autocratic forces”, and urged collective action in face of “sustained and alarming challenges to democracy”. This paper examines the question how the Biden administration positions democracy in the US security policy agenda and how does this affect the Central European democracies? What vision about democracy’s factor in security policy the Biden administration has (in terms of goals, instruments, challenges)? How did the Russian aggression on Ukraine affect Biden’s vision? How does the administration perceive the idea of democratic resilience and how does it plan to implement it? What role for democratic resilience is foreseen in Russia’s containment strategy? What are the main factors determining the position of the U.S.? What risks and opportunities does this idea present for the Central European countries? These are the questions the paper aims to address.

**Keywords:** Democracy, United States, Central European Countries, Security


**Attila Antal**

Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University


### **THE EXTRAORDINARY GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE**

The authoritarian populist right-wing has rapidly reborn in the field of authoritarian state and emergency governance, moreover the COVID-19 crisis gave a new rise this phenomenon mainly at the expense of civil society. The failures of liberal democracy opened the way of authoritarian populist right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which on the one hand remained integrated into the neoliberal capitalism and on the other hand dismantled the legal basis of liberal constitutionalism. Investigating the CEE authoritarian populist regimes (especially Hungary), it has been argued that Hungarian authoritarian populism and its regional followers established this politics from the migration crisis of 2015 on the permanent state of exception and extraordinary governance measures. The COVID-19 crisis offered a new opportunity to maintain and extend the emergency measures. Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister found the way to capitalize the pandemic crisis and introduced the overlapping exceptional measures. Relying on the political theoretical concept of exceptional governance, it has been argued and analysed in this paper that the new forms of authoritarianism in CEE are based on the extraordinary measures. The main task of the lecture is to examine the relationship between extraordinary governance and democracy, it has been emphasized here what are the main the impacts and risks of the use of extraordinary measures on democracy.

**Keywords:** state of emergency, extraordinary governance, Hungary, Central and Eastern Europe, democracy



<p><b>PANEL IRSS-2: Politics of the Visegrad group</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Laura Gheorghiu</b></p>	<p><b>14:00 – 15:30</b></p> <p><b>B3</b></p>
<p><b>Zoltán Gál</b> Faculty of Economics, University of Pécs</p> <p><b>Andrea Schmidt</b> Faculty of Humanities and Social Science, University of Pécs</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>“IS THE V4 THE GROWTH ENGINE OF EUROPE?” GEOPOLITICAL &amp; GEOECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL &amp; EASTERN EUROPE</b></p> <p>Economic cleavages within the EU involves an examination of the economic and financial relations that have developed as a result of global market reintegration and the accession of post-socialist states to the EU during the economic transition. Economic dependencies are interpreted in a historical context by introducing a post-colonial perspective relevant to the position of CEECs within the EU. Concepts of core-periphery relations in the form of postcolonial dependency regimes remain relevant for understanding the development of post-socialist states whose geo-economic positioning within the EU can be characterised as semi-peripheral and intermediate (post)colonial. The depletion and vulnerability of the FDI-led growth model also fuels discontent, economic nationalism and anti-EU populism, exacerbated by recent geopolitical (Russia-Ukraine war) and geo-economic rivalries (US-China trade war). The big question is how the CEE can reposition itself in the emerging new global order, both economically and geopolitically. We are searching the answer of how the multiple crises, the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the fractured trade relations, the tension within the V4 group and the illiberal Hungarian regime together with the unorthodoxian capitalist model can strengthen or question the perception that Hungary, together with the V4 group can be observed as the „engine of Europe”.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> geoeconomics, economic bordering, core-periphery, postcolonialism, Central and Eastern Europe</p>	
<p><b>Adam Kirpsza</b> Jagiellonian University in Krakow</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>COALITION BUILDING AND BARGAINING SUCCESS OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES IN EUROPEAN UNION LAWMAKING</b></p> <p>The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate whether and under what conditions the Visegrád Group countries, i.e., Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, are more successful in attaining their preferred outcomes in EU lawmaking when they build a joint coalition. Building a coalition is defined as either working out a common position on EU legislation or approximating preferences in order to present the closest position. Drawing from the spatial model of decision-making and the theory of coalition-building in the Council, the paper delineates several hypotheses, in particular that: a) The V4 countries are</p>	



more likely to be successful in EU lawmaking when they form a coalition; b) Building the V4 coalition is beneficial when the V4 countries hold extreme preferences on EU legislation; c) Building the V4 coalition is beneficial when the V4 countries attach high salience to EU legislation; d) The effect of the V4 coalition on the V4 countries' bargaining success is greater when their preference is closer to that of a member state holding the highest voting power, i.e. Germany, France, Italy, or the UK (until 31 January 2020). The hypotheses are tested using a multilevel linear model on the DEUIII dataset, which includes 363 controversial issues relating to 141 politically important EU legislative proposals decided between 1996 and 2019 (Arregui and Perarnaud, 2022). The analysis also includes several control variables related to, inter alia, the status quo position, the preferences of the European Parliament and the European Commission, policy areas, and legislative procedure.

**Keywords:** European Union, Visegrád Group, bargaining success, EU lawmaking, coalition building


**Janik Szabolcs**

Centre for Political Science, Mathias Corvinus Collegium

### VISEGRAD 'À LA CARTE' – AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY-BASED APPROACH TO THE PLATFORM

The devastating war in Ukraine has brought new dynamics into European politics, including subregional groupings and intergovernmental platforms that are a permanent feature of Europe's political landscape. Among them we find the 32-year-old Visegrad Group (VG), comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The platform fulfilled its original objective in 2004 with the Euro-Atlantic integration of its members. However, the four countries decided to continue their cooperation after the EU accession on a wide range of policy areas and political issues and in various forms. Public and academic interest in Visegrad grew significantly after the 2015 European migration crisis, which seemingly cemented the platform. In the literature we find several valuable attempts to categorise, define and assess Visegrad, most of them emphasising its subregional and complementary nature vis-à-vis the European Union. Nevertheless, we argue that the very essence of Visegrad is missing from most of such attempts, which is the diversity of policy areas and political issues addressed by the VG and the variety in the specific forms of cooperation. In this study we present selected examples of Visegrad cooperation from 2015 to illustrate this diversity, also including some areas and issues where cooperation could have materialised, but due to diverging interests and positions finally has not. In this respect, we also touch upon the lack of common policy action regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine (and more generally the lack of a Visegrad Russia policy). At the end of the paper we offer an alternative theoretical approach to describe Visegrad, borrowed from (EU) integration theory.

**Keywords:** Visegrad Group, regional cooperation, European politics, policy analysis, integration theory



**Vadym Zheltovskyy**

Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw

**POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP LEADERS ON THE PROSPECTS OF EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS**

The main purpose of the paper proposal is to analyze the issue of EU-Russia relations in the political discourse of the Visegrad Group leaders in the context of Russia's full-scale military aggression against Ukraine. Based on the analysis of selected speeches, the proposal focuses on explaining the style of political leadership of the prime ministers from V4 countries. Additionally, the accent is put on the main elements of their vision regarding the transformation of the EU foreign policy. Particular attention is paid to the issue of future format of EU-Russia relations, as well as to the issue of EU enlargement. For this purpose, a comparative analysis of the V4 prime ministers' leadership style evolution was carried out in relation to the issue of cooperation with Russia in 2014-2022 and after the full-scale Russian invasion that took place on February 24, 2022.

**Keywords:** EU-Russia relation, transformational leadership, political discourse, the Visegrad Group


**Andrea Schmidt**

Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Pécs


**TROJAN HORSE OR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE? HUNGARY AND THE V4 RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF MULTIPLE CRISES**

The Visegrad Group celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2021. The countries that were considered the most prominent students during the period of regime change have survived multiple shocks over the past thirty years, with crises and strong cohesion. This multi-level crisis can be basically justified by the economic shocks, the migrant issue, the economic crisis caused by the covid and the war in the neighbourhood. The war in one of the group's neighbours, Ukraine, which has also driven a wedge into what was once considered a rock-solid Polish-Hungarian friendship. Our intention in this paper is to shed some light on this crisis, primarily from a Hungarian perspective, placing it in some historical and political context. The paper will focus on the question of how the Hungarian dependent stance has led, among other things, from a rock-solid Polish-Hungarian cooperation to isolationism, and to what extent the specific Hungarian stance and orientation has been a hindrance in decades of regional integration, such as the functioning of the Visegrad Group. Our analysis focuses on the problem how the Hungarian specific standpoint can be measured and how the traditional economic and political cooperations should be reconsidered.

**Keywords:** V4, Poland, Hungary, economics



<p><b>PANEL CP-2: Elections</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Višeslav Raos</b></p>	<p><b>14:00 – 15:30</b></p> <p><b>E3</b></p>
<p><b>Ingrida Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė</b> Department of Political Science, Vytautas Magnus University</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>ANALYSIS OF THE 2023 LITHUANIAN LOCAL ELECTIONS: HOW MUCH THE WAR IN UKRAINE WAS IMPORTANT FOR ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR OF LITHUANIAN VOTERS?</b></p> <p>In March 2023, Lithuania held local elections electing municipal councils and mayors for 60 municipalities. The elections were a chance for Lithuanian citizens to evaluate the work of local authorities and to use their votes to try and elect the best people who will represent them for the next four years. While voter turnout was below 50 percent (48.97), it was the highest turnout for local elections in two decades, according to the Central Electoral Commission. Many parties took this election as an important test of how they would perform in next year's Lithuanian Parliament, Presidential, and European Parliament elections. Generally, the opposition parties have performed better than the ruling parties. In 38 municipalities incumbent mayors have been re-elected. The mentioned results raise many questions regarding the factors influencing the increased voters' participation in elections and their choices. Why the turnout was higher than in previous elections? How much the active participation in elections was influenced by the war in Ukraine and security threats? What topics dominated the campaigning? Was the rhetoric of candidates important in making voting decisions? Was the candidate's view towards war in Ukraine or/and relations with Russia an important factor in evaluating candidates? What factors – insecurity and pursuit of stability or really good results of the municipality work could have an effect on the victory of incumbents? This presentation aims at answering the mentioned questions by analyzing the election statistics, campaign events such as candidates' debates, communication in social media and news media portals as well as data public opinion polls.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> The Lithuanian municipal elections, campaign communication, election behavior, social media, war in Ukraine</p>	
<p><b>Daria Boratyn</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University</p> <p><b>Jarosław Flis</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University</p> <p><b>Wojciech Słomczyński</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p> <p><b>Dariusz Stolicki</b> Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków</p>	



## BEYOND DUVERGER'S LAW: FORMALLY MODELING THE NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES UNDER THE JEFFERSON-D'HONDT SYSTEM

Existing models of the relationship between the number of relevant parties and the electoral formula range from purely empirical regression models to heuristics with little grounding in formal theory (such as the Taagepera-Shugart Seat-Product Model). But the question of a mechanical effect of the electoral system on the number of parties given some probabilistic model of vote distribution can be treated as a purely mathematical one. This is the approach we take, starting with a probabilistic electoral model and working deductively to obtain a formula for the expected number of relevant parties. The paper combines methods from apportionment theory, probability theory, game theory, and computational social choice with classical electoral studies approaches. Not only the resulting model is better grounded in formal theory, our preliminary research indicates that it is also significantly more accurate than competing models.

**Keywords:** electoral systems, Jefferson--D'Hondt, party systems, relevant parties


**Liutauras Gudžinskas**  
Vilnius University

## ELECTORAL RESILIENCE OF MAINSTREAM POLITICAL PARTIES IN LITHUANIA: SECURITIZATION VS. ENDOGENOUS EVOLUTION

Lithuanian party system can be described as highly volatile (Cabada et al. 2014) as well as fragmented and hardly predictable (Casal Bertoa & Enyedi 2021). However, the country has so far avoided democratic backsliding happening in many other East-Central European states. Moreover, despite multiple waves of populism since the election of President Rolandas Paksas in 2003, the mainstream political parties, such as the centre-right Conservatives, and Liberals, as well as the centre-left Social Democrats, have managed to survive and remain on the top. In addition, the Eurosceptic forces, albeit increasingly vocal and visible in the public space, still struggle to overcome the electoral threshold. One explanation relates these anti-populist and anti-Eurosceptic tendencies with the salience of external security dimension of Lithuanian political system. According to it, being sandwiched between Kaliningrad oblast and Belarus, both the elite and the society support further strengthening ties with the West, which also encourages them to uphold the liberal democracy and its values. The paper will test this 'exogenous' theory of securitization against an alternative approach that emphasizes 'endogenous evolution' of mainstream political parties to counter and adapt to the populist challenge.

**Keywords:** mainstream parties, populists, Euroscepticism, securitization, party evolution

**Jakub Čapek**  
Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague



## INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE IN THE CASE OF CZECH MAYORS: ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS IN 128 LARGEST CZECH CITIES

In the Czech Republic, the position of mayors is one of the most important in the entire political system. Many mayors use their strength to advance to the higher levels of the political system or to defend their office. The impact of the so-called incumbency effect, a condition where the incumbents have an advantage over their opponents, on the results of elections has long been known. However, it is still a rather marginal part of research, especially in Central Europe. The Czech Republic is a unique case in terms of its municipal structure, which is very fragmented and because local politics have a huge influence on the highest level of the political system. Also, the electoral system at the municipal level focuses on electoral lists and not individuals. This paper focuses on the mayors that are able to defend their positions in several consecutive electoral periods. It examines whether we can observe the manifestation of incumbency advantage among Czech mayors and how high this advantage is. To do so, it uses a database compiled from mayors of the 128 largest cities in the Czech Republic, excluding Prague. It contains electoral data of successful incumbents between 2002 and 2018. It can be concluded that these mayors have an advantage over their challengers while they are incumbents. This is reflected in the high proportion of cases where mayors defend their post, which happens on average in more than 50 % of cases. This points to the fact that the incumbency effect is large even though the electoral system is not supportive.

**Keywords:** Incumbency advantage, mayor, local politics, election

**Michael Škvrňák**


Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences

**Lukáš Linek**

Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences

## THERE'S SOMETHING SPECIAL 'BOUT PEOPLE LIKE US: VOTER-CANDIDATE SIMILARITY AND PREFERENTIAL VOTING

The research on preferential voting suffers from the lack of survey data on which candidates attract votes from which voters. Apart from the effects of gender, the effect of voter-candidate similarity on casting preferential votes remains understudied. Using the data from a three-wave panel survey conducted during the 2021 Czech general election, we construct dyadic data containing attributes of both candidates and voters to estimate multi-level models to explain casting preferential votes based on voter-candidate similarity. We evaluate the effect of voter-candidate congruence in gender, location, age, university education, and partisanship. Contrary to the previous research, all of these attributes are included (or can be deduced from the information) on the ballot, therefore we assume that the difference in the effect is related to the voters' preferences, not their direct knowledge of candidates. Regarding partisanship, we exploit the fact that contenders in the 2021 general election were two pre-electoral coalitions: Spolu (Together), composed of three right-wing parties, and the Pirates and Mayors coalition containing two parties. We find that the congruence in location, gender, and partisanship has a positive effect on the probability of casting a preferential vote,



while age and education does not have a substantial effect. In addition, we find that the effect of partisanship is affected by the strength of voters' party identification with strong partisans having a higher probability of casting a preferential vote for a party candidate.

**Keywords:** Campaign, Electoral Behaviour, Experimental Design, Political Psychology, Survey Experiments, Survey Research, Voting, Voting Behaviour

**PANEL PCP-3a: The EU's neighbourhood after the Russian aggression against Ukraine**

**16:00 – 17:30**

**Panel Chair: Tomasz Stępniewski**

**B2**

**Tomasz Stępniewski**  
Catholic University of Lublin

**SURVIVING A GEOPOLITICAL EARTHQUAKE? HOW WILL THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP CHANGE SINCE FEBRUARY 2022?**


The paper aims at outlining the EU policy, including Poland's role in its development, towards the Union's eastern neighbours, encompassed by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP). The situation of the EU's eastern neighbours has become considerably complicated in the last years. The Euromaidan revolution and the war in Donbas have led EU Member States to direct their efforts towards stabilising the situation in Ukraine. As a consequence, discussions of future prospects and the EU policy towards Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus have been set aside. The paper will also attempt to indicate the required modifications in the logic of the ENP and EaP. As the situation in the southern and eastern neighbourhood proves, with no changes in the neighbourhood policy, the EU will be unable to react to conflicts and the rapidly changing reality. Both the EU and its neighbourhood are undergoing changes. For that reason, the policy of conditionality, which is the basis of the ENP, ought to be modified with the EU's objectives and interests towards the neighbourhood in mind.

**Keywords:** European Union, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Eastern Partnership

**Marko Babić**  
Associate Professor, University of Warsaw

**BETWEEN EUROPEAN UNION AND US/BRITISH POLICY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: INTEGRATION OR NEW SPHERES OF INFLUENCE?**

Today it is more than obvious that EU Policy of Enlargement has been put on hold for a long time. The problem is that the idea of integrating Western Balkans into the European Union was seen as a remedy for political and economic stability in the region. Facing the war in



Ukraine and potential destabilization of the region, the US and Great Britain introduced a new idea of bringing the region close to its Western allies and keeping Russia and others out. The idea is to propose three spheres of influence in the region: Croatian, Serbian and Albanian. External borders will not be changed, however, political and economic control will be imposed in: 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Zagreb, Republika Srpska to Belgrade), 2. Montenegro (to Belgrade), Kosovo (to Tirana) and Northern Macedonia (western Macedonia with largely Albanian population to Tirana, other parts of Macedonia to Belgrade). The problem with this concept is that has never been published, there are no official documents, however, policies that are underway in the region clearly suggest that this project has been actual for some time.

**Keywords:** Integration, Sphere of Influence, USA, Western Balkans, European Union

**Andrzej Szabaciuk**

Catholic University of Lublin

### **MIGRATION FROM EASTERN EUROPE TO POLAND (CENTRAL EUROPE)**

The dramatic outbreak of the Russian aggression against Ukraine crisis has radically changed the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we observe a brutal war covering the entire territory of the state and a massive influx of war refugees in many European states. Poland is the country where the largest number of refugees from Ukraine found shelter, over 1 million people, but it is worth emphasizing that this is the second large wave of refugees, after the presidential elections in Belarus in 2020 about 100,000 Belarusians moved to Poland. This would not have been possible without the solidarity shown by the Polish society, local authorities, and decisions taken by the state. It will be impossible without the joint response of the European Union and NATO countries, which supported Ukraine in the broader sense.

The aim of the paper is to show the conditions, scale, and importance of forced migration from Ukraine to Poland and to present possible further scenarios of the situation. During the research, available official statistical data, discourse analysis, and Quantitative research methods were used.

**Keywords:** European Union, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Migration, Eastern Europe, Central Europe


**Artur Adamczyk**

Centre for Europe University of Warsaw

**Goran Ilik**

Faculty of Law University "St. Kliment Ohridski"

### **THE IMPACT OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE ON THE ENLARGEMENT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE BALKANS – POLISH PERSPECTIVE**



The main objective of the paper is to present how Russia's aggression against Ukraine influenced the position of the European Union and the Member States concerning the enlargement of the European Union to incorporate the Balkans. The point of reference will be the evolution of Poland's position on this matter. Until the escalation of Russian aggression in February 2022, Poland focused mainly on the eastern policy of the European Union and was one of the leaders of this direction in the EU policy (it co-created the Eastern Partnership). As a result of changes that took place in the international dimension after the Russian aggression, Poland decidedly opted for limiting Russian influence in Europe, including the Balkan states. Warsaw has become one of the advocates of the enlargement of the European Union to incorporate the countries of the Western Balkans, realizing that this has become the best way to free these countries from Russia's influence and thus weaken Moscow's position as a player on the European scene. The discussion on the enlargement of the EU is a great challenge for this community due to the reluctance of the societies of some Member States. However, the enlargement policy is the best effective instrument for building a strong position of the EU in the region and limiting Russian opportunities.

**Keywords:** European Union, Western Balkans, Russia, Poland, Enlargement

**Jacek Wojnicki**

Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies, Warsaw University

**PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE FACE OF THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE,  
CHALLENGES AND DETERMINANTS**

The paper was dedicated to the issue of challenges caused by the war in Ukraine for Polish public administration. Changes were forced on several levels; organizational, structural and functional. Hundreds of thousands of refugees (mainly single mothers with children, Ukrainian youth, elderly people) created great organizational and logistical challenges for administrative structures. The public administration had to reorient the strategic plan of social assistance for refugees, education had to be changed. The registration of refugees was a great challenge. Another aspect of the changes in public administration is related to the provision of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

Changes were also forced in the sphere of public administration related to national defense and public security issues. It should be noted that some of these changes were planned earlier, but the military conflict forced the introduction of these changes in a more dynamic way.

**Keywords:** European Union, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Public Administration, Refugees

**PANEL PP-3: Energy and environmental policies**


**Panel Chair: Dario Nikić Čakar**

**16:00 – 17:30**

**B4**

**Sima Rakutienė**

Faculty of Political science and diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University



## IMPLEMENTATION OF EU CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN LITHUANIA: IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS

Since 2019, the cabinet of the European Commission announced and promoted the ambitious program of the European Green Deal, short-term and long-term goals were set to achieve a completely climate-neutral consumption model by 2050. Furthermore, in 2021 the EU climate law was adopted. Until now, there are no comprehensive scientific studies in Lithuania evaluating the adaptation of the EU climate change strategy at the national level and "mitigation" strategies (analyzed by scholars in other countries e.g. Eriksen et al. 2015, O'Brien and Selboe 2015; Lesnikowski et.all, 2021). The issue of climate change has not been more actively debated at the national political level, but the growing EU pressure and the linking of EU funding with climate change programs and measures encourage political parties to talk about it more and integrate priorities into political programs. Also, the war in Ukraine and the resulting energy crisis led to even more attention to renewable energy resources. Can the geopolitical situation in Europe encourage a political consensus to achieve climate change goals? How do the mainstream political parties of Lithuania assess the situation?

This research aims to analyze and evaluate the implementation of the EU climate change policy in Lithuania focusing on the main issues in the political discourse, identifying and comparing the influence of the most important international and national factors. The research aims to explain how Lithuanian mainstream political parties deal with this issue? Is there a political consensus on the EU climate change policy implementation in Lithuania? Do parties and the government face crisis situations and the problem of public resistance? How do different political parties set priorities in this area and how do they express them in a political discourse? The scientific research is based on the analysis of the political discourse of the last five years in Lithuania in the main media portals and the analysis of political parties' programs, regulations, and other national documents analysis.

**Keywords:** EU, climate change policy, political parties, Lithuania

### **Anka Kekez**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

### **Andrija Henjak**


Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

### **Ivan Miković**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

## AT THE FRONTLINE OF ENERGY TRANSITION: HOW COOPERATIVES EMPOWER CITIZENS TO PRODUCE AND CONSUME ENERGY

The growing intensity and complexity of challenges facing the world today has spurred governance reforms and participatory innovations across the globe. Governance innovation that this paper tackles has been recently fostered with acute energy crisis that opened space for citizen's initiatives in energy production and consumption. Over the last decade, energy cooperatives are increasingly recognized as sustainable path toward collective production and distribution of energy by citizens, often in partnership with small and medium



enterprises, non-profits, and local public authorities. With them, decades ahead could be marked by successful, sustainable, and widespread energy platforms of citizens and entities. Not being in one or more of them could, unfortunately, be the destiny of deprived groups, excluded from education, jobs and welfare. The beauty of energy cooperatives is, however, in their inclusiveness, giving us hope for the new era with large parts of humankind sharing the benefits of collaboration.

By studying three solar energy cooperatives from Croatia, paper explores paths through which such platforms can - in a rather unfavourable national policy context - enable citizens to join energy projects in their local communities through connecting them with public, non-profit, and private sector. Based on focus groups and interviews with actors engaged in initiation, development and implementation of projects led by cooperatives, paper aims to unfold variation of designs through which local energy arena can be spurred and diversity of tools and practices through which collaborative energy production be managed. By employing comparative case strategy, paper characterises modes through which cooperatives generate deeper citizen's engagement in energy co-production.

**Keywords:** energy cooperatives, citizens energy, co-production, comparative case strategy, Croatia

**Davor Boban**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**THE RUSSIAN ENERGY POWER IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE AND THE EU'S COUNTERMEASURES**

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, Russia sought to build a new position in international relations. It has been primarily oriented toward the post-Soviet 'near abroad' and to the regions where it had an interest and opportunity to build its influence. In Europe, it was primarily Southeast Europe (SEE), the geopolitical soft underbelly through which the Kremlin could exercise its geopolitical and geoeconomic power. The SEE primarily served the Kremlin as a barrier to the building of Western influence and power near Russian borders and as a transit territory for Russian gas exports to Europe. For the latter, Kremlin has tried to achieve control over the region's energy sector, but the EU and some of the region's countries perceived this as a danger to their energy security. In the last two decades, the EU adopted various measures and policies to limit the Kremlin's influence and bring the SEE countries under the EU's regulation umbrella. This has resulted in energy diversification and, eventually, in the decrease of the Russian influence in the SEE.

**Keywords:** Russia, Southeast Europe, European Union, geoeconomics, geopolitics

**Miriam Matejova**


Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University

**Peter Spáč**

Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University

**Vlastimil Havlík**

Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University



## **POPULISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES IN THE LAND OF COAL: RESULTS FROM A CZECH OPINION SURVEY**

Populism and environmental and energy concerns have been at the forefront of public and academic debates. In this article we evaluate expectations about the relationship between populism and environmental attitudes, and specifically as they relate to climate change and fossil fuels. Relying on the extant literature on the determinants of environmental attitudes and populism, we pay special attention to the role of gender and age. Specifically, we expect that populism and support for fossil fuels as energy sources are positively correlated. As per the prevailing literature, women tend to be more supportive of environmental protection, but environmental concerns decrease among aging population regardless of gender. To evaluate these expectations and to further assess the intersection between the two phenomena we analyze results from a Czech public opinion survey conducted in 2021 with 2,000 participants. Studying the intersection of these two phenomena in the Czech Republic, where the coal mining industry is strong, would, among other things, allow us to suggest policy solutions aimed simultaneously at both populism and public environmental/energy concerns.

**Keywords:** populism; gender; energy; climate change; environmental attitudes


**Bartha Ildikó**

Department for European Law and International Law, University of Debrecen

## **WHAT'S BEHIND MARKET INTERVENTION? THE EXAMPLE OF STATE AID IN CEE COUNTRIES IN TIMES OF CRISIS**

The European Union's state aid rules generally prevent Member States from granting financial support to companies in a way that distorts competition and cross-border trade within the EU. Since the early 2000s, there has been a tendency in the European Union to grant Member States increasing freedom to make use of exemptions from the general prohibition on state aid. Recent challenges such as the coronavirus crisis or the energy crisis due to the ongoing war in Ukraine may even reinforce this tendency, as the European Commission seems to have a rather accommodating attitude towards such national instruments.

Despite legitimisation of state aids this way, their economic and political implications as a form of market intervention are hotly debated. In addition to its potential positive effects, such an intervention may have negative consequences from the point of view of market participants (other than the aid recipients) and consumers, or even lead to serious market distortions. We argue that such effects depend to a large extent on the political environment in which an aid measure is implemented. This argument will be tested by an empirical analysis of aid measures adopted by Member States from Central and Eastern Europe in response to the economic impact of the war in Ukraine and approved by the European Commission (49 measures so far). The analysis also includes a case study of one of the selected countries (Hungary), where the government's economic policy is influenced by a strong nationalist and protectionist political ideology represented by the ruling party.



**Keyword:** war in Ukraine, European Union, state aid, political ideology, Hungary  
**Author**

**PANEL PCP-3b: Foreign policy perspectives in Central Europe**

**Panel Chair: Jaroslav Ušiak**

**Panel Co-Chair: Péter Rada**

**16:00 – 17:30**

**E2**

**Jaroslav Ušiak**

Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica


**VISEGRAD FOREIGN AND SECURITY COOPERATION AFTER START OF UKRAINE WAR**

The Ukraine crisis has significantly impacted the foreign and security policies of Central European countries, especially the Visegrad Group (V4) composed of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The aim of this paper is to analyze the dynamics of foreign and security cooperation within the V4 after the start of the Ukraine war. The paper will begin by providing a brief overview of the historical background and political context of the V4, focusing on the development of their foreign and security policies. The paper will then examine the impact of the Ukraine crisis on the V4, and how it has affected their cooperation and coordination in foreign and security policy. The paper will use qualitative research methods, including content analysis of policy documents and media reports, as well as expert speeches. The paper will also draw on existing literature on the V4 and their foreign policy. The paper will argue that the Ukraine crisis has both strengthened and challenged the V4's cooperation and coordination in foreign and security policy. On the one hand, the crisis has highlighted the need for closer cooperation and coordination, especially in response to the perceived threats posed by Russia. On the other hand, the crisis has also revealed differences in the V4's perspectives on foreign and security policy, particularly with regard to their relationships with Russia. The paper will conclude by offering insights into the prospects for future cooperation and coordination within the V4, and the implications for regional and global security. Overall, the paper will contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of foreign and security cooperation in Central Europe, and the challenges and opportunities for greater regional integration and cooperation.

**Keywords:** Visegrad Group, foreign policy, security policy, Ukraine crisis, cooperation, coordination

**Péter Rada**

Budapest Metropolitan University



## **SURREALISM OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM: THE RUBIK'S CUBE OF OUR WORLD ORDER**


Analysts and political actors alike have pointed to the fundamentally altered Euro-Atlantic security environment due to resurgent Russia and multidimensional security threats, as crucial drivers of this transformation; and significant socio-economic challenges and sharpened domestic political polarization in several member states and in the “liberal order”. Considering the discourses on the “post-liberal world order” and the re-emergence of intensifying great power competition (return of realist anarchy), arguably on the understanding of our order will be consequential for the design of our future. The war in Ukraine, as well as the discourses on the response and strategic approach by the liberal order and especially the United States further adds to the complexity of these matters.

The Russian aggression in Europe is a wakeup-call for the surreal approach of liberal internationalism. Many have axiomatically accepted that we live in a “liberal World order” which was designed by the United States after the Second World War and liberal internationalism – based on the expansion of free trade, universal protection of human rights, peaceful coexistence of sovereign states – has been the leading paradigm of international relations after the end of the Cold War because of that realist concerns of competition and anarchy became obsolete. Due to the global interdependence “offensive liberalism” created a blueprint: if all the players in international relations are similar, the global challenges can be managed together for good; thus the “liberal order” needs to make these players similar to protect the order.

The above has manifested in recent agendas of the United States: such as the “world of democracies” concept of the Biden Administration. The surrealism is tangible because recent years brought events which do not fit rationally in the logic of liberal order but simply saying that realists are correct in their assessments is not convincing either because of the power of surprises (Covid-19) or miscalculated believes (Russia).

The paper aims at providing a methodological experiment to summarize the mainstream – as they have more impact on actual policy decisions – debates in a model on the “world order” from liberal (eg. Ikkenberry) to realist (eg. Mearsheimer) approaches including multidisciplinary summaries (eg. Wendt). The Rubik’s cube metaphor gives theoretic and methodological support to assess multidimensional question like how, where and which values and interests are constructed, or what drives foreign policy. The paper also intendsto understand the place of Central Europe in the “liberal World order” with the goal of highlighting the surRealism of liberal internationalism: we Central Europeans truly live in the “liberal World order” but our realist concerns in the international system have not disappeared.

Therefore, to propose an integrated approach for analysis, the paper presents a conceptual framework based on the logic of the Cube, highlighting the main components and levels of analysis, and arguing that this dynamic and iterative approach is especially suitable for evaluating the discourses on the logic of world order. The paper will discuss the challenges related to the dimensions and intends to put the puzzles together by highlighting the connections between the dimensions. Obviously all differentiation between issues and dimensions can only be artificial because in reality these overlap each other and the separation is only possible in theory. The dimensions represent a set of factors which influence core functions in international relations. The metaphor suggests that we need to look at six separate dimensions with having in mind that these “faces of the cube” also interact with each other and clearly influence each other.



**Keywords:** Constructivism, liberalism, realism, world order, theoretic model of international relations

**Laura Nyilas**

University of Public Service

**VISEGRAD SECURITY AND STRATEGY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES**

In recent years, the region has received particular attention as a unit for examining security. The region has a particular importance because it implies an expression of security needs that is below the international level but above the state level. Thus, the study of the region as a unique reference point with its own specificities about security helps to complement the realist tradition of international security studies. Regional security systems are also crucial to understanding how security is organised and managed at the global level. In 2023, it is important to look at the Central and Eastern European region. The V4 countries are located at the intersection of a number of international (global) strategic and economic interests, making them a key player in regional and global politics. In order to explore the deeper dimensions of the cooperation between the four Visegrad countries, I analysed the national security strategies of the four countries and assessed them comparatively. Although the relevant strategy documents of the countries concerned provide a deeper understanding of the Visegrad Cooperation, including the security challenges, common interests and goals of the Central and Eastern European region, in order to gain a better understanding of the theoretical framework, I conducted professional interviews with government officials of the four countries who have a full insight into the strategy-making process. In the case of the non-governmental, academic expert interviews, the selection logic was based on the need for the expert to have a professional and academic track record going back many years and relevant to the subject. Analysis of the security strategies and interviews revealed that despite the differences we see today the V4 countries have common strategic partners which are the USA and Germany, and they also share a number of common security challenges. (Supported by the ÚNKP-22-2-I-NKE-29 new national excellence program of the ministry for culture and innovation from the source of the national research, development and innovation fund.)


**Keywords:** Visegrad Group, foreign policy, security policy, national security strategy, regionalism

**Ewelina Kancik-Kołtun**

Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University

**PROBLEMS OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN UKRAINE**

The escalation of Russia's war in Ukraine, which took place on February 24, 2022, caused a great challenge to the security of Europe, where the states and citizens of the former USSR, and thus those directly bordering Ukraine, felt particularly threatened. Various security sectors have since become very important in the policies of individual countries, including military security, energy security, food security, and information security. The importance



of Poland and Polish diplomacy in multifaceted assistance to Ukraine is very high. In order to implement the policy of deterrence and show the ability to defend the alliance countries, NATO strengthened the presence of its troops on the eastern flank, thus also increasing the number of American and allied troops stationed in, among others, Poland. It is also intended to increase the security of NATO member states and their citizens. NATO's main task is to prevent a full-scale war in Europe. Another important problem that affected the Visegrad Group countries was the migration from Ukraine on an unprecedented scale. The main problem is the broadly understood relationship that occurred during the influx of refugees from Ukraine between the state and civil society, as well as community practices of dealing with this problem and its social consequences, as well as social solidarity during the nearby war, including protest movements of citizens against providing assistance, or tensions between refugees and local communities of the Visegrad Group countries.

**Keywords:** Visegrad Group, war in Ukraine, security, migrations

**Petr Just**

Department of Political Science and Anglophone Studies, Metropolitan University Prague

**Nuno Morgado**


Department of Geography and Planning, Corvinus University of Budapest

### **REVIVING TRAUMAS AND GRIEVANCES: GEOPOLITICAL CODES AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE**

Historical traumas and grievances greatly influence political culture and discourse, electoral runs, attitudes of society and voters' behaviour several years, decades, sometimes even centuries later. Such attitudes, reflected both in domestic political culture and discourse as well as on the international level, are not the exclusive domain of nationalistic, xenophobic or populist parties. They become, therefore, relevant mainstream issues. The aim of this paper is to analyse the role and intensity of selected events of the past in today's political culture and discourse, in chosen cases of Central European countries, i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. This region is rich in historical events of changing in size and shape of countries, or its geopolitical code, that seeded roots for further use of this 'heritage' in political movements. During the communist period, some of these historical traumas and grievances were artificially suppressed. However, after the 1980s they were free to emerge and become influential factors in electoral competition and political positions.

**Keywords:** Neoclassical geopolitics; trauma; foreign policy; electoral behaviour

<p><b>PANEL CP-3: Populism and polarization</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Ingrida Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė</b></p>	<p><b>16:00 – 17:30</b></p> <p><b>E3</b></p>
<p><b>Lukáš Linek</b></p>	



Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences

**Lenka Hrbková**

Department of Political Science, Masaryk University

### **AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN**

Contemporary democracies are witnessing a growing role of partisan animosities and negative emotions in politics. However, trends in affective polarization within European countries are variable (Boxell et al. 2021). Notwithstanding the long-term changes, elections seem to provide a context for increasing affective polarization, although the current evidence is indirect (Hernandez et al. 2021). This study fills this gap and investigates the short-term dynamics of affective polarization both at the aggregate- and individual-level during the election campaign using a panel survey fielded during and after the 2023 Czech presidential election campaign. Elections and especially election campaigns provide opportunities for political parties and candidates to fuel political conflict, mobilize supporters, spread (dis)information, and foster political identities. Therefore, we expect that affective polarization will grow during the election campaign. In addition, our design allows us to inspect the mediating role of traditional and social media consumption. We measure media consumption via passive measurement using smartphone apps. We test a series of hypotheses using an original four-wave panel data collected around the 2023 presidential elections. Unlike most research on affective polarization in European multiparty systems, which utilizes party sympathies to operationalize affective polarization, we use questions that measure sympathies for voters of various parties. This makes our case a hard test of affective polarization since voters tend to be polarized more strongly towards political parties as institutions rather than to their voters.

**Keywords:** Campaign, Elections, Electoral Behaviour, Political Psychology, Survey Research, Voting Behaviour


**Éva Ványi**

Corvinus University of Budapest

### **POLITICS OR EXPERTISE? THE IMPACT OF POPULISM ON THE COMPOSITION OF ORBAN GOVERNMENTS (2010-2022)**

The link between politics and expertise has long been a topic of political science. Recently, however, especially in the context of populist tendencies in our region, the study of politics and expertise in government composition and governance has become more prominent. Since the 2010s, the question of how populist leaders shape the composition of governments and the impact on governance has been even more highlighted in the literature.

This paper examines the composition of recent Hungarian governments in the context of politics and expertise between 2010 and 2022. The study examines the effects of populism and the transformation of the political system in the background. The basic research question is whether the higher number of experts/outside in the Orban governments, especially in the political leadership levels and among deputy state secretaries, can be explained (only) by populism and illiberal state theory or whether there are other political reasons in the background.



In order to answer this question, a database of members of Hungarian governments since 1990 is used to analyse the political and professional careers of cabinet members.

**Keywords:** politics, expertise, public administration, Hungary, populism

**Natalia Stręk**

Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian University in Cracow

### **THE POPULIST STRATEGY OF POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME - A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY**

This research aims to critically analyze populist electoral strategies used by Polish parliamentary parties in 2015 - in times of relative "peace", in 2019 - during the Covid-19 pandemic and in 2023 - when the threat of war has been hanging over Europe for year and half.

Through qualitative collective case studies, the research methodological framework aims to analyze the strategies of Polish political parties during the election campaign. The data comes from the programs of political parties and the presented election spots. The aim of the study is to better understand the concept of populist strategy in relatively calm times, during the crisis caused by the pandemic and in the wartime. The presentation will focus on three aspects of populism:

- the appeal to the will of the people - how the people are treated? whether as a uniform inclusive entity or as a part separated from the general public
- the nature of political messages - whether political parties talk about themselves and their achievements or about what their opponents have done?
- the creation of the enemy - does the party use the figure of the enemy at all? if so, who is the enemy? Political system, government or enemy is created?

Thanks to the study of these dimensions, it will be possible to compare electoral strategies that took place in such different political backgrounds. In addition, through a specific analysis of the figure of the enemy, it will also be possible to capture the political tools used in fear tactics.

**Keywords:** populism, political strategy, Polish parliamentary campaigns, fear mongering


**Jakub Krupa**

Doctoral School in the Social Sciences - Jagiellonian University

### **US AND THEM. POPULISM OF POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES**

This presentation is about populism in the programs of Polish political parties, which crossed the election threshold between 2011 and 2019. The concept of populism is burdened with many definition problems; definition often includes phrases such as elevation of the people above the rest, anti-elitism, opposition to pluralism, and representative democracy, a dichotomous view of the world and pointing to the enemy. Populism can be treated as: a "thin-core" ideology, a set of ideas, discourse, style of political communication, or an election strategy.

The operationalization of the term "populism" poses even more problems than its conceptualization. For the purposes of this project, it was assumed that populism is defined



by a set of three general attributes that do not have to occur simultaneously: a positive attitude towards the people, a negative attitude towards the elite, and a critical attitude towards the enemy. Populism it is not a binary phenomenon, but a gradual one.

The author made use of parliamentary election in Poland, which took place in 2011, 2015 and 2019. Fifteen programmes of political parties and coalitions, which exceeded the election threshold (2011: PO, PiS, Ruch Palikota, PSL, SLD; 2015: PiS, PO, Kukiz'15, Nowoczesna, PSL; 2019: PiS, KO, Konfederacja, Lewica, PSL-Koalicja Polska) has been taken into account. First hypothesis claims that the degree of populism was higher in the extreme parties than in the mainstream parties. Second hypothesis claims that opposition parties more often postulate to increase the share of direct democracy in the decision-making process than mainstream parties. In research both quantitative and qualitative methods were used.

**Keywords:** populism, the people, party manifestos, direct democracy

**Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka**

Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce

**Rafał Dudala**

Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce

### **THERE AIN'T NO CURE FOR POPULISM**

Populism has become a building block of liberal democracy. The question increasingly being asked is not how to fight against it, but how to manage it within democratic systems. Since populist parties have entered mainstream politics, populism has stopped to be marginalized phenomenon. Our thesis presents populism as part of the DNA of democracy. Building an informed civil society, learning to be critical of the media, and resisting propaganda are ways to 'tame' populism and it can be the real challenge for liberal democracy.

**Keywords:** populism - liberal democracy - civil society - media - propaganda

**PANEL PCP-4a: The challenges to EU regional policies: Inclusion and development**

**Panel Chair: Simona Kukovič**


**18:00 – 19:30**

**B2**

**Petr Bláha**

Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem

**“DO WE EVEN HAVE A CHANCE?”: LOCAL REFERENDA IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES**



A lot of local referenda have been held in the Czech Republic, but not all of them have been successful. The aim of this paper is to map the political background of each referendum and to analyse whether factors other than the size of the municipality or the nature of the question play a role in the announcement of referenda. The key theoretical tool in this case is the concept of political opportunity, which was originally used to analyse social movements. In our case, however, it is applied to a different form of political participation. This approach can help determine whether, for example, the composition of a coalition and its political orientation can significantly influence the success of a referendum.

**Keywords:** referenda, participation, political opportunities, citizenship, Czechia

**Pavel Mažkarinec**

Faculty of Arts, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem

### **WOMEN'S POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT REGIONAL LEVEL AND ITS DETERMINANTS: THE V4 COUNTRIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

The paper focuses on women's political representation at the regional level in the Visegrad Four countries (Poland, Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia) between 1998 and 2022. The reason for choosing this topic is that although some attention has been paid to the research on women's political representation in the post-communist area, this is particularly true for the national level of governance, while much less attention has been paid to this issue at the sub-state levels of governance. The present paper is divided into two parts. The first part will focus on the dynamics of regional change in women's political representation in the V4 regions. The second part will then attempt to analyse the different determinants of women's political representation. In particular, we will focus on three types of factors: 1) institutional; 2) socio-economic and demographic; 3) cultural.

**Keywords:** women's political representation, Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia

**Lili Karácsony**


Eötvös Loránd University Budapest

**Márton Maróth**

Eötvös Loránd University Budapest

### **CHANGES IN THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY WITH THE APPEARANCE OF EU SOURCES IN HUNGARY**

This paper investigates the transformation of the regional development policy in Hungary examining the last 25 years. The former autonomy of national governmental policies was heavily affected when the EU accession negotiations began, paving the way for integration within the regional development sector. This research focuses on the political and economical factors affecting the territorial strategies that lead to the current, rather



centralized regulation. The initial wide scope of tasks and independence of municipalities were brought to an end by the 2010s. The municipal and territorial public administration reforms slowly abolished the regional county and micro-regional development councils, making the elected county level the main territorial actor. A subsequent centralisation of many responsibilities of counties and municipalities has been accompanied by new governmental offices at county and district level (including the capital), operating as the government's deconcentrated administration bodies with general competences. However, the centralisation-tendency shown by Hungarian governments may be deterred by the recent direction of EU sources being addressed to the local municipalities, providing them the opportunity of reclaiming the lost tasks. The paper concludes that the pattern and strategy of regional development has always been determined by the economic and power preferences of the government in question, in terms of the resources of the EU. The current political considerations continue to be the primary factors when assessing the regulation of the territorial development structure of Hungary.

**Keywords:** regional development policy, EU sources, public administration, territorial strategy, governmental reforms, Hungary, Eastern-Europe

**István Hoffman**

Eötvös Loránd University Budapest


### **EU COHESION POLICY AND THE NEW MEMBER STATES: SOFT POWER OF EU POLICIES?**

Between 2004 and 2013 13 new member states accessed to the European Union. The majority of the regions of these new Member States has belonged to the less developed or transition regions, therefore, the role of the EU cohesion policy has been significant in these countries. However, the regulation on EU cohesion policy has been partially transformed during the last two decades, compliance with EU rules have been important part of the EU rules on regional development. Therefore, even those policies could be emphasised by the EU regional development policy, which have been based on the competences of the Member States (for example social policy, health policy, education policies etc.). During the last decade, the role of the EU cohesion policy emerged in the field of the rule of law issues, and the defence of the values of EU. The new rules of the Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 on enabling conditions, the general and specific objectives of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and the decisions of the Council based on these regulations emphasised, that the role of the EU cohesion policy and the EU funds have been increased in the field of the governance, as well. The chapter will analyse this impact based on the examination of the legal regulations, policy documents and policy practices, especially the analysis of the Hungarian and Polish cases.

**Keywords:** EU cohesion policy, regional development, RRF, enabling conditions, Central European countries

**Simona Kukovič**

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia



## ENHANCING LOCAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Local communities and authorities at international borders often face problems and issues directly related to the presence of the border. Effective handling of such problems requires the development of cross-border cooperation, i.e., a concerted process of building relationships between local stakeholders and authorities on both sides of a border to overcome such problems and promote harmonious development of neighbouring communities. Since in Slovenia every third municipality is a border municipality with one of the four neighbouring countries, the paper focuses on cross-border cooperation between Slovenian municipalities and municipalities in Croatia, Austria, Hungary, and Italy to analyse the different ways and methods of cross-border cooperation that Slovenian municipalities use to facilitate their own development. The paper also examines challenges to cross-border cooperation, such as political differences, cultural barriers, and legal and regulatory frameworks. It argues that effective cross-border cooperation requires a comprehensive approach that addresses these challenges and promotes mutual trust and understanding between neighbouring countries. In conclusion, this paper emphasises the importance of cross-border cooperation in promoting development and economic growth, as well as peace and stability. It highlights the need for policymakers and stakeholders to work together to address cross-border cooperation challenges and foster deeper integration and cooperation between neighbouring countries.

**Keywords:** cross-border cooperation, national border, municipalities, local development, Slovenia

**PANEL CP-4a: War and change**

**Panel Chair: Hrvoje Cvijanović**

**18:00 – 19:30**

**B3**

**Vlastimil Havlík**


Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University

**Alena Kluknavská**

Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University

### NO MORE UKRAINE, THEY SAY! THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT FRAMING OF RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Russian invasion of Ukraine presented both challenges and opportunities for populist radical right political parties due to their close ties with Russia in previous years. However, the Russia-Ukraine war has disrupted the traditional PRR blame game, as Russia has been viewed predominantly as an aggressor in the public discourse. As a result of the invasion, public opinion has shifted, and PRR parties had to take this into account to remain electorally



successful while still being true to their core beliefs. This study aims to examine how PRR political actors have responded to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia and how these positions relate to their core ideology. We answer this puzzle by focusing on the case of the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party in the Czech Republic. Applying the frame analysis on PRR discourses, we focus on the social media communication of the party on the social networking site Facebook in the year following the invasion. On the grounds of the ideology of the party, we identify the key frames communicated by its leader Tomio Okamura, through which the party interpreted and politicized the war, its causes, and consequences. We conclude that after the initial hesitant rejection of the Russian invasion, the party (re-)turned to pro-Russian narratives, incorporating the war into its populist nativist discourse and driving the ideas of welfare-chauvinism and economic protectionism. Even the large-scale act of Russian aggression has not changed substantially the pro-Russian positions of the populist radical right in the Czech Republic.

**Keywords:** populism, the radical right, nativism, Ukraine, Czech Republic

**Johannes Böhnlein**

Institute for Political Science, University of Würzburg

**HOW DOES THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR AFFECT THE FORMAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF NEIGHBORING CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN EU STATES? A COMPARISON OF TWO DIFFERENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY AND ESTONIA**


The formal democratic institutional structure of a state can be influenced by informal institutions. Informal institutions exist in every country to varying degrees of strength and characteristic. They can strengthen or weaken the formal institutional structure of a country. Crises, such as the Russia-Ukraine-war, have an influence on informal institutions in different countries.

The aim of the present research project is to investigate the causes of different development processes of democratic institutions of the Eastern-European-Countries. The focus is on development paths and their dependency relationships in these states. The historical institutionalism interprets institutions not only as formal, but also informal, in terms of norms, processes, and conventions. They are an elementary component of the social order of society.

In historical institutionalism, wars represent extrinsic crisis situations that enable institutional change if there is an actor able and willing to change institutions. Change can be transformation, strengthening or weakening of an informal institution. A transformation can be the disappearance, the further development, the conversion or the rebuild of an informal institution.

The research project examines various informal institutions from the areas of networks (clientelism and corruption), attitudes (preference for a strong leader and trust in political institutions) and culture (nationalism). The effects of wars on the informal institutions are analyzed comparatively in two countries: Hungary and Estonia. The methodological survey takes place within the framework of qualitative interviews. Experts from science, politics, journalism, and international institutions are interviewed.

Does the Russia-Ukraine-war influence the development of informal institutions in Hungary and Estonia and influence this the formal democratic institutions?



**Keywords:** Russia-Ukraine-War, Eastern-European-Countries, Democratic Backsliding, Institutions, informal factors

**Jan Holzer**

Department of Political Science and International Institute for Political Science, Masaryk University

**PUTINISM? CHANGES IN THE IDENTITY OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN POLITICAL REGIME**

The objectives of the presentation are (1.) to identify the categories and concepts that are currently used in comparative political science to name the regime of Vladimir V. Putin and through their critical assessment (2.) to discern the features of the political regime of contemporary Russia, with an emphasis on the period of the war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

These are the concepts of *fascism* (Alexandr Motyl, Marlene Laruelle), *crypto-fascism* (Marcel H. Van Herpen), *schizo-fascism* (Timothy Snyder), *bureaucratic authoritarianism* (Judas Everett), *totalitarianism* (Andrei Kolesnikov), or *neo-totalitarianism* (Maria Domanska).

The presentation will confront the named categories and concepts with the classic characteristics of political regimes: the existence of an ideology, the degree of militarization of the state, the degree of centralization of state and economy, the degree of control of the media sphere, the suppression of civil society, the type of leadership.

The research has asked the following questions:

- 1) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the mentioned concepts?
- 2) Are there really identifiable features indicating a totalitarian tendency in the current Russian political regime, labeled as Putinism?
- 3) What would the revival of the category of totalitarian regimes mean for comparative political science in terms of its development in the last 3 decades?

**Keywords:** Russia, putinism, political regimes, totalitarization

**Marta Żerkowska-Balas**


SWPS University, Warsaw

**FREEDOM OR FORTRESS? PRIORITIZATION OF FREEDOM VS. SECURITY AMONG POLES IN TIMES OF CRISIS**

In times of crisis, the decisions made by authorities inevitably lead to trade-offs, with the choice between freedom and security being a prime example. Over recent years, Poles' preference for these values has been put to the test by two significant crises.

Firstly, the coronavirus pandemic compelled both authorities and citizens to choose between the efficacy of restrictions aimed at curbing the pandemic and the potential threat they posed to Polish democracy, the economy, and individual freedoms.

Secondly, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has directly influenced Poland's sense of security due to geographic proximity, the potential for escalation, and historical context. The looming threat of war and the rising sentiment among Poles that their national security is under threat



necessitate a reevaluation of the balance between implementing security measures and preserving personal, political, and economic freedoms.

The objectives of this paper are threefold: Firstly, we aim to determine whether Poles prioritize freedom or security during crisis periods. Secondly, we seek to understand the hierarchy of different forms of freedom and how they relate to security within the context of existing social and political cleavages. Finally, we aim to discern the decisions people make when confronted with choices between economic, political, and personal freedom, privacy, and health. We hypothesize that the perceived threats from the coronavirus and the conflict in Ukraine significantly influence these choices.

To verify our assumptions, we will utilize survey data from the Covid Tracking Project (2021) and the "Poles' Knowledge, Attitudes, and Preferences towards the New Civilization Threats" project (2023).

**Keywords:** war in Ukraine, Covid-19 pandemic, freedom, security

**Juraj Marušiak**

Institute of Political Science, Slovak Academy of Sciences

### WAR IN UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ATTITUDES OF SLOVAK CITIZENS TO THE MIGRATIONS

The aim of presented paper is to analyze the reaction of Slovakia's political elites and public to the wave of refugees that hit the country as a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in February 2022. During the refugee crisis in 2015 – 2016, Slovakia belonged, together with other Central and East European states to the close allies of Viktor Orbán and opposed the introduction of mandatory refugee quotas by European Commission, although it was not directly confronted with the inflow of immigrants. In general, the negative attitudes to the refugees was a topic of political mobilization not only in the elections in 2016, but also in the next elections in 2020. In 2022, Slovakia remained largely a transit country. However, the presence of Ukrainian citizens became a part of everyday practices. Despite the sudden wave of spontaneous solidarity with Ukrainian refugees during the first months of the war, the refugees of Roma origin from Ukraine, were treated in a negative way. Finally, one year after the beginning of the war, the attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees have radically changed. The paper will try to answer question, what was the reason of the anti-Ukrainian shift within the Slovak society, also in the context of upcoming general elections scheduled on September 30, 2023. Last but not least, it will examine to what extent the representatives of political parties also participated in this radicalization of society. The paper will be based primarily on publicly available sources - the media and social media posts.


**PANEL PCP-4b: Conspiracy theories and their impact on CEE politics**

**Panel Chair: Miro Haček**

**18:00 – 19:30**

**E2**

**Agnieszka Turska-Kawa**



Institute of Political Science, Silesia University in Katowice

### **BETWEEN SACRUM AND PROFANUM. DIMENSIONS OF MOTIVATIONS OF CONSPIRACY THEORISTS**

The presented study is part of the discussion looking for factors responsible for belief in conspiracy theories. Researching religiosity, researchers see a similarity between an ‘all-powerful being’ (as described in many religions) and a hidden power organizing events or hiding the truth. This undefinable power is fundamental to conspiracy thinking (Galliford and Furnham, 2017). Although in some studies, religious individuals were more likely than non-religious ones to believe in conspiracy theories (e.g., Kim and Kim, 2021), other studies found no significant relationship (e.g., Agle and Xiao, 2021), or the relationship was different for different CBs scales (Atari et al., 2019). Different results encourage deepening the problem. The study aims to show the importance of religious motivations compared to other groups of determinants of belief in conspiracy theories. The study is carried out in Poland, which creates a unique platform for examining the outlined model. This results from Poles’ declared high level of religiosity as well as the past and present role of the Catholic Church. It is worth emphasizing that Polish religiosity is specific. It is more cultural than institutional and spiritualistic. Polish religiosity is said to be popular and involves the fusion of sacred and profane spheres in everyday life. The popular character means that non-liturgical elements dominate it. Although frequently considered immature, popular religiosity gives the person something meaningful and helps form their identity. In Poland, its fundamental features are the mass character (intensity of religious practices) and ceremonial character (observance of holidays and customs).

**Keywords:** Conspiracy; theories; beliefs; religiosity


**Tine Šteger**

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

### **THE ANALYSIS OF PREVAILING CONSPIRACY THEORIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE**

The objective of the article is to shed light on the phenomenon of conspiracy theories prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe share several common characteristics while also having some distinctive historical experiences. The focus of our study is to identify global, regional, and local conspiracy theories, that are currently circulating in the region. We aim to explore the prevalence of such conspiratorial beliefs among the population, with particular attention given to the impact of the recent coronavirus pandemic, which has given impetus to many conspiracy theories, especially in times of full-blown social media, not helped by the rise of populist politics. As conspiracy theories can be understood as a dynamic yet historically contingent set of arguments, images, and interpretations which are flexibly drawn upon, modified, debated, and applied to novel circumstances in the course of the ongoing events (e. g. Byford, 2014), we seek to identify the key elements of COVID-19 conspiracy theories in Central and Eastern Europe considering conspiracy theories, that have circulated in the region in the recent past.

**Keywords:** Conspiracy theories; Central Europe; Eastern Europe; Balkan; COVID-19



**Paweł Matuszewski**

Institute of Political Science, Silesia University in Katowice

**CONSPIRACY THEORISTS' COMMUNICATION PATTERNS**

Conspiracy theories are explanations for significant events that involve secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups. They are believed to be influential in contemporary politics, but little about how conspiracy theories spread in political communication is known. One of this process's main aspects is the factors determining when an account starts to spread such content actively in its social networks. Social media create environments where people can experiment with their publicly expressed identity. In this context, spreading political messages is a costly and risky behaviour. Identity and social contacts are at stake since political opinions may provoke adverse reactions from political opponents. However, conspiracy-inspired political messages may be ridiculed or produce aggression because of their conspiracy nature, making the costs even higher. In such a context, the question arises: what social factors facilitate becoming an active conspiracy spreader? The research aims to identify the behavioural patterns behind the transition from non-conspiracy theorist to conspiracy theorist: whom such accounts interacted with (politicians and conspiracy theorists), what topics they discussed, what feedback they received, and who gave them this feedback. The research material was collected from Twitter in 2022 and 2023 using the Twitter REST API. An original author's algorithm was used to identify conspiracy narratives ( $F1 > 0.9$ ). The study is part of the Polish National Science Centre's "Political potential of conspiracy theories. A study of Poland and Slovenia" project.


**Keywords:** conspiracy theory; social diffusion; social influence; political communication

**Miro Haček**

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana


**(DIS)TRUST INTO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES: CASE OF SLOVENIA**

After the collapse of the non-democratic regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new democratic states emerged in Central and Eastern Europe and began their state building on the wave of democratic enthusiasm by the public. Majority of those countries, including Slovenia, entered European Union in early 2000s as consolidated well-working democracies, although public trust in democratic political institutions has been on the slow decline since gaining independence, only to drop substantially more after global economic crisis and wave of populist politics hit countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the last decade. Author is analysing trends in (dis)trust levels in key political institutions in Slovenia with emphasis on the wave of populism and conspiracy theories, which both coincided and boomed especially during and after global coronavirus pandemic. Crisis events such as the global economic crisis in early 2000s, the wave of migration in mid 2010s or the recent pandemic have triggered a wave of concerns about the actual background of such global crisis events, and those concerns added fuel to the political parties and non-governmental stakeholders that exploited those sometimes-legitimate concerns to their own benefits.



**Keywords:** Conspiracy, theories, Slovenia, populism, political parties, elections

<p><b>PANEL CP-4b: Political participation</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Bartul Vuksan-Ćusa</b></p>	<p><b>18:00 – 19:30</b></p> <p><b>E3</b></p>
<p><b>Armin Mühlböck</b> University of Salzburg, Department of Political Science</p> <p><b>Birgit Mitter</b> Salzburg Center of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>WHAT DRIVES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN SMALL TO MEDIUM SIZE MUNICIPALITIES? EXPLAINING THE EFFECTS OF POPULATION POLARIZATION ON TURNOUT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL</b></p> <p>What drives political participation in small to medium size municipalities outside central cities? It is often claimed that municipalities are the seedbeds of innovative democracy and citizen empowerment. As issues are often less complex, the barriers for involvement lower, the decision-makers more approachable, and the distances of communication shorter, people are more readily drawn into politics. Nonetheless, there is a puzzling variety of levels of participation within otherwise seemingly homogenous regions with some small municipalities being very active while neighboring localities have much lower rates of citizen involvement. Specifically, in the Austrian State of Salzburg, the focus of my investigation, the rates of electoral participation vary between less than 70 percent and nearly 100 percent in local elections. Yet, as I will show, these differences cannot be adequately explained by conventional factors rooted local economic and political performance. What can account for this?</p> <p>I argue that a substantial portion of the variation is causally related to a process of socioeconomic change. The related developments result in a growing Population Polarization, which, in turn, has a significant effect on democratic participation. With my work, I hope to be making a contribution not only to the literature on local development and governance but also more generally to the literature on democracy. I am fortunate to be able to draw on regional time series data from 118 communities in the Austrian State of Salzburg (excluding the City of Salzburg). This dataset forms the basis for a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis to test the principal hypothesis while controlling for several variables generally assumed to affect political participation.</p>	
<p><b>Katarzyna Domagala</b> Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław</p> <p><b>Aleksandra Moroska-Bonkiewicz</b></p>	



Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław

## ALL HANDS ON BOARD! CIVIL SOCIETY 'TOLERANT' STRATEGIES OPPOSING POPULIST ILLIBERAL POLICIES IN POLAND

The international academic debate on the possibilities of democracy protection is state-centered and only recently draws attention to civilian democracy protection, especially the work of civil society actors, including non-governmental organisations. As the Polish experience demonstrates, populists can become a genuine challenge for liberal democracy. Data on initiatives opposing the Law and Justice government between 2015 and 2020 show that reactions of civil society actors constitute a significant proportion of actions opposing the illiberal policies of the ruling party and that they are of a 'tolerant' nature. This is undoubtedly a new area of activity for civil society actors who have been growing in the Polish public space after 1989. This raises further question about the specifics of their opposition and mobilising factors. Thus we firstly ask how nongovernmental organisations reoriented their activities to democracy protection, what strategies they have used. Why do they respond in a tolerant way? Secondly by using the social movement theories, we indicate factors facilitating the mobilisation of civil society organisations to counteract populist policies. We argue that among other the opportunities and threats in multilevel environment, strategic partnerships and the NGOs capabilities to adjust were of particular importance to mobilise democratic defence in Poland. The paper applies a thematic content analysis based on press articles and semi-structured interviews conducted with Polish NGOs.

**Keywords:** populism, civil society, Poland, Law and Justice, rule of law


**Michal Klíma**

Metropolitan University Prague

## RETHINKING THE CONCEPT OF EXTREMISM IN RELATION TO THE NEW PROTEST MOVEMENTS. THE CASE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN 2015-2023

The phenomenon of '*party anti-systemness*' posed a profound threat to the existence of democracy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, specifically in the interwar period and in the Cold War era (Sartori 1976). The idea of '*party anti-systemness*' became largely symbiotic with the term '*ideological anti-systemness*'. The focal interest was *maximal ideological distance*, which was defined by two extreme poles, the *extreme right* and the *extreme left*: Fascism, Nazism, and Communism. Moving from the level of the party system to the dimension of the relationship to democracy, ideological anti-systemness generates *anti-system opposition* in the sense of disruption of the democratic regime.


Within this context, the question arises of how we are to define concepts of anti-systemness and extremism in the conditions of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, in which dramatic global changes have influenced the establishment of new protest movements. In 2015 Europe experienced an unprecedented wave of immigration. In the period of 2020-22 Europe was hit by the coronavirus pandemic. Then, in 2022-23 this was followed by an energy crisis and soaring inflation, in which a substantial contribution was made by the Russian aggression in Ukraine. In the Czech Republic, all of these crises have led to the emergence of three protest movements: (1) against immigration, (2) against the stringent anti-pandemic measures and



(3) against the drop in living standards. This paper shall examine whether it is possible to apply traditional conceptions of extremisms to the new protest movements.

**Keywords:** extremism, anti-systemness, protest movements, Czech Republic, global changes

<p><b>PANEL PT-5: (I)liberalism, wokism and autocracy</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Berto Šalaj</b></p>	<p><b>09:00 – 10:30</b></p> <p><b>B2</b></p>
<p><b>Enes Kulenović</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>THE SPECTRE OF WOKISM: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE DECLINE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY</b></p> <p>An important part of the anti-liberal rhetoric today is an attack on social justice movements and the ideology of wokism. For some, wokism is a misguided set of ideas that fails to achieve its worthwhile goals. For more vocal opponents, wokism is a dangerous ideology that hides its authoritarian tendencies under a mask of social justice. More dramatically, wokism is perceived as the true face of the declining culture of western liberal democracies. The aim of the paper is twofold. First, to identify the core features of the ideology of wokism. Second, to address different ways in which the rejection of this ideology is utilized for political purposes. The paper differentiates between the critics, the opponents and the enemies of wokism. The critics embrace the values and the concerns of social justice agenda but disapprove of its methods. The opponents proclaim their commitment to the values of social justice but reject its diagnosis of political and social ills as well as its methods of addressing these ills. The enemies of wokism not only reject the diagnosis and methods as false, but also the values that social justice advocates endorse.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> wokism, social justice, ideology, liberalism</p>	
<p><b>Tonči Kursar</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p> <p><b>Ana Matan</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>LIBERALISM AFTER LIBERALISM</b></p> <p>The presentation intends to explore the characteristics of the retreat of liberalism as a hegemonic idea. First, using Gramsci’s methodology, it will be shown that this idea (and its political forces) ceases to be ‘leading’, but still remains ‘ruling’. Regardless of the fact that today’s woke revolution prefers the so-called liberating tolerance, that fights against ‘inhuman reality’ (Marcuse), liberalism remains the ‘ruling’ structure. We will show this with Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution in which the forces of ‘thesis’ incorporate some</p>	



parts of ‘antithesis’ so that the ‘war of maneuver’ turns into a ‘war of position’. We consider woke revolution to be a contemporary variant of ‘war of position’ led by ‘ruling’ liberalism. As a non-Marxist John Gray noticed very early that it has its roots in the transformation of liberal philosophy into a moralistic one which used the so-called the end of history’ to end classical tolerance. Other authors like Rancière expressed it slightly different. He said that (liberal) philosophy first was realised/eliminated itself. After that, it began voluntarily to carry out the procedure of a kind of apology to the “infinite otherness of the Other”. As a result, this philosophy has become ‘the reflection of the mourning’ that now as ethics denounces ‘the inhumanity of man’ (Rancière). It is thus a part of the order created after 1989 that deals with ‘real bodies’ whose attributes correspond to their names (s. *Disagreement*). Apart from Rancière we will refer on Badiou’s critique of ‘ethical Ideology’ which seems to be one of the key obstacles for the ‘plurality of politics’ (Badiou) based on singularity of an event. We conclude that today’s ‘ruling’ liberalism promotes unmediated identity of the victims or the subjects of unspeakable suffering, but it is carried out by the state apparatus. It is within theoretical tradition we refer to that makes it non-political.

**Adam Szymański**

Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw


### DEMOCRATIZATION AND AUTOCRATIZATION IN MULTI-LEVEL DEMOCRACIES. CASE STUDY OF POLAND

Most studies on the democratic or, in recent years, de-democratic changes have concentrated so far on the national level, while they are also important at the local and regional levels. The proposed paper is aimed at investigating: 1) changes going in either democratic or autocratic direction within the subnational structures in a state as well as 2) their relationship with the similar processes at the national (central) level – focusing on the impact of the national tier on lower territorial levels.

The case of Poland will be studied in the years 2010-2023 (three full legislative periods of local and regional structures). The paper will present a part of research within the pilot project carried out at the University of Warsaw. It covers selected 5 voivodeships and cities. The theoretical framework consists of two pillars: democracy/(de-)democratization and territorial dimension of politics. It takes mainly a qualitative approach. For analysing links between territorial dimension and democratization/autocratization in Poland the following sources have been collected: local media materials, data from in-depth semi-structured interviews of sub-national politicians and national experts as well as data from focus group interviews – local journalists and NGOs members. The following methods of analysing data have been used: content analysis (with a use of MAXQDA software) – to find out if we can observe at subnational levels any non-democratic legislation and practices and to investigate the local and regional groups’ perception of the state of democracy in their cities or regions; and process-tracing of the paths through which the national level affects the subnational structures – to investigate the causal chains leading to democratic or autocratic changes.

**Keywords:** (de-)democratization, democratic enclave, local democracy, Poland, territorial politics

**Chris Welzel**



Leuphana University

**TURNING QUANTITY INTO QUALITY: HUMANITY'S AMAZING BIRTHS-TO-BRAINS TRANSITION**

Humanity as a whole is in the middle of a pervasive "births-to-brains" transition that redirects people's reproductive investment from maximizing the number of children towards maximizing children's skills, thus reverting fertility into schooling. Independent from different cultural traditions, this demographic transition is progressing literally everywhere in the world; societies are just at different stages in the same process. The demographic "births-to-brains" transition capitalizes on our species' most powerful quality: human intellect. Therefore, the "births-to-brains" transition allows societies to mobilize and harness their populations' entire human potential more fully, to the benefit of better solutions of collective problems of all kinds. Furthermore, the "births-to-brains" transition triggers a massive process of cognitive mobilization that empowers ordinary people ever more to think for themselves and lowers their need for doctrinal guidance in what to believe and what to do--a condition under which people naturally find increasing appeal in emancipative values (which are on a ubiquitous ascension for this reason). Finally, I argue that the key driver of the "births-to-brains" transition is scientific progress--especially in medicine--and the consecutive drop in mortality and increase in life expectancy.

**PANEL CP-5a: European Union politics**

**09:00 – 10:30**

**Panel Chair: Josip Lučev**

**B3**

**Robert Sata**


Central European University

**Marta Żerkowska-Balas**

SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw

**WAR IN UKRAINE: BREAKING THE ILLIBERAL ALLIANCE AGAINST THE EU**

Hungary and Poland have become the leaders of democratic backsliding within Europe, with Orbán and Kaczyński being the staunchest critics of the EU. Despite consistent support for the European project among the wider public and being a net benefiter of EU membership, both leaders have continuously radicalized their populist Eurosceptic discourse. We claim Euroscepticism of the discourse is an unavoidable consequence of a continuous populist performance of crisis that demands the creation of images of friends and foes to unite and mobilize people. The financial crisis, the refugee crisis and even the pandemic crisis have been performed to further exacerbate the conflict between the illiberal 'self' and the liberal 'others'. All crises are performed discursively by both countries to find newer and newer common enemies that are empowered or embodied by the EU, yet the war in Ukraine is the crisis that pits Poland against Hungary and its reluctance to condemn Russia. This breaks the



Polish-Hungarian union: while Orbán remains trapped by his own discourse bashing the EU, claiming it is the Western world that is warmongering, the Polish discourse is reconceptualized and while still wary of the EU, Russia is now perceived as the main enemy. Security concerns thus pull Poland back into the liberal world, while Hungary becomes an even more isolated pariah, losing its most influential ally in claiming illiberal democracy is a fundamentally European project to serve the people by opposing the liberal world order embodied by the EU.

**Adrienne Komanovics**

Corvinus University of Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem

**WHAT HAS THE EUROPEAN UNION EVER DONE FOR HUNGARY?  
EXPECTATIONS V. REALITY**

Central and Eastern European countries had high expectations when applying for EU membership, hoping for democratic transition, security, economic growth, high standard of living and Western integration. However, membership inherently entails a certain risk of losing control, an idea that does not easily sit with all leaders in the region. The deliberate trajectory of the Orbán administration away from democratic principles since 2010 was met with limited reaction from EU institutions; the EU thus indirectly contributed to the erosion of constitutional checks and balances in Hungary, and assisted the replacement of the rule of law with the rule by law.

Against that backdrop, this contribution explores the correlation between two **diametrically opposed** positions prevalent in Hungary. First, it examines the Hungarian Government’s narrative that EU institutions represent a threat to the country; and describes Hungary’s struggle against Brussel’s “attempts to interfere” that allegedly jeopardize the country’s sovereignty and national values. Second, the perceptions of Hungarian citizens and the support and trust they have in the EU and its institutions will also be demonstrated. With this popular support in mind, it is argued that the EU should change its tactics to preserve democracy and use the full toolbox available under EU law to push for democratic reform in Hungary.

**Keywords:** European Union; Hungary; democratic backsliding; values of the European Union; illiberal democracy

**Dario Čepo**


Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb

**Goran Čular**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**FUNDAMENTAL VALUES BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND AUTOCRACY:  
ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN VALUES' DISCOURSE IN EUROPEAN COUNCIL  
CONCLUSIONS**

There is a growing interest in understanding the importance of adopting, respecting, and implementing fundamental European values in member states, candidate countries, and even beyond Europe. At the same time, it is clear that the influence of member states on the



European Union is as great, if not greater, than the influence the EU institution exert on member states. Even though we know what EU's fundamental values are and how EU institutions try to implement them, less has been said on how those values have been vocalized and presented in practice – through public statements, official documents, and activities of member states and their most important political actors – heads of states and governments. This paper analyses how European Council conclusion, from 2020 until 2023, conceptualized and operationalized fundamental European values. Time frame was selected due to several crises occurring concurrently, which amplified the need for intra-EU coherence. The research has been done through the use of content analysis and coded with nVivo software for qualitative data analysis. The research question posed was: how do most powerful European political actors use European Council to signal and depict fundamental European values. The working hypothesis was that values are depicted in a perfunctory and sporadic manner, bounded to general statements, and by avoiding any substantive elaboration of how they would be transposed in European public policies that would reach the European *demoi*. Repercussions of such conceptualization is that fundamental values, although a cornerstone of European integration, remain dormant and subjected to different (and differing) interpretations by political actors in the EU. That, in turn, has profound repercussions on the health of democracy in the EU as a whole, and in member states specifically.

**Keywords:** fundamental values, autocracy, democracy, European Council, Council conclusions


**Sebastian Kubas**

University of Silesia in Katowice

### **THE UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS BY THE EU AND HUNGARY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2022 CONDITIONALITY REGULATION**

The paper examines the controversy between the EU and Hungary whether the Europeanization process can be interpreted differently or must be harmonious. Before and after the 2004 accession to the UE, Hungary tried to follow the EU approach towards liberal democracy, yet, from 2010 has developed an illiberal democratic legal and political system. This fact revealed a broader divergence between Hungary and the EU. The questions posed in the paper focus on the problem of the trajectory of the systemic deterioration of democracy in Hungary, the EU's reaction to this situation and the EU's decision to apply a conditionality mechanism in 2022. The main hypothesis of the research concluded in paper is that the reluctance to use more severe sanctioning tools by the EU after 2010 helped Hungary utilize EU funds to develop an illiberal democratic state. The research methods are: quantitative and qualitative method, synthesis and analysis of facts, comparative method and neo-institutional approach. The results and conclusions allow us to state that that, up to 2022, the EU, though making some efforts, was unable to force Hungary to obey the rule of law and other liberal democratic principles. Only the worsening economic situation after the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine inclined the EU to create a conditionality mechanism correlating the EU subsidies with the fact of obedience to the EU rules.

**Keywords:** EU, Europeanization, Conditionality Mechanism, Hungary



**Michal Garaj**

Faculty of Social Science, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava

**SLOVAK MEMBERS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES, FACEBOOK & WAR IN UKRAINE**

The main goal of the contribution is to identify communication strategies on Facebook of the war in Ukraine by parties in Slovakia and with regard to their affiliation to a European political party and its position. It tries to find similarities and differences between research subjects. Analytical categories include identification of the communicated position of European political parties, identification of the communicated position of Slovak political parties, identification of the frequency of contributions and identification of the position (positive, negative or neutral) of contributions. In summary, the contribution tries to establish the consistency between the communication on Facebook of the war in Ukraine between European political parties and its Slovak members.

**Keywords:** Political Parties, Facebook, Political Communication, War, Ukraine

**PANEL PC-5: Communication science, democracy and social media**

**09:00 – 10:30**

**Panel Chair: Karin Liebhart**

**B4**


**Pero Maldini**

University of Dubrovnik, Department of Mass Communication

**FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OR ITS MISUSE: IS SOCIAL MEDIA UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY?**

In a time of democratic backsliding marked by a crisis of democratic institutions and the rise of illiberal populist options, and an infodemie that calls into question citizens' ability to inform themselves about real social and political facts, the question arises as to what has remained of the great expectations of the information and network society. Have ICT expanded the public political communication space and have they strengthened or undermined citizen participation? In this sense, social media, as the most widespread form of communication but also increasingly as the primary source of information for many, seem to undermine rather than enhance democracy and democratic processes. This paper addresses some of the key dangers posed by social media in this sense, namely:

- Political communication riddled with misinformation and fake news, as well as a lack of fact-checking, negatively impact citizens' attitudes and the formation of public opinion.
- Computer algorithms (Echo Chambers) select content and steer users toward a particular type of information, attitudes, opinions, and interests. This inevitably fosters polarization and reduces the tendency toward deliberation, compromise, tolerance, and ultimately consensus.



- Reinforcing extremism and hate speech by connecting like-minded people deepens division and weakens the cohesion of society.
- The misuse of social media for the purpose of discrediting political opponents and manipulating public opinion undermines trust in democratic norms and institutions.
- The lack of accountability enables the misuse of social media, especially by powerful political or economic actors, without (political or legal) sanctions.

Here the question arises as to the limits of the right to freedom of expression and the threat just to this and other civil rights and liberties.

**Keywords:** crisis of democracy, social media, misinformation, political division, accountability

**Karina Czepiec-Veltzé**

Jagiellonian University, Doctoral School of Social Sciences

### **HOW TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN SOCIAL MEDIA? A NETNOGRAPHIC APPROACH ORIENTED TOWARDS CREATIVE MULTIMODAL DISCOURSE**

Political communication nowadays has many forms and dimensions. Going beyond the traditional and institutional framework, it largely transcends activities thus belonging to the civic sphere. Changes in the way and style of communicating about politics and the public sphere are less and less organized and purposeful, to be more spontaneous, unpurposeful and ephemeral acts. The environment for such acts has become social media, which create the conditions for a variety of interactions, undertaken in unlimited numbers and directions. Modern science faces the challenge of how to study such revolutionized political communication, as well as the spaces in which it takes place. Since this phenomenon is complex, an interdisciplinary approach that draws from political science, media and social communication sciences or sociology is necessary. This paper proposes a study of creative political communication from a netnographic perspective, the basic methods of which consist of observation and in-depth interviews. Their application takes place in relation to the social media space, where human interactions undertaken in the field of political communication are observed, as well as interviews with participants in conversations and sites administrators. The author's research scheme in this area, supplemented by media studies methods, will be proposed. The paper responds to the growing need in the scientific community to develop a coherent and effective research strategy in the face of the fluid, volatile and ephemeral environment of social media, as a place of ever-evolving political communication in the creative dimension.


**Keywords:** political communication, creative political participation, social media, netnography

**Rudolf Metz**

Centre for Social Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest

**Márton Bene**

Centre for Social Sciences; Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law



**PROVE YOUR LEADERSHIP (IF YOU CAN)! IDENTITY-BASED IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT AND FORMATION IN ONLINE SPACE**

The distance between leaders and their potential followers constantly grows in modern democracies, suggesting that ‘it is easier to believe in leadership than to prove it’ (Meindl, 1990: 161). Social media helps to overcome this challenge by offering a virtual space in which politicians can send signals to their followers that they ‘really’ have the qualities required for leadership. Although impression management is general in mediatized and personalized politics (Landtsheer et al. 2008), online platforms allow politicians to influence impressions created about them in a quasi-direct and undistorted way. However, leaders’ acceptance depends on whether the traits and behaviour patterns displayed in posts match certain mental schemas or prototypes constructed by their audience (Metz 2021). Social media has made explicit this essentially hidden cognitive process of impression formation: followers can respond directly to these signals by expressing emotions (likes and emoji) and even imitating political participation through sharing and commenting on leaders’ posts (cf. Bene, 2017).

The literature distinguishes between two modes of impression management and formation depending on whether leaders communicate general leadership skills (see: Antonakis et al., 2016;) or group-specific qualities (see: Haslam et al., 2020). Political science tends to emphasise the importance of the former in personalised politics (Bittner, 2015; Garzia et al., 2022), but the emergence of polarising identity politics puts it in a new light (Garzia and Ferreira da Silva, 2022). Accordingly in this paper, we assume that the embodiment of shared identity is more salient in online impression management and more successful in influencing impression formation (in terms of followers’ reactions) compared to demonstrating universal leadership skills. We test this assumption via a manual content analysis of the Facebook posts made by the leading candidates in the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Viktor Orbán and Péter Márki-Zay.

**PANEL PCP-5: New hybrid threats: Old risks redefined after Russian aggression in Ukraine**

**Panel Chair: Robert Mikac**

**09:00 – 10:30**

**E2**

**Robert Mikac**


Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**Vladimir Sazonov**

University of Tartu and Estonian Military Academy

**RUSSIAN HYBRID INFLUENCE ON THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND THE WESTERN BALKANS COUNTRIES**

In recent years, especially because of the Russian regime’s aggression against Ukraine, the topic of hybrid threats and influences “has dominated the security landscape in Europe.



Whereas it may be considered a new topic by several stakeholders, in fact it is not. It is as old as conflict and warfare, but repackaged and empowered by changing security environment dynamics, new tools, concepts and technologies targeting vulnerabilities in several domains in an unprecedented manner” (Giannopoulos et al., 2020: 4). A hybrid threats and influences refer to when – state or non-state – actors seek to exploit the target vulnerabilities to their own advantage by using in a coordinated way a mixture of measures (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological, cultural, informational), while remaining below the threshold of formal warfare. Examples are the hindering of democratic decision-making processes (e.g. interference in parliamentary elections and presidential elections, etc.) by massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors. This paper starts from the scientific assumption that there are certain Russian hybrid threats and influences on the Baltic countries and the Western Balkans countries, therefore the aim of the research is to investigate the forms, dimensions and similarities between Russian hybrid activities directed towards these two regions.

**Keywords:** hybrid threats and influences, Russia, Baltic countries, Western Balkans countries

**Věra Stojarová**

Masaryk University Faculty of Political Science

### **THE NIGHT WOLVES IN CEE AND THE WESTERN BALKANS – PUTIN’S ANGELS OR DEVIL’S ADVOCATES?**

The Night Wolves have become one of the sharp power tools of Russia, operating in and outside Russia while supporting the Russian foreign policy with diverse activities ranging from paramilitary operations to humanitarian work and rescue operations in Turkey or work with the youth. The club promotes Russian values and propaganda and, in many countries, creates controversies resulting in banning Night Wolves activities in the given country. The paper looks at the activities of the Russian Wolves in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Balkan region, at their promotion events, and online and offline narrative and seeks to answer the question of whether their strategies for gaining hearts and minds differ in CEE and the Balkan. The paper unveils the differences between their campaigns in both regions, the different strategies, their physical appearance in both regions, and their online promotion.


**Keywords:** Night Wolves, Russia, Serbia, Republika Srpska, sharp power

**Josef Kraus**

Masaryk University Faculty of Political Science

### **COMPARISON OF HYBRID INTERFERENCE AGAINST POLICE FORCES AND MILITARY FORCES**

Both the security forces and the armed forces are responsible for national security. While the first deals with domestic security problems, the second is tasked with protecting the country against external enemies. By having different roles, they logically face different challenges and threats. These challenges and threats may be of a direct and physical nature, or of a less



obvious and indirect nature. Hybrid action is precisely the less obvious way of threatening the functioning, unity and morale of the security forces and the armed forces. Given the different missions and structures of these two-armed bodies, it is clear that hybrid interference against them also operates differently, with the emphasis on different themes and different modes of dissemination. This paper aims to present the fundamental differences in the hybrid action against the security forces and the armed forces, to show what such action looks like in the Czech Republic as an example, and to try to outline the resilience and ways of strengthening it in the future in the case of the internal and external security forces based on the collected data.

**Keywords:** Hybrid threats and interference, unconventional war, Armed forces, Security forces, Resilience

**Miroslav Mareš**

Masaryk University Faculty of Political Science

### **IMPACT OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE ON HYBRID THREATS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

The Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 significantly changed security environment in East Central Europe, including intensity and aiming of hybrid campaigns against the security interests of the Czech Republic. The author analyses essential dimensions of this transformation. The restructuring of pro-Kremlin movement (a. o. the shift between the anti-vax movement and pro-aggression movement will be described and reason for new agenda setting of hybrid interference will be explained (a. o. misuse of the issue of Ukrainian migration etc.). Adaptation of Czech security policy to new environment will be discussed.

**Keywords:** Russia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, hybrid campaigns

#### **PANEL CP-5b: Political parties**

**09:00 – 10:30**

**Panel Chair: Goran Čular**


**E3**

**Beata Kosowska-Gąstol**

Jagiellonian University in Krakow

#### **WHY DO SOME NEW PARTIES SURVIVE AND MOST DIE? PARTY GENESIS IMPACT ON THEIR CHANCES TO SURVIVE MEASURED BY THE INDEX OF CANDIDATE CONTINUITY AND CHANGE**

One of the most crucial factors that influence the survival of new parties is their genesis (Houghton & Deegan-Krause 2020). Genuinely new parties have worse survival chances than rooted newcomers (Bolleyer & Bytzek 2017). Being aware of the multiplicity of definitions (for an overview see Chiamonte & Emanuele 2015), we consider as new these parties that compete in elections for the first time (Hug 2002; Tavits 2006, 2008). However, even if the parties have new labels, frequently they place on their electoral list politicians



that took part in previous elections as candidates of other parties. The hypothesis is that parties with candidates without prior experience in politics cannot survive in a long-term perspective. The greater the continuity in the list of candidates, the better the chances of survival.

We propose the candidate continuity index to test the congruence and change of candidates participating in subsequent elections. It can be used to assess the level of party novelty when a party entered the parliament for the first time, but also to evaluate whether the party changed then in terms of candidates. To answer the question about party survival, we assume that party stability can be gradual. We perceived as stable or institutionalised parties that are able to compete alone in at least three subsequent elections; however, we also distinguish as less stable parties that took part in the second or third elections as components of broader coalitions and consider whether they served as main components within these coalitions (measured by the share of the candidates). Data from Poland are used to verify the hypothesis.

**Keywords:** new party, genuinely new party, rooted newcomer, candidate continuity index

**Marko Kuček**

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**Dario Nikić Čakar**

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
### **STAYING LOYAL TO THE ROOTS? PARTY ORIGIN, VOTER LINKAGES AND DELIBERATION IN CROATIAN POLITICAL PARTIES**

Deliberative procedures enhance the quality of interest aggregation within and outside party organization, but often meet resistance of national and local party elites. This chapter traces the party attitudes towards deliberative procedures back to party origin and the nature of its linkage with voters. First, parties originating as grassroots movements continue to face pressure for inclusive co-decision procedures even as their organizations mature. Second, new parties are more receptive to alternative forms of interest aggregation, as a way of differentiating themselves from established parties. Third, as opposed to programmatic parties, clientelist parties lack incentives to innovate the procedures of policy development. These arguments are tested through a mixed-methods study of Croatian parties. Quantitatively, parties' acceptance of co-decision procedures is assessed on the basis of three waves of local councilor survey (2010, 2016, and 2023), and correlated with their origin, newness, and expert survey data on the nature of party-voter linkages. These relationships are illustrated by a qualitative exploration of deliberative practices of party Možemo!, based on semi-structured interviews with local party coordinators.

**Keywords:** deliberation, intra-party politics, party origin, Možemo!

**József Dúró**

Institute of Social and Political Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest



## CHANGES IN AN UNCHANGED SITUATION. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2022 HUNGARIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN THE PARTY SYSTEM

Following the 2010 elections the Hungarian party system which had formerly been characterised by a tight competition of two blocs, became a pre-dominant one. Moreover, in this party system, the governments led by the dominant party have faced a divided opposition (central party system). However, before the 2022 elections, six opposition parties declared to form a joint list with common candidates for the next parliamentary elections. Hence, there was a real chance of restoring the competition of two large blocs. Nonetheless, the results of the 2022 elections did not prove the expectations. Fidesz-KDNP remained in dominant position, while Jobbik, which formerly had been stronger in the countryside, was not able to mobilise a significant part of its voter base. On the right of Fidesz, in the place of Jobbik, Our Homeland Movement, a new political actor emerged. The paper focuses on the reasons of these changes, namely 1) why was the government able to not only get re-elected but also to broaden its voter base, 2) why did Jobbik voters not follow their parties on its way to an alliance with the left-wing opposition in the hope of a change in government, and 3) what are the main reasons of the emergence of Our Homeland which took the former place of Jobbik in the party system.

**Keywords:** party system, Hungary, elections, 2022, Fidesz

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### **Daria Boratyn**

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### **Damian Brzyski**

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### **Beata Kosowska-Gąstol**

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### **Jan Rybicki**


Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków

### **Wojciech Słomczyński**

Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Kraków

## MEASURING PARTY SIMILARITY: A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF METRICS

The literature on party positioning exhibits a rich diversity of methods, ranging from expert surveys, through human-coded and automated analysis of party programs, as well as statistical analysis of roll call voting records and electoral patterns, to social network analysis. Advances in machine learning and big data availability open further new vistas. But do all those methods really reflect the same concept of party similarity? Is there even a single such concept? And -- assuming there is -- can we quantitatively assess the accuracy of different methods in measuring that concept? In our paper, we seek to answer those



questions by computing -- for several EU countries, including Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and the Czech Republic -- a large variety of party similarity measures and exploring their correlation matrix using both parametric and non-parametric statistical methods (including PCA and factor analysis). The measures to be tested include not only classical ones, such as similarity of MARPOR topic distributions, NOMINATE scores, or CHES position scores, or cosine similarities of manifesto word distributions, but also those based on manifesto embeddings, transformer-based language models (BERT, GPT), program and parliamentary speech styles, coalition formation patterns, legislative cosponsorship networks, candidate transfer graphs, and social network patterns.

**Keywords:** party similarity, party programs, natural language processing, coalition formation, party systems


**Malgorzata Kaczorowska**

Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw


**FOR PEACE YOU HAVE TO TAKE RISKS JUST AS MUCH AS IN WAR? THE  
IMPACT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE ON THE ACTIVISM OF THE  
POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CEE COUNTRIES**

Critical moments are sometimes turning points in everyone’s life, and the same is true for political parties. The war in Ukraine, like the COVID-19 virus pandemic before it, has changed the functioning of many European societies and also affected the political parties (particularly in Ukraine, Poland and the CEE countries). These tragic circumstances have necessitated, among other things, special aid measures, various initiatives and political commitment in favour of Ukraine, refugees or a decisive change in the ways of operation. Political parties, like other actors in socio-political life, adapt to changing conditions. How has the activity of Polish political parties changed in comparison to political groupings in the CEE countries as a result of the critical situation such as the war in Ukraine? Whether it is possible to distinguish any regularity in this case? A basic theoretical assumption is that the older the “age” of a political party, the more resources and opportunities for new initiatives and activities. An important variable in the paper is the age of political party. On the basis of in-depth interviews conducted with representatives of party elites of selected political groupings in Poland and selected CEE countries, as well as an analysis of their strategic and programme documents, I seek to answer the following research questions: how did the war in Ukraine affect the change in political party activity? What new (forms of) ventures did political parties reach for at this time? How did the decision-making mechanisms change?

**Keywords:** political parties, war in Ukraine, change, political activism



<p><b>PANEL PT-6: Moralism and realism in war and peace</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Luka Ribarević</b></p>	<p><b>11:00 – 12:30</b></p> <p><b>B2</b></p>
<p><b>Szilárd János Tóth</b> Institute of Political Science, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest</p> <p><b>Attila Gyulai</b> Institute of Political Science, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest</p> <p><b>DOES THE METHOD MAKE A DIFFERENCE? REALISTS IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL NORMATIVITY</b></p> <p>Realists famously believe that the actual practice of politics places constraints on normative political philosophy. However, surprisingly little has been said about what these constraints are. For the most part, realists have been preoccupied with differentiating their <i>method</i> for construing norms from the method applied by so-called moralists. In essence, they argue that instead of abstract theorizing, one ought to begin with an assessment of the objective peculiarities of politics. For example, they take disagreement and conflict to be such peculiarities and argue that any political philosophy aiming to provide useful guidance in the real world will have to prioritize the provision of order over justice, as well as abandon any attempt to enforce a comprehensive moral doctrine in society. But not all realists focus on the same objective peculiarities. For instance, some of them focus on the contextual demands of legitimacy, the truth value in ‘legitimation-stories’ and even instrumental norms. We take these suggestions one by one to see in what ways (if any) they entail a departure from what realists dub ‘political moralism’ and whether they offer any grounds for the distinctively political normativity some realists aim to construe. In a way, the distinctiveness of the entire realist project depends on the answer to this question. Only if it turns out that differences in method (compared to ‘moralistic’ theories) lend support to novel norms in content will the distinctiveness of the realist approach be confirmed. Otherwise, the debate on method becomes somewhat self-referential.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> realism and moralism, political normativity, method in political theory</p>	
<p><b>Domagoj Vujeva</b> Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb</p> <p><b>MORALITY AND PRUDENCE IN KANT'S POLITICAL THEORY</b></p> <p>The idea of perpetual peace is of central importance in Kant's political theory. It is not just the highest end of the international right, but the final end of the entire Doctrine of Right as well, as the freedom and the property of citizens cannot be secured as long as there exists a real prospect of warfare between states. As a highest and final moral end in the sphere of right, perpetual peace represents the unconditional duty for states and their rulers and takes precedence over all considerations of political expediency.</p> <p>This does not mean however that there is no room for political prudence in Kant’s political theory. Although he states that “politics cannot take a single step without first paying tribute to morality”, the task of politics is not mere enforcement of moral principles independently</p>	



of the circumstances of time and place. Kant's actual position is not that politics should yield to the demands of morality, but that there is no real disagreement between the two of them. In my paper I intend to stress the significance of political prudence in Kant's understanding of the relation between moral and politics. This I intend to do in two steps. Firstly, by expounding Kant's, often neglected, repudiation of the attitude of "despotic moralists", which he finds as dangerous as that of "political moralist" who fashions his morality to suit his own interests. Secondly, by examining Kant's emphasis on "permissive law" in international right, which allows the ruler to postpone some reform measures, required by the idea of perpetual peace, if in given circumstances they endanger the existence of the state or threaten to frustrate the overall purpose of the reform. In this way I hope to depict the figure of the "moral politician", whose disposition Kant sees as a successful combination of moral and prudential demands.

**Keywords:** Kant, perpetual peace, morality, political prudence

### Ádám Darabos

Research Institute for Religion and Society, Eötvös József Research Centre

### CHRISTIAN REALISM – A CORRECTIVE PERSPECTIVE FOR HUNGARY ON THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) is considered as one of the most influential American theologians and political thinkers of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As the father of Christian realism, Niebuhr heavily focused on the sinful nature of human beings and political realities without abandoning the question of human responsibility and the representation of Christian values (especially justice) in politics. Above theoretical influences and domestic events, Niebuhr's perspective solely relied on contemporary international conflicts, including the Second World War and the Cold War. This contributed to the fact that his ideas gain a renewable interest in times of international conflicts. The presentation's ambition is twofold. First, it analyses how the core arguments of Christian realism, a predominantly American way of thinking, are applicable in a different political, social, economic, and cultural context, namely in one of the Eastern European countries, Hungary. Second, it will be concluded that due to its firm determination towards democracy and balancing approach between the necessities of politics and normative ethics, Christian realism can serve as a corrective perspective on the Russian-Ukrainian War for two key actors, the Hungarian government and the Hungarian Christian Churches.


**Keywords:** normative political theory, political realism, Christian realism, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hungarian politics

### Rastislav Kazanský

Faculty of Political Sciences and international relations Matej Bel University Banská Bystrica

### Lucia Rýsova

Faculty of Political Sciences and international relations Matej Bel University Banská Bystrica



**Radoslav Ivančik**

Academy of the Police Force, Bratislava

**REMARKS TO THE DEBATE BETWEEN REALISTS AND LIBERALS IN THE LEVEL OF ALLIANCE THEORY AND ITS IMPACTS TO THE SECURITY POLICY OF SMALL STATE**

Central topic of this thesis is the Alliance theory and application of the realist and liberal approach to particular case studies. Alliance research used to be sphere of authors connected to the realistic paradigm, but since 1980s' liberals tended to research alliances more often. In this thesis both main approaches are introduced, from the context of their creation, through the ideas used to explain creation, operation, decline or endurance of alliances. Application of main ideas of both theoretical approaches on the chosen case studies should answer the question whether liberalism managed to fully establish itself in the alliance research and whether liberalism managed to equalize or even surpassed realistic paradigm. In our paper we present implications and comparative analysis to the impact of the development of security policy in a small state in contemporary security environment. The aim of the research is to present research focus to the importance of the alliance policy as a result of contemporary threats and risks and its connections between theory and practice.

**Keywords:** alliance, realism, liberalism, security policy, small state

**PANEL IRSS-6: Multipolarity, EU and Russia**

11:00 – 12:30

**Panel Chair: Dario Čepo**


**B3**

**Josip Lučev**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**HEGEMONIC CAPACITY IN AN ERA OF MULTIPOLARITY**

The modern challenge to Western dominance a result of a complex set of intertwined long-term processes. In terms of productivity and economic size, the asymmetry that was an ultimate result of the Industrial revolution has been overcome after two centuries, primarily as a result of the consistent, rapid growth in China before the covid-19 pandemic. In terms of political and military issues, the US hegemony is now critically challenged as regional powers take part in various conflicts that sideline the US and seek to establish new power relations (Yemen, Libya, Syria), most challenging of which is the Russian involvement in Ukraine. Future consequences may include a substantial geopolitical shift which depends on a complex and dynamic balance of power. The objective of this article is to offer an insight into the relevant aspects of such power, particularly with a view to the possibility of a new hegemon on the rise. To do so, the article seeks to offer a new approach to hegemony, through the analysis of current hegemonic capacity among the largest global economies. We



focus on the top 10 by purchasing power parity: China, USA, India, Japan, Germany, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, France and the UK. The article focuses on dimensions of hegemony. Economic dimensions include the size of economy (both nominal and PPP GDP as share in global GDP), size of financial sector (primarily market capitalization), size of investments abroad and trade balance. Military dimension concern the capacity to project force globally and military spending corrected for PPP. The political dimension includes the size of Free Trade Agreements in force by market size. This allows us to revisit the Hegemonic Stability Theorem and suggest the role of new types of liberalization and the specific positions played in regional economic integrations by the largest global economies.

**Keywords:** hegemony, multipolarity, capacity, Free Trade Agreement

**Petar Popović**


Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

### EUROPE'S 'STRATEGIC SOVEREIGNTY': A REACTION TO CONDITIONS OF NON-POLARITY

The EU's 'strategic sovereignty' is commonly perceived as Europe's bid to become an autonomous geopolitical player in today's hostile multipolar world. The position is controversial because it is seen as detrimental to both Trans-Atlantic alliance and foreign policy sovereignty of EU member states. However, this paper analyzes the 'strategic sovereignty' agenda from different perspective, which assumes contemporary world in the state of non-polarity. Put forth by Richard Haass, the non-polar world (conceptually similar to Barry Buzan's *decentered globalism*), presumes the international system not being run by two or more great powers, but by diffused power of private and public entities. It is the weakening of the state-centric world that helps explains 'strategic sovereignty'. First, the 'strategic sovereignty' does not stem from political contradictions within Trans-Atlantic alliance, but from the US retrenchment caused by structural unsustainability of liberal hegemony. Second, EU's present economic crisis and uncertainties regarding its green transition render self-sufficiency a priority. But instead of cutting dependencies on China, or implementing protectionist measures vis-à-vis the US, the EU seeks to diversify supply chains and expand interdependence through projects such as *Global Gateway* or Critical Raw Materials Club. Third, the EU itself institutionally reflects the logic of non-polarity. Often missed is the 'intersitial' (Jozef Bator) dimension of EU, which allows member states to pursue otherwise unattainable national interests. This explains the recent behavior by French president Emmanuel Macron. His open support for Europe's 'strategic sovereignty' builds upon French economic and geopolitical interests, particularly in Africa where China's influence is growing.

**Keywords:** EU, strategic sovereignty, non-polarity, the US, China autonomy

**Anna Molnár**



University of Public Service – Ludovika, Budapest

**Éva Jakusné Harnos**

University of Public Service – Ludovika, Budapest

### **ISSUE OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEAN AUTONOMY AFTER THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE**

The aim of our paper is to analyse the Issue of European sovereignty –European autonomy after the Russian aggression in Ukraine by content and document analysis. When war returned to Europe with the unprovoked Russian aggression in Ukraine, the question of sovereignty is more relevant than ever both on European and State level. In the case of states, sovereignty means supreme power and capacity to act autonomously externally. At European level, the question of strategic autonomy and sovereignty was raised in the past decade. The strategic autonomy of the European Union can be interpreted as capacity to act autonomously, and as the springboard of European sovereignty. Now, these concepts refer not only to security and defence, but also to economy, digitalisation, technological systems and innovation. The Strategic Compass (2022) highlighted the need for creating strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty.

The question still remains: can the European Union act autonomously and tackle the threats and challenges raised by the Russian aggression in Ukraine? During the last year, despite some internal debates, the EU demonstrated its ability to act in unity and effectively in the framework of the integrated approach and provide support by the EU's crisis management toolbox. While unity manifests in supporting Ukraine, the question whether the Union will deepen cooperation in the field of security and defence in the shadow of the NATO and in parallel with external actions and crisis management still remains open.

**Keywords:** European sovereignty, European autonomy, security and defence, integration


**Stipe Buzar**

Libertas International University

### **THEORY OF A MULTIPOLAR RUSSIAN WORLD. A „COULDA-SHOULDA-WOULD“ APPROACH TO PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE**

The Russian invasion of Ukraine can be linked to at least two concepts in Russian geopolitical thought. First, the war is a major part of the Kremlin's bid to influence the creation of the kind of *multipolar world* about which Russian politicians, diplomats, academics, authors and news people have been speaking for years. Second, the war is a major part of the Kremlin's bid to establish, secure and consolidate what the above actors have been calling the *Russian world* (*Русский мир*), which is a contentious concept that refers to Russia and a large number of countries with at least partially russophone populations, and within which Russia sees itself as the single pole of power.


Ironically, the causes of the war could be identified at the intersection of these two concepts, while a recipe for peace could be found in their equal treatment in terms of the polarity of power. Namely, if the Kremlin were to treat the Russian world as a multipolar reality in which the member states are treated as equals, rather than as Moscow's colonial possessions,



then the causes of the war as seen in Moscow would be nullified. This, however, is precluded because it would require a proper democratization of Russian domestic politics. Additionally, it would require, at least on the central-east European side of what they insist is the Russian world, a mutual understanding between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and perhaps even Lithuania, that all of them are equals as the cultural and political successors of the medieval Kievan Rus', to which Moscow has thus far always made an exclusive claim.

**Keywords:** multipolarity, Russian world, war, peace, democracy

<b>PANEL PC-6: Political communication in wartime</b>	<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Marko Roško</b>	<b>B4</b>
<p><b>Gabriella Ilonszki</b> Corvinus University of Budapest</p> <p><b>György Lengyel</b> Corvinus University of Budapest</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>POLITICAL AND MEDIA POLARISATION IN COMMUNICATING WAR AND PEACE</b></p> <p>Hungary appears among the highly polarised countries in Europe (Bettarelli et al. 2023). The literature argues that excessive affective polarisation is a bedrock of democratic backlash and demonstrates it through diverse institutional, legal, partisan and governance evidence. Our paper aims to add to this perspective by analysing how the polarisation of the media follows from while also strengthens political polarisation tendencies and cements the authoritarian turn of the political regime. We shall introduce the media environment and analyse the media context of fundamental media outlets in Hungary regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The argument of the paper is that we can observe asymmetric polarisation at least in two respects. One is that there are serious and deepening differences in the communication possibilities of the government and the opposition forces. In addition to this asymmetric media scene asymmetry prevails in information provision for the national and the international audiences, the former particularly serving the government's electoral goals. This paper is a case study on Hungary, largely built on an ongoing comparative research project dealing with the content and discourse analysis of news and articles published before and after the outbreak of the war.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> affective polarisation – democratic backlash – asymmetric polarisation – media communication</p>	
<p><b>Tanja Gradečak</b> Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University J.J. Strossmayer of Osijek</p> <p><b>Sara Erdeljić</b></p>	



Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**HOW TO (NOT) DECLARE A WAR – THE PERFORMATIVE AND EUPHEMISTIC CHARACTER OF PUTIN'S PUBLIC DISCOURSE**

After providing an historical overview of some more relevant acts of declarations of war or their absence we present a case study of the development of addressing the instances of the war in Ukraine with a focus on Russian president Putin. The aim of the study is to provide a microanalysis of linguistic performatives in public discourse, such as a declaration of war, for positioning the actors in both the political and military arena.

Setting our study in the pragmatic and cognitive-linguistic theoretical framework, we claim that Putin has been creating a carefully structured political agenda of avoiding the performative speech act of declaring a war in the Austinian tradition of performative, and instead has used a scalar, metonymic progression of euphemistic expressions (Author 1 2005) such as "special military operations", "escalation" and "conflict". Putin's first use of the word "war" in reference to the Russian aggression on Ukraine was recorded 10 months after the censorship law had been passed in March 2022 which prohibited its public use as dissemination of "fake" information about the invasion. Our research of Putin's public speeches has shown that up to that point Putin's political agenda had been construed around war being waged against Russia by the West and NATO, which is clear from his use of the word in his first public address to Russian citizens on 24 Feb 2022.

We'll refer the results of the study to various legal acts such as the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1945 United Nations Charter in treating the threat and the use of force in international conflicts.

**Keywords:** performatives, euphemisms, declaration of war, Putin, the war in Ukraine

**Anzhelika Savchuk-Konarska**

Doctoral College of Political Science and Administration, Wrocław University


**POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN WARTIME. THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WAR NARRATIVE ON THE OFFICIAL INSTAGRAM'S OF VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY AND PETRO POROSHENKO**

The war in Ukraine has brought its correctives in political communication. The Instagram accounts of politicians Zelensky and Poroshenko have become a tool for informing/ Short speeches by the politicians quickly and easily reached the public, after which Ukrainians could learn more. The aim of the presentation is to analyze the medium information on the war (films, speeches, and photos) published by politicians. The paper partly coincides with the topic of the doctoral thesis on which the author is working. Methods used: comparative content analyse, historical narration, comparative analyse of social narration.

**Keywords:** social media, political communication, Poroshenko, war, Zelensky

**István Hegedűs**

Hungarian Europe Society



## WAR AND PEACE: POPULIST AND RADICAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SPREAD BY FIDESZ AND ITS LOYAL MEDIA IN HUNGARY

The Russian aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 created a new political moment in Hungary just a few weeks before the general elections. After a short hesitation, the right wing authoritarian populist ruling party under the leadership of Viktor Orbán has chosen a communication strategy that emphasised his desire for “peace”. Following previous successful polarising smear campaign methods, this time Fidesz labelled opposition politicians as the supporters of a “war” Hungarians have nothing to do with and who would “send our boys to a foreign country to die”.


Top government politicians could easily rely on the dominant and loyal segments of the state captured media that have spread and reiterated the centralised propaganda since its complete uniformisation after 2010, the year of political takeover and the beginning of an illiberal U-turn and democratic backsliding. Mobilising significant parts of the Hungarian electorate for support has been based on fear, anxiety, resentment as well as traditional provincialism mixed with new-fashioned radical right wing cultural identity politics.

Analysing the political communication methodology invented by the government we can detect the following techniques how to widen the cleavage between “us and them”, hence, the defenders of the nation “under attack” versus “Brussels”, “Soros” and their domestic “mercenaries” in an “era of multiple dangers”:


1. Attacking the old and new, internal and external “enemy of the people” through character-killing charges and invented conspiracy theories,
2. Framing events in accordance with an artificially constructed alternative reality where the government has desperately fought for its own country and countrymen whilst neglecting any facts and information that would challenge this simplistic concept,
3. Supplying ultra-conservative and alt-right ideological themes, perceptions and arguments to the audience as a guideline how to fight (back) against the assumed oppression by globalist liberal-minded elites and their domestic representatives,
4. Spreading Russian-friendly narratives in order to support Orbán’s geopolitical balancing “dance” between the Western democratic political community and emerging authoritarian systems in the world.

The relevance of the Hungarian government’s *Sonderweg* within the European Union and in the global political arena, including its communication tools and practices, cannot be underestimated especially since Putin’s attack against a sovereign nation and, as a consequence, the international “*Zeitenwende*”.

**Keywords:** political communication strategy, smear campaign, polarisation, cultural identity politics, opposition



<p><b>PANEL PCP-6: Reshaping transnational dependencies in the European Union’s periphery: changing policies and perceptions</b></p> <p><b>Panel Chair: Gergő Medve-Bálint</b></p>	<p><b>11:00 – 12:30</b></p> <p><b>E2</b></p>
<p><b>Imre Szabó</b> Central European University, Vienna</p> <p><b>Vera Scepanovic</b> Universiteit Leiden</p> <p><b>MANUFACTURING FOREVER – WHAT CAN THE EU LEARN FROM THE VISEGRAD FOUR ABOUT REBUILDING INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY</b></p> <p>In the Western ‘core’ countries the combination of climate concerns, energy crisis, and geopolitical competition has reignited efforts to rebuild domestic industrial capacities. As the prime location for manufacturing in Europe, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) seems well poised to benefit from this turn. Yet in some ways this seems like a rerun of the late transition period, when countries of this region succeeded in reversing de-industrialization through foreign investment and becoming tightly integrated into European production networks. The turn also comes amidst a shifting mood in the region, with actors from across the political spectrum questioning the region’s development model and sounding alarms about the ‘middle income trap’. In this paper, we study the policies CEE governments have put in place to respond to the shift in industrial policy at the European Union level. We examine the extent to which they continue, or depart from, the policies that supported industry in the past, and their potential to ensure more balanced growth. To that end, we look beyond manufacturing to understand the interaction between industrial policy and developments in other sectors, from environment to public services. Our findings help to understand how the lessons of the previous round of re-industrialization inform the decisions of CEE governments in the post-neoliberal era, as well as to sound a note of caution against re-industrialization as panacea to Europe’s competitiveness.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> industrial policy, re-industrialization, middle income trap, CEE</p>	
<p><b>Gergő Medve-Bálint</b> Corvinus University of Budapest and Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest</p> <p><b>OUT OF CONTROL: ENERGY DEPENDENCE AND THE GREEN (NON)TRANSITION IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES</b></p> <p>The Visegrad countries (V4) have so far been laggards in the green transition as their energy mix is largely based on fossil fuels, nuclear power, and other non-renewables. Most of these energy resources are supplied from abroad, leading to a high level of energy dependence in the V4. While the EU, and, most recently, large foreign investors urge the development of green energy, this external pressure meets low domestic political commitment to turn to renewables. Instead, V4 governments prefer to strengthen the incumbent power sector (coal</p>	



in Poland, coal and nuclear power in Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia) or turn to nuclear energy (Poland) which is expected to provide cheap power in the long run. The paper argues that a mix of political and security considerations rather than economic reasons drive the V4's so far limited achievements in green transition. Although shifting the energy mix towards renewables involves extremely high costs, expanding on traditional energy supplies is no less expensive. By committing to the incumbent power sector, V4 governments aim to retain domestic control over energy production and reduce the risks associated with the availability and reliability of green alternatives that are strongly dependent on foreign know-how and technology. However, as the paper shows, with this strategy, the V4 reinforces rather than mitigates its traditional vulnerability and dependence on imported raw materials and technology, thus, ultimately, power generation remains out of domestic control.

**Keywords:** green transition, energy policy, dependence, energy security, Visegrad states

**Sándor Kozák**

Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest

**Miklós Sebők**


Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest

**Anna Ürmössy**

Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest

**THE GERMAN ENABLERS OF ILLIBERALISM: THE CASE OF ORBÁN'S HUNGARY WITH MERKEL AND THE INDUSTRIAL LOBBY**

The most important political consequence of the global financial crisis has been the rise of a new wave of economic nationalism that challenges globalization and puts national sovereignty back at the forefront of policy-making. What is less explored, however, is the role of international enablers in these tendencies. Public and private actors, from governments to multinational companies, in advanced economies often pay lip service to the values of liberalism and democracy yet are perfectly happy to assist illiberal leaders and fledgling autocrats in building out their repressive orders. A case in point is Viktor Orbán's Hungary, a poster child of this new wave of such hybrid (illiberal or managed democratic) political systems. In this article, we explore how a key cluster of international enablers contributed to the nationalist overhaul of the Hungarian political economy. We separately explore the impact of the decisions of both Angela Merkel's governments and those of German industrialists in supporting and (less often) restraining the emergence of Orbán's illiberal political economy. We show how Orbán bought the support of German multinationals with excessive (that is: not widely distributed) state hand-outs and tax exemptions and how he relied on right-wing German politicians in solidifying his international status despite actions that ran contrary to the founding principles of the EU.



**Keywords:** economic nationalism, illiberalism, foreign investment, Hungary

**Visnja Vukov**  
University of Vienna

**RESHAPING DEPENDENCY THROUGH MULTIPLE CRISES: SPAIN IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT**

Crises are often seen as times when (semi-)peripheral countries lose the room for maneuver, increase their dependency, and succumb to the dictate of the core countries or international institutions. The global financial crisis of 2008 has been a perfect example of such dynamics in Southern Europe, with the core countries, the EU, and international financial institutions jointly imposing strict conditionality and reducing policy space for the Southern governments. Similarly, the Covid-19 pandemic is usually depicted as further increasing vulnerabilities of the South, particularly for Spain and Italy. This paper instead explores crises as opportunities for reshaping relations of dependency and increasing autonomy of peripheral states. Focusing on the case of Spain, the paper examines how the adjustments and policy responses to multiple crises at the domestic level, as well as negotiations at the European level reconfigure patterns of dependency and enable the repositioning of the state and the economy in transnational markets. The article focuses on the developments from the Eurozone crisis to the Russian invasion on Ukraine and examines transformations in three areas: diversification of dependency on distinct types and sources of capital inflows; changes in energy dependency, and efforts at reindustrialization and upgrading in manufacturing value chains. Contrary to the approaches that emphasize structural constraints in the peripheries and political divisions between the European North and South, the paper explores the conditions under which peripheral states can use different crises to increase their room for development and negotiate win-win settlements with the core countries.

**Keywords:** dependency, semi-periphery, crisis management, re-industrialization, Spain

**PANEL CP-6: Voter behaviour**

**11:00 – 12:30**


**Panel Chair: Andrija Henjak**

**E3**

**Bartul Vuksan-Ćusa**  
Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**Višeslav Raos**  
Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

**THE WHEEL OF TIME: AN AGE, PERIOD, AND COHORT ANALYSIS OF VOTER BEHAVIOR IN A POST-COMMUNIST CONTEX**



Due to availability of longitudinal survey data, most studies of generational differences in voter behavior have so far been focused on Western Europe. This paper fills this gap by placing generational voter research in a specific post-communist context of the Central and Eastern Europe. The data used in this paper stems from Croatian National Electoral Studies (CroNES), a series of pre- and post-electoral nationally representative field surveys covering the 1990-2020 period. The paper tests intergenerational differences in voter behavior by look at the interaction of predictors of cleavage voting and age, period, and cohort effects, regarding the likelihood to support a given political party. The article looks at key determinants of cleavage voting, such as religiosity, income, education, partisanship and left-right self-identification, as well as the influence of historical legacy of World War II. The article proposes a novel periodization of cohorts which is rooted in shared generational experiences of key events and processes that have shaped political socialization. These pertain to pre-socialist socialization (i.e., before World War II and one-party communist rule), early socialist socialization (mid-1940s to mid-1960s), mature socialist socialization (mid-1960s to 1980, i.e., Tito's death), late socialist socialization (1980s), and post-socialist socialization (after the 1989-1991 democratic transition). The paper disentangles age, period, and cohort effects by restraining age and cohort effects according to age groups (lifecycle effect) and political generations, while allowing period (survey year) effects to vary freely.

**Keywords:** political socialization; generational voting; voter behavior; post-communist party system

**Olivera Komar**

Faculty of political science, University of Montenegro

**Slaven Živković**


University of Mainz

### **SAME OLD, SAME OLD: ATTITUDES OF MONTENEGRIN CITIZENS ABOUT RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION ON UKRAINE**

The main political cleavage in Montenegro, opposing attitudes towards Montenegro's statehood and national identity can be traced back to the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Since then, the cleavage persisted taking different forms and shapes, and often manifesting itself in various issues, depending on time and saliency of different political events, but remained the most important predictor of group political behavior in the country. The constant reconsideration on whether a country should be independent and in what form, strongly influences politics and country's stance on important foreign relations topics. War in Ukraine is no exception.

The paper is looking into to what extent the attitudes of the citizens of Montenegro towards Russian aggression on Ukraine correlates with the main political cleavage in the country. While Montenegro aligned its policy with EU on war in Ukraine, we argue that citizens' opinion about this issue is polarized along the lines of country's main cleavage.

To test the hypothesis on the high correlation between the two, the authors will use the third edition of the Montenegrin National Electoral Study which is scheduled to run after the parliamentary elections. We expect that support for Russia strongly correlates with negative attitudes towards Montenegrin national identity, and support for Ukraine to strongly correlate with those who perceive Montenegrin national identity as undisputable. We tend to explain these opinion patterns, and factors that lead to this strong polarization, arguing



that the role of Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro is crucial for the rising cleavage on this issue.

**Keywords:** Montenegro, Ukraine, cleavage politics, national identity

**Boglárka Koller**

Department of European Studies, University of Public Service, Budapest

### COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CITIZENS' VIEW ON DEMOCRACY IN CEE MEMBER STATES OF THE EU

This paper provides a comparative analysis of democracy perceptions in eleven Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States of the European Union in the crisis years of 2020-22. Democracy's pre-existing problems in Central and Eastern Europe, have been affected by recent crises, such as the COVID19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. The economic recession, the energy crisis and rising inflation could also threaten faith in democracy, especially in a region that is geographically close to the war zone.

The underlying assumption of this paper is that individuals could have a significant role in preventing democratic backsliding. Citizens' perceptions of the functioning of the democracy affect how they vote at elections, what institutions they trust, and what policy decisions they accept or reject. Consequently, analyzing the views of individuals on democracy is of paramount importance for the survival of democracy as a whole and the protection of democratic values in the Union. Since, the political systems of the Member States are embedded in the unique, supranational political system of the EU, democracy perceptions can be measured both at country and EU levels. Are CEE nationals satisfied with the way democracy functions at country and EU-levels? Do they believe that their voice counts in their country and in the EU? What are the main components of democracy according to the people? What do they think about free elections, freedom of speech, equal rights? What institutions do they trust at national and EU levels? And at last, but not least how do they value democracy in crisis times? My paper aims to provide answers to these questions by building on recent results of Eurobarometer surveys on these issues as well as results of other surveys on perceptions of democracy.

**Keywords:** democracy, perception, public opinion, EU citizens, Central and Eastern Europe, European Union

**Filip Kostelka**

EUI

**Lukáš Linek**


Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences

**Jan Rovný**

Sciences Po Paris

**Michael Škvrňák**

Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences



## VOTER TURNOUT AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN THE POST-COMMUNIST CONTEXT

Does democratic dissatisfaction fuel electoral abstentionism in Central and Eastern Europe? So far, this common assumption, frequently echoed in the media and pundits' accounts, has received little empirical scrutiny. In particular, it has not been studied using panel data that would measure satisfaction with democracy both before and after elections. Individual-level evidence, if any, has mostly come from post-election surveys in which association between participation and satisfaction may stem from a causally reversed relationship (i.e., from participation to satisfaction). In addition, this study investigates these relationships in the context of the two-round presidential election in the Czech Republic. Thus, different effects of participation in the first and second round of election and voting for various winning and losing candidates can be investigated. This preregistered study fills this gap and investigates the relationship between voter turnout, candidate choice, election outcome, and satisfaction in the post-communist context. Drawing on the existing literature, it formulates five hypotheses and tests them using an original four-wave panel dataset collected around the 2023 Czech presidential election.

**Keywords:** Elections, Electoral Behaviour, Political Participation, Voting Behaviour, Voting

**PANEL PT-7: Violence, conflict and political identity**

**14:30 – 16:00**

**Panel Chair: Domagoj Vujeva**

**B2**

**Luka Ribarević**


Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

### IN THE BEGINNING, WAS THERE VIOLENCE? THOMAS HOBBS'S KINGDOM OF GOD

In his civil philosophy, Hobbes differentiates between the two types of state. The first one is the state by institution. It is founded on a social contract between the future subjects consenting to lay down their rights and authorize the sovereign as their common representative. The second is the state by acquisition. Its main characteristic, which sets it apart from the state by institution, is that it is acquired by force that the future sovereign wields.

With this distinction in mind, I turn to Part III of *Leviathan*, "Of a Christian Commonwealth", where Hobbes provides a systematic account of the Jewish Commonwealth. Since Hobbes sought a Biblical justification for his theory of a sovereign state in the Old Testament, that kingdom plays an important role in *Leviathan*.

My intention in the paper is to identify the kind of the state that was established by Abrahamic and Sinai covenants – was it a state by institution or rather a state by acquisition? Answering this question entails a discussion of the place that force and consent play in the establishment of the state which could be providing a model of a perfect constitution since its sovereign was none other than God himself.



**Keywords:** Hobbes, Leviathan, Old Testament, covenant, the state

**Szilvia Horváth**

Institute of Political Science, Eötvös Loránd University

### FROM STASIS TO AGON: POLITICAL THEORY, THE OTHER, AND THE POST-STASIS CONDITION

Over-politicization and polarization of societies is perhaps the most important experiences of present-time societies, especially in Central Europe. We have also witnessed the hybridization of regimes in the region, or authoritarian-like turns, like in Hungary. This experience offers an opportunity to rethink the philosophical value of stasis, or civil war, in the context of a democratically contained rivalry or agonism. The role of the Other is generally crucial both practically, as the excluded and theoretically, as the constitutive outside. In a polarized discourse, the Other has the traits of the enemy, which addresses how the Other is perceived in the differing perspectives of either the regime or its opposition. Posing this question offers a glimpse into the actual existence of the most radical point the political can embrace and helps us to understand the ambivalent nature of the Other. What happens when the Other is not just a friendly interlocutor but an enemy who wants to destroy one's position? And vice versa, what happens when the Other is not just an enemy, but someone morally and politically equivalent to us, who can have a voice and be right? These reflect on a civil war-like situation or stasis and a post-stasis condition, where people seek reconciliation with the Other and reconstitute the divided polis. At this point, the main concern is a political ontology of stasis and agonism. The ambivalence problem read into the context of how the political can be defined helps us explore what ontological otherness looks like in agonism.

**Keywords:** antagonism, civil war, the ontology of the political, democratic agonism


**Laura Gheorghiu**

Karl Franzens University Graz

### THE ANATOMY OF TWO META-POLITICAL IDENTITIES

Sometimes nationalism has to face *real-politik*. The way it responds, the way it is willing to adjust arguments and incentives determines not just a chain of facts, but the profile to display for the coming political era. The novelty of the present war in Ukraine is that the nationalists' bells are rung in by voices from a fake national choir. Simulating a revival of grass-roots claims, these actors play in a trans-national movie, similarly to their opposites. The debate unfolds between two double-faced kind of actors: some of them speaking about sovereignty without being merely sovereigntists while the others pretending to defend the domestic realm while offering it to external strategies. It is almost an inverted (Lacanian?) scenario in which each voice speaks an inverted language.

I claim that the deep change of paradigm we just witness, relates to crossing beyond the territorial borders into ideological ones. This way, the core terms of nationalism and sovereignty gain new, de-territorialized semantics: a nation represents a group of people



talking the same ideological language and envisaging the same ideological tools to protect it, while sovereignty relates to an ideological area suspected to cover a given territory where a majority of population supports the narrative. It all looks like a meta-political language, each side carving its discourse out of a plurality of legal and political layers. I seek to follow and describe the anatomy of these two new political idioms as they come out of the war in Ukraine.

**Keywords:** nationalism, sovereignty, de-territorialisation, meta-language, ideological identity

**Hrvoje Cvijanović**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

### WORLD WAR Z: RUSCISM AND RUSSIAN DECOLONIZATION

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022 with its already prepared empty symbolism of the Z letter radiating a mystic power of evil, the “Russian world” (Russkiy mir) ideology, or what is also known as Ruscism - a concept describing radical Russian nationalism with the elements of fascism - becomes fundamental for understanding Russian war, not only in Ukraine, but also Russian war against the West and the Western values. The aim of this paper is to discuss Russian imperial renaissance as a historical mission and fate of Russia. In one of his speeches, Putin divides the world to colonies and metropolises, invoking Carl Schmitt’s “pluriverse” theory where the international law is just a form of domination of those who can impose order to others. This “sovereignist” challenge to the world order not only reflects Russia’s self-understanding of being a *katechon*, or “the one to withhold” the last evil in the world, but also it becomes a narrative of decolonisation - the process of dismantling the political, economic, and cultural systems established by colonial powers - where Russia legitimises its invasion by basically turning its necropolitics into the victimization narrative, something receptive to the Global South and Western anti-imperialist Left. In that sense, one of the most important task today is to elucidate the real meaning behind Russian decolonization as a need to address both the legacy of imperial expansion and colonisation, which has often being marked by violence, oppression, and exploitation of Russian necropolitics.

**PANEL IRSS-7: Foreign policies and bilateral international relations**

**Panel Chair: Petar Popović**


**14:30 – 16:00**

**B3**

**Jan Niemiec**

Jagiellonian University in Kraków





## CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN POST-PANDEMIC TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE WESTERN BALKANS

The scientific goal of this proposed paper is to analyse the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Turkey's approach towards the Western Balkan states (i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia). After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey has attempted to increase its international influence. Western Balkans region, with which Turks maintain strong historical and ethnic ties, has thus become one of the key areas in the AKP's foreign policy doctrine. As a model of regional cooperation based on socio-cultural community did not bring expected results, the Turkish government has focused on developing economic cooperation with Western Balkans. In this context, this proposed paper aims at answering the research question of how the Covid-related phenomena and processes affect the development of relations between Turkey and the countries of the region. Having employed available original sources (official documents, public reports, interviews and speeches of AKP politicians) as well as literature on the subject (academic publications, policy briefs), the most decisive factors shaping Turkish foreign policy towards the Western Balkans have been identified. An analysis of semi-structured expert interviews with relevant stakeholders from Western Balkan countries (including think tank researchers, NGO activists, academics) was also crucial for this research. Based on qualitative research methodology (e.g. content analysis, political discourse analysis, process tracing method), this paper seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of Turkey's involvement in the region, and attempts to predict future trends in Turkish foreign policy towards the Western Balkans.

**Keywords:** Turkey, Western Balkans, foreign policy analysis, regional cooperation, Covid-19 pandemic

**Miklós Teszáry**


Eötvös Loránd University

## FROM ORTHODOX BROTHERS TO STEPBROTHERS? MONTENEGRO-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF THE UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN WAR 2014 – 2022

The research presents the changes in Montenegrin-Russian relations over the last eight years. Although for Moscow, Podgorica has been a traditional ally in the Western Balkans, in the past decade the relationship between the two countries has been affected by a number of key issues. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Podgorica's accession to the sanctions regime foreshadowed the slow drift that has characterized relations between the two countries in recent years. The most crucial point in the relationship between the two countries has been Montenegro's accession to NATO over the last decade. Although the process of NATO accession had been on the agenda since 2006, for Russia, preventing the country's integration became a key issue by the 2010s. The context of the Kremlin's motivation can be fully understood by examining Russia's presence in the Mediterranean and the 2016 coup attempt in Montenegro. As well as the so-called 'Church Law' of 2019, one of the supposed intentions of which was to reduce Russian influence in the Black Mountain country. However, Moscow's influence has been significantly reduced following Montenegro's accession to NATO, while the country remains a haven for many Russian citizens since the

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*Financially supported by the Faculty of Political Science University of Zagreb, Ministry of Science and Education and the Student Center of Dubrovnik*



Russian invasion in 2022, thanks to its 'golden passport' system. During the 2010s, extremist paramilitary groups, often linked to Russia, such as the Serbian Honour, the Night Wolves, or the Balkan Cossack Army, whose (re)formation was held in Kotor, Montenegro, have been increasingly active in the Western Balkans.

The research will look at the relationship between the two countries from the Montenegrin perspective, examining the gradual transformation of Russian influence from the early 2010s until the end of 2022.

**Keywords:** Russian, Montenegro, Bilateral relations, Geopolitics, NATO Accession

**Brucker Balázs**

CERS, Institute of Regional Studies

**THE END OF POLISH-HUNGARIAN FRIENDSHIP? THE EFFECT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE ON SISTER CITY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HUNGARY AND POLAND**

Before the war, Poland had the strongest relations with Hungary. Budapest was not only its most important partner in the region, but it was one its most important partners in the EU. This alliance was based on several strategic factors (sovereignty, Euroscepticism, migration, Russia etc.). The political similarities of Poland and Hungary were so strong that PiS even tolerated the Hungarian Prime Minister's close relationships with Russia.

However, thin red line was crossed after the Russian aggression on Ukraine. Hungary and Poland are making different approaches to the war in Ukraine. While Poland sees Moscow as the greatest threat to its security, Hungary maintained a highly unambiguous pro-Russian position towards the conflict. Therefore, the Hungarian position was criticized by the Polish Prime Minister who confirmed that Hungary and Poland are on separate path.

Although the diplomacy is traditionally associated with the operation of the state, in contemporary times, states are no longer the only entities participating in international relations. Along with states, sub-state actors (regions, counties, cities) have emerged. And this sub-national diplomacy does not necessarily follow the direction changes of diplomacy at the national level...

The objective of my research is to present the effect of the war in Ukraine on the city diplomacy relations of the capital, Budapest (led by the opposition) and two other minor cities (one led by the opposition parties, and one other by the governing parties) with Polish cities.


**Keywords:** Hungary, Poland, diplomatic relations, city diplomacy, sister cities

**Péter Kacziba**

Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Pécs

**THE NEXUS BETWEEN POPULISM AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF HUNGARY**

The aim of the presentation and the related research is to identify the link between populism and public diplomacy by analysing the Hungarian case study. To reach this goal, the presentation will outline initial results from a research project analysing the Hungarian



government’s digital public diplomacy on Twitter in 2021 and 2022. The research collected the 40 most active and followed governmental users on Twitter, retrieved their two-year-long posting activities, and analysed the collected data through structure, content, and sentiment analysis. From these three, the presentation will outline results of the content analysis which aimed to detect the most important topics and narratives of Hungarian Twitter diplomacy and assumed that they resemble the populist narratives of domestic political communication. The content analysis had two stages. Firstly, an automated concept analysis using Atlas.ti detected prevalent narratives in the retrieved dataset. Secondly, based on these initial findings, a manual and semi-automated coding process filtered populist contents in the retrieved Twitter posts. Eventually, the results of the second phase revealed a somewhat unexpected result: the findings of the content analysis showed that the Hungarian digital public diplomacy differs from the domestic communication in the sense that it contains populist narratives only to a limited extent. The analysis concluded that Hungary used two parallel communication strategies in its public diplomacy: domestic figureheads of the government used populist narratives, while officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade adopted a functional approach, discussing mainly neutral, bilaterally important issues and cultural topics. With this conclusion the presentation will argue that public diplomacy cannot fully implement populist narratives, as the usage of such communication practices could undermine the very purpose of public diplomacy.

**Keywords:** populism, public diplomacy, content analysis, Hungary

**PANEL PC-7: War, disinformation and propaganda**

**14:30 – 16:00**

**Panel Chair: Pero Maldini**

**B4**


**Viktor Denisenko**

General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania

**THE DISCOURSE OF “PEACE” IN KREMLIN PROPAGANDA IN THE  
CONTEXT OF RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE: THE CASE OF  
BALTNEWS**

Russia began an open war against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. It continues hidden (hybrid) aggression which Moscow started implementing in 2014. Propaganda become an integrated part of aggression since the beginning. Moscow uses it for multiple purposes: to make influence the society of Ukraine (i.e. in Crimea in 2014), to raise support for Kremlin decisions inside Russia, to justify abroad Moscow's decisions etc.

The topic of “peace” is important in the context of Kremlin war propaganda. Peter Pomerantsev compared Kremlin propaganda to the “hall of (carnival) mirrors”. This propaganda is changing the nature of context, including the meaning of the words and definitions. The concept of “peace” is no exception in the mentioned process. Kremlin propaganda is trying to represent Russia (which is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine) as a peaceful country giving peace and prosperity to its new (occupied) territories. In other words, the conception of “peace” is one of the tools the Kremlin is using in “war against reality”.



The discourse of “peace” will be presented using publications of the outlet *Baltnews*. This media was created in 2014 undercover (officially registered in the Netherlands) as a media outlet for Russian-speaking inhabitants of the Baltic states. *Baltnews* link to Russian state media was discovered in 2017. Publications of *Baltnews* represent the main narratives of Kremlin propaganda.

**Keywords:** propaganda, information warfare, discourse, Russia, Ukraine

**Marko Roško**

University of Dubrovnik

**Sandra Buratović Maštrapa**

University of Dubrovnik

**Monika Cverlin**

University of Dubrovnik

### **WAR IN UKRAINE: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF FAKTOGRAF'S FACT CHECKS**

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, disinformation has proliferated across various online platforms, including social media, online media, and social networks. Despite the presence of several global fact-checking organizations, Croatia only has one such entity, Faktograf.hr. Faktograf is a non-profit online media outlet specialized in fact-checking in the public space and is also a member of the International Fact-Checking Network, along with other regional entities. It has been operating in Croatia since 2015 and has fact-checked numerous topics, ranging from conspiracy theories in the political spectrum to disinformation related to COVID-19. Currently, one of its main focuses is the war in Ukraine. Faktograf's live blog is dedicated to updating and addressing disinformation surrounding the war in Ukraine that is circulating within Croatia's online space. This article aims to identify the types of disinformation that Faktograf fact-checks, their sources, narratives and targets. Faktograf has identified around 110 instances of disinformation related to the war in Ukraine in the first year of the conflict. By utilizing a quantitative approach and performing content analysis on all the fact-checks from the first year of the Ukraine war, the article seeks to determine the prevailing type of disinformation in Croatia's online environment.


**Keywords:** disinformation, online media, fact-checks, Faktograf.hr, war in Ukraine

**Krisztina Juhász**

Department of Political Science, University of Szeged

### **EU DEFENSIVE DEMOCRACY VERSUS SHARP POWER. THE RESPONSES OF THE EU TO DISINFORMATION**

Action against disinformation has become a central topic within the European Union since the mid-2010s due to the information operations mainly linked to the Russian Federation, which it used during the hybrid warfare in Ukraine in 2014 and with which it attempted to



influence the Brexit referendum and the presidential election in the United States of America in 2016, the 2017 French presidential election or the 2019 EP election.

In response, the European Union introduced a number of measures, such as the Eastern Strategic Communication Working Group, the Western Balkans, and the Southern Working Groups operating as part of the Strategic Communication and Information Analysis Department or the setting up of the Disinformation Rapid Alert System. In 2018, the Commission's Action Plan against Disinformation was adopted, and a code of practice for social platforms was developed in order to curb disinformation spreading on social media. The European Action Plan for Democracy, published in December 2020, aimed to further develop the code of practice based on voluntarism, moving away from the self-regulation approach, and intending to create an EU regulatory framework, giving the EU more room for manoeuvre in the fight against disinformation. Accordingly, the Commission submitted its proposal for a regulation on the single market for digital services to the co-legislators on December 15, 2020.

The purpose of the presentation is to interpret the phenomenon of foreign disruption, including information operations and disinformation, within the framework of the sharp power concept that appeared in the second half of the 2010s. On the other hand, during the review and analysis of the EU's responses, relying on the theoretical framework of militant, or in other words, defensive democracy, it intends to go around questions: whether the concept of militant democracy can be applied as regards the European Union, what tools the EU uses to neutralize foreign disturbance and disinformation, and to what extent these steps affect the basic values and freedoms that are the essence of democracy.

**Keywords:** EU, militant democracy, sharp power, disinformation

**Romualdas Povilaitis**

Vytautas Magnus University

### **CONTRADICTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY ASSESSMENT IN NEW MEDIA (THE CASE OF LITHUANIA)**


The purpose of the study is to reveal the peculiarities of the assessment of Lithuania's foreign policy in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Theoretical and practical significance: study of the political culture of the population; form the reaction of the political elite to the assessment of foreign policy in the public sphere.

Literature and sources: Lithuanian political scientists and counter-propaganda specialists (E. Vaitkevičiūtė (Dictionary of Propaganda, 2017); V. Sinica (Lessons of the Ukrainian War, 2023), etc., analysis of social networks and websites.

Research:

1. Media overview. Internet portals: (Delfi. Lietuvos rytas, Respublika, Optv, bukimevieningi.lt, etc.) are distinguished by their loyalty or disloyalty to the politics of the political elite (Government, Seimas, President).
2. Classification of contradictory arguments (extreme Russophobia: "Russians are a bad, incorrigible nation", radical Russophilia: "the USA started a war in Ukraine, Lithuania was occupied by NATO" (corresponds to Russian propaganda).
3. Contradictions and reasons for a critical approach to Lithuania's foreign policy:
  - a) objective or partially objective criticism:
    - underestimating the consequences of actions, not knowing the attitudes of the population, poor preparation for national defense by one's own forces, etc.



- different values: transfer of globalization ideology and practice to Lithuania, weak defense of national interests,
  - fear that the political elite will take advantage of the war in Ukraine and limit democracy.
- b) biased criticism:
- preconceived negative opinion and distrust of the elite, dissatisfaction with social policy, which is equated with foreign policy,
  - Influence of Russia and Belarus (through the media, personal),
  - business problems due to sanctions against Russia and Belarus,
  - fear of immigrants from Ukraine.

Pro-Russian provocateurs exploit all negative attitudes.

#### 4. Relevance

The inconsistency of foreign policy assessments divides society. This is the goal of Russia's information war against Lithuania. It is important: to seek greater support of the political elite, intolerance of pro-Russian propaganda and anti-state activities, the ability to expose them, to understand the identity of the interests of Lithuania and Ukraine today, to predict the population's reaction to Russian aggression in Lithuania.

5. A few conclusions: criticism of the elite is twofold: a) for too little security preparation, b) for too much support for Ukraine. Distrust of the elite weakens support for Ukraine, but support for Ukraine strengthens the position of the elite in Lithuania. Relevant: is it possible to limit democracy due to the activities of pro-Russian opponents? When? To what degree?

**Keywords:** War, media, public opinion, foreign policy

### PANEL PCP-7: The politics of numbers and rhetoric of indices

14:30 – 16:00

**Panel Chair: Heino Nyssönen**  
**Panel Co-Chair: Jussi Metsälä**


**E2**

#### Heino Nyssönen

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku

### POLITICS OF REFERENDUMS IN NATIONS IN TRANSIT

This paper examines the referendum practices in cases where the tradition of democracy is already inherently weak or incomplete. The research material consists of the so-called Nations in Transit countries, or the 29 post-communist countries of Central Europe and Eurasia. The paper asks what kind of referendums have been held over the last three decades in these countries and applies the theory of “plebiscitary leader democracy” (PLD) to analyse them. While previous research has looked at referendums primarily from Western perspectives and data, the critical perspective of this article highlights referendums as means of gaining legitimacy for authoritarian leadership and as power politics between parties. We have created four different categories, focusing in particular on the more than thirty referendums meant to increase the power of political leadership and initiated by political leaders themselves. Although the role of referendums is often emphasized as a means of measuring public opinion or government policy, their use as a means of achieving undemocratic purposes is particularly emphasized when looking at the EU's eastern borders



and the countries of the Western Balkans and Central Asia. It seems that the farther we move eastwards from Central Europe, the more common the use and manipulation of referendums as a means of authoritarian power aspirations are.

**Jussi Metsälä**

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku

**Heino Nyysönen**

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku

**RHETORIC OF NUMBERS: EIGHT INDICES IN COMPARISON**


The paper examines the role of competition and measuring through eight well-known international indices. The research object is all the countries of the world, and the analysis is based on Kenneth Burke’s rhetoric of hierarchies. The rankings of every country are tabulated, proportioned to the index measuring the state of democracy and arranged into ascending order according to the average value of all the eight rankings combined. Even though the use of various indices for the purpose of comparing different states has been criticised for their politized nature and sheer abundance, we claim that the amalgamation of several indices into single “rhetoric of the numbers” has importance in both producing new knowledge and avoidance of disinformation. Because of the extensive material, we have focused only on the best and worst performers and occasionally on the “black swans”, or on states, which have rankings that somehow deviate from the other rankings of that state. In this paper competition is seen from the perspective of IR as a sort of “involuntary sports”, that has importance for both those that succeed and those that do not. The most triumphant states in the overall competition are also the most successful ones in the individual indices, whereas the situation of the weakest state is not as distinct.

**Jarosław Jańczak**


Adam Mickiewicz University and European University Viadrina

**BORDERS, MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES. RHETORIC OF NUMBERS IN THE CONTEXT OF WEST–EAST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEBATE(S)**

Statistical approach to (im)migration and exile issues are one of the most dominant dimensions of the EUropean debate, revealing the east-west cleavages and serving as a starting point (as well as explanation) of broader processes, especially related to the right wing radicalism, autocratization tendencies and Euroscepticism. They have significantly intensified together with the immigration crises in 2015 and the Russian invasion over Ukraine in 2022, leading to radicalization of domestic debates in many of the European states and forcing the European Union to face new challenges. The aim of this paper is to overview dominant narratives in statistical approach to immigration and refugees issues, as well as comparative analysis of construction and deconstruction of quantitative argumentations about the EUropean project from the perspective of borders and human flows. Critical approach shall reveal not only normative, historical and interest-based aspects of the investigated processes, but also mechanisms of misinterpretation (or even manipulation), defining the spaces for qualitative approach application possibility and necessity.



<b>PANEL CP-7: Political institutions</b>	<b>14:30 – 16:00</b>
<b>Panel Chair: Petr Just</b>	<b>E3</b>
<p><b>Krisztián Máté Lukács</b> Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem – ELTE</p> <p><b>BOUND TO FOLLOW? COMPARISON OF REGIMES WITH THE THEORY OF PLEBISCITARIAN LEADER DEMOCRACY IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REGION</b></p> <p>Recently, it has been a polarising topic to classify regimes that can no longer adhere to the requirements of traditional liberal democracy. One of the theories that can be used to describe some aspects of the regimes in the contested territory is the theory of „plebiscitarian leader democracy”, which is based on the writings of Weber. Numerous single-country case studies have been done before based on this theory. However, only a handful of them attempted to compare these characteristics of certain regimes, let alone with a focus on the Central European region. This paper aims to fill this void and highlight the key similarities and differences of democratic deconsolidation in the region. In this paper, I am going to compare the formation of regimes in the region that can be classified as plebiscitarian leader democracy. Furthermore, I am going to compare characteristics and circumstances such as the source of charisma, the political discourse, the accountability, and the institutional changes executed by the leader of each country. During the comparison, I am examining the regimes such as Babis’s, Fico’s, Kaczyński’s, and Orbán’s.</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b> democratic deconsolidation, populism, democracy-theory, personalization of politics</p>	
<p><b>Jan Hruška</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University</p> <p><b>Stanislav Balík</b> Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University</p> <p><b>SAME JOB, DIFFERENT APPROACHES: ALTERNATIVE ROLES OF UPPER CHAMBERS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CZECH SENATORS</b></p> <p>Even though upper chambers have always struggled to justify their existence, research on bicameralism has focused primarily on the composition and powers of upper chambers. Recently, however, attention has shifted to the issue of the legitimacy of upper chambers, which has become an important dimension of the concept of bicameralism (Russel, 2013). In this regard, it is of great importance to examine the perceptions of citizens and the perceptions of the office holders themselves. The latter is the focus of our research, which uses the case of the Czech upper chamber – the Senate. The Czech case is interesting as there</p>	



are several alternative roles for the Senate existing side by side, even though it was not envisaged by the framers of the constitution and the institution does not possess adequate powers.

Our research seeks to answer the following questions. What is the role of the upper house from the perspective of the senators themselves? Do senators' perceptions correspond to the actual powers of the institution? Moreover, how can senators perform a role for which senators are not endowed with any powers? To answer these questions, we collect new data in the form of semi-structured interviews with approximately 18 senators. The data collected will be subjected to content analysis.

Our study also aims to show a difference in perception between citizens (our previous research) and senators. This potential difference can negatively affect trust in the institution and its legitimacy, as the perception difference can result in unfulfilled citizen expectations. It could be a reasonable explanation for the long-term problematically low turnout in Senate elections. Our study also contributes to research on the exercise of public office, in particular, showing the means by which office holders can influence politics beyond the instruments strictly defined by the constitution and laws.

**Keywords:** bicameralism, office holders, parliaments, semi-structured interviews, upper chambers

**Michael Drašar**

Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University


### WHO HOLD THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES? COMPARISON OF TWO EUROPEAN REGIONS

Many studies and articles summarize the composition of parliament or governments from the sociological perspective (age, education, etc.). Nevertheless, the area of the composition of heads of states is not researched so much. The aim of the paper is to describe the basic sociological characteristics of European directly elected presidents after 1989 and compare their trends in two European regions. For the paper two research questions are defined:

- 1) What do basic development trends look like when it comes to age, education, previous political experience, and gender of European presidents in the period after 1989?
- 2) How do these sociological characteristics differ in the region of traditional Western European democracies and in the region of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe?

In the introduction of the paper the topic and its importance will be introduced. The second chapter will focus on the literature review and will map the current state of knowledge in the composition of constitutional offices or parliamentary assemblies. The next part of the article will introduce the methodology and sources of data. The fourth chapter will briefly summarize the history of direct presidential election in the European continent. The analytical part of the paper will map the basic sociological characteristics of European presidents – age, education, previous political experience, and gender. After that, the results will be described in trends after 1989 and compared in two European regions – traditional Western democracies and post-communist Europe. In the conclusion, the results of the analysis will be summarized and evaluated.

**Keywords:** presidents, sociological characteristics, Europe, comparison, direct presidential election



**Przemysław Żukiewicz**

University of Wrocław

**LEGISLATIVE PARTY SWITCHING AS A THREAT TO DEMOCRACY IN  
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: MYTH OR FACT?**

Legislative party switching in Central and Eastern European parliaments varies widely. In some countries – such as the Czech Republic – deputies change their party quite rarely. In others – such as Poland and Lithuania – the changes are frequent and involve up to a third of MPs. Especially in the latter cases, the ‘migrations’ of MPs can be significant and impact the composition of parties between government and opposition. Because party switching can cause instability and become a basis for political corruption, there are opinions that it should be forbidden to change the affiliation of MPs during the parliamentary term of office. In short: some experts are inclined to regard party switching as a breach of the electoral contract and a threat to the stability of democracy.

Using the very latest database on party switching in Central and Eastern Europe, I’m going to prove that legislative party switching has no impact on the quality of democracy. On the contrary, the ban on legislative party switching strengthens the position of party leaders and has the effect of weakening the bond of voters with their representatives.